cannot at this time agree upon a definition of the doubtful cases, they agree at least (with one exception, which has been noticed) that in all cases of the seizure of such articles as contraband, full compensation shall be made to the end that in doubtful cases, the inconvenience being thereby much lessened, the danger of rupture may be diminished by inclining the party which conceives itself injured to acquiesce in the pecuniary compensation.

But though I have no doubt that this is the true and genuine sense of the clause, and that it does by no means warrant the construction put upon it, yet as it may possibly become the pretext of abuses on the side of Great Britain, and of complaint on that of France, I should have liked the treaty better without it. On the whole, I think this article the worst in the treaty, except the 12th, though not defective enough to be an objection to its adoption.

Articles XIX. and XX. These articles require no comment. They are usual and every way unexceptionable provisions.

Article XXI. This article is liable to no just objection. The first part of it restrains generally the citizens of each party from participating in hostilities against the other. This is implied in the leading article of every treaty of peace, is conformable with every moral idea-and though more comprehensive in the extent of the inhibition, is agreeable to the principle of the law of Congress on this subject.

It is also agreeable to the true policy of the United States, which is, to keep its citizens as much as possible from being implicated in the quarrels and contests of other nations, in foreign feelings, interests and prejudices. This is an idea of great importance to our security in various ways. The only case, if at all, in which it can be our interest that our citizens should engage in foreign service, is that of young men of education entering into foreign service to acquire military knowledge and experience.

But it is conceived that the doing of this in time of peace is not forbidden. The citizens of each party are not to accept commissions from, nor to be permitted to be enlisted by, the enemies of the other. This seems to suppose a state of war when the forbidden act is done. The punishment for infractions of this

part of the article is referred to the laws of the party whose citizens commit them. No precise one is defined.

The latter part of the clause subjects to the penalties of piracy the citizens of one party accepting commissions from the enemy of the other for arming any vessel to act as a privateer.

A similar provision is to be found in all our commercial treaties heretofore made, and is familiar in the commercial treaties of other powers during the present century. It has wisely become the policy of nations to confine the mischievous practice of privateering to the belligerent parties. This is peculiarly our true policy; as from situation the contrary would never fail to compromise our peace.

It is to be observed that this crime of piracy does not extend to land service, nor to service on board of public ships of war, commonly called men-of-war.

Article XXII. This is a reasonable and usual provision in affirmance of the laws of nations, and calculated to prevent war.

Article XXIII. This article merely stipulates those rights of hospitality which the courtesy and humanity of nations owe to each other, and which it has been the endeavor of our government to observe. It does not extend to privateers, which are never denominated ships of war, and consequently does not interfere with our treaty with France as hitherto interpreted and acted upon.

Articles XXIV. and XXV. These articles, which are compatible with the rules of neutrality and the rights of belligerent nations, are becoming formulas in most modern treaties. They are to be found essentially in our treaties with France, Sweden, and partly if not wholly in that with Prussia, and in the treaty of 1786 between France and Great Britain. They stipulate:

I. That the enemies of one party shall not arm their privateers in the ports of the other.

II. That they shall not sell their prizes there.

III. That they shall not be allowed to purchase more provisions than are sufficient to carry them to the nearest port of the prince or state to which they belong.

IV. That the ships of war or privateers of the two contracting

parties may carry whithersoever they please the prizes made of their respective enemies, without being obliged on entering the ports of each other to pay fees, or being detained or seized or subject to search, except to prevent infractions of the laws of revenue, navigation, and commerce, or having cognizance taken of the validity of their prizes, and with free liberty to depart to the places mentioned in their commissions which they are to show.

V. That no shelter or refuge shall be given to such as have made prizes of each other's ships or vessels, but if forced by stress of weather to enter, their departure is to be hastened.

VI. That while the parties continue in amity, they will make no future treaty inconsistent with these two articles. But there is this express proviso, that nothing in the treaty shall be construed or operate contrary to former and existing public treaties with other sovereigns or states.

Hence while on the one hand these articles make no unreasonable stipulations in favor of Great Britain, they can by no possibility interfere with prior stipulations to France or any other power. If, consequently, there is any repugnancy, the treaty with Great Britain must give way to those prior treaties. There is only one particular in the conduct hitherto observed towards France in which the treaty with Great Britain will produce an alteration, that is the selling of prizes in our ports; because this indulgence has been granted not upon the ground of any obligation to do it to be found in our treaty with France, but upon that of there being no law of the United States against it. The 24th article of the present treaty will be a law against it, and will restrain it.

But nothing can be more proper; and I well remember, that when it was concluded to permit the selling of prizes, it was unanimously regretted that the Executive, for want of law, could not do otherwise. Because the measure had an unneutral aspect, permitting to one party a military advantage which our treaty with that party did not leave us at liberty to extend to the other; and was of very questionable propriety. The permission was of a nature to give much dissatisfaction to the other

powers. A revocation of it, therefore, by a treaty with one of those powers, is unexceptionably equitable. The clause which restrains the making of future treaties in the given case, has been grossly misunderstood. It is expressly confined to the two articles, and, for aught I see, is nugatory. For a treaty implies of itself, that while the contracting parties remain in amity, they shall make no subsequent treaty inconsistent with the prior one between those parties.

Articles XXVI., XXVII. These articles need no particular comment. They are liberal and equitable, and interfere with no interest or duty. The part which regards ambassadors and ministers, is calculated to avoid very delicate embarrassments, and to exclude intrigues and bad conduct in foreign ministers. It would be a valuable article in all our treaties.

Article XXVIII. The effect of this article is to enable either party in two years after the termination of the existing European war, to put an end to all the articles of the treaty except the first ten.

This, upon the whole, is a desirable ingredient. It makes the commercial part of the treaty a mere experiment of short duration, and enables each party, if any part of it should be found to work amiss, or if it thinks that upon the whole the treaty is not sufficiently advantageous, to put an end to it unless the parts not satisfactory can be amended, or the additional provisions which are desired can be agreed upon.

Article XXIX. This, which is the last article, provides merely for the ratification, and looks to future negotiations for more beneficial arrangements.

To these particular views of the different articles of the treaty, the following general views may be added.

The truly important side of this treaty is, that it closes, and upon the whole as reasonably as could have been expected, the controverted points between the two countries; and thereby gives us the prospect of repossessing our western posts, an object of primary consequence in our affairs, of escaping finally from being implicated in the dreadful war which is ruining Europe,

and of preserving ourselves in a state of peace for a considerable time to come.

Well considered, the greatest interest of this country in its external relations, is that of peace. The more or less of commercial advantages which we may acquire by particular treaties, are of far less moment. With peace, the force of circumstances will enable us to make our way sufficiently fast in trade. War, at this time, would give a serious wound to our growth and prosperity. Can we escape it for ten or twelve years more, we may then meet it without much inquietude, and may advance and support with energy and effect, any just pretensions to greater commercial advantages than we may enjoy.

It follows that the objects contained in the permanent articles are of real and great value to us. The price they will cost us in the article of compensation for the debts, is not likely to bear any proportion to the expenses of a single campaign to enforce our rights. The calculation is therefore a simple and a plain one. The terms are no way inconsistent with national honor. As to the commercial arrangements in the temporary articles, they can be of no great importance either way; if it were only for the circumstance that it is in the power of either party to terminate them within two years after the war. So short a duration renders them unimportant, however considered as to intrinsic merit.

Intrinsically considered, they have no very positive character of advantage or disadvantage. They will in all probability leave the trade between the two countries where it at present is.

Supplementary Remarks.

There is however one material circumstance in which this will not happen. The XVth article declares that there shall be no prohibition of the importation of, or exportation to and from the respective territories of the contracting parties, which shall not equally extend to all other nations. This permits us to carry to the British dominions any article the growth or manufacture of another country, which may be carried from such coun