lieving that the law will not be weakened by the Executive clemency. It would be vastly easier to yield to such appeals as the present case makes to me, but I submit to you whether in so doing I should not be responsible for an improper interference with the course of justice. As now advised, I must decline to grant a pardon in this case, or to modify the sentence at present. Very respectfully your obedient servant, D. H. CHAMBERLAIN, Governor. It was Governor Chamberlain's invariable custom in acting upon applications for commutations of sentence, or for pardons, to prepare and give to the public, through the press, a statement of the reasons for his actions. The following examples of this practice exhibit the feelings of a merciful man, who recognizes that he is bound by public duty to execute the laws. The closing paragraphs of the first paper are worthy of special attention. In the second it is noticeable that the Governor refused to grant a pardon even upon the recommendation of the judge who tried the accused, being convinced of his guilt and fair trial. THE STATE vs. DENIS R. BUNCH-murder. Denis R. Bunch was tried and convicted upon an indictment for murder before His Honor Judge Reed, at the February term of the General Sessions for Charleston County, and sentenced to be hung on the 16th day of April, 1875. On the day previous to the execution of the sentence I was induced to grant a respite of one week, and before the expiration of this respite an order was granted by the Lieutenant Governor postponing further the execution of the sentence until the 28th of May, 1875. It appears from the papers submitted to the Lieutenant Governor, and subsequently placed in my hands, that the action of the Lieutenant Governor was mainly influenced by the statements contained in affidavits of A. F. Farrar and Julius M. Bing, to the effect that they were in possession of information and facts which would show extenuating circumstances sufficient to induce Executive clemency, which information and facts they were prevented from laying before me by my temporary absence from the State. Subsequently the friends of Bunch laid before me the papers, which were considered by the Lieutenant Governor sufficient to justify his action, and, by the friends of Bunch, to warrant me in at least commuting the sentence from death to imprisonment for life. Official copies of one or two papers which were deemed essential, and which were to have been furnished me, have not been received, owing to sufficient causes, but I have been able to obtain, in a reliable form, all the information which those missing papers could have contained. I have now patiently heard and read all that is claimed by any one can bear upon the question that I am to decide. Having previously considered the whole case, with the exception of such information and statements as have been laid before me since the order of the Lieutenant Governor was made, it is not necessary for me to repeat that I am forced to concur in the verdict of the jury and the sentence of the Court, so far as they depend upon the facts developed on the trial. The additional circumstances which are now relied upon as furnishing grounds for a change of the sentence are these: That upon the trial one F. A. Michell testified, among other things, that about nine o'clock on the morning after the homicide, Bunch, in reply to an inquiry why he shot Donahue, said "that he had killed the Irish son of a—, and he was not sorry, and he intended to kill two more sons of if he got out"; that upon the trial subsequently of the case of the State vs. F. W. Dawson, in the same court, Michell being a witness, his testimony was disproved, and his general character for veracity was successfully impeached. It is urged that these facts are sufficient to justify me in concluding that the statements made by Michell on the trial of Bunch are unworthy of credence, and that when his testimony is rejected an essential part of the evidence upon which the verdict and sentence rest is eliminated. My attention was also called to the reference made by Judge Reed in passing sentence upon Bunch to the testimony of Michell, and it is urged that this testimony must have been essential in establishing in the minds of the jury and the Court the malice of Bunch in committing the homicide. It is clear that it is now impossible to determine with certainty what weight was given by the jury to the testimony of Michell; but I cannot think that it follows from this that, admitting the falsity of Michell's testimony, the conclusion should be reached that the jury would have rendered a different verdict, or that the present verdict is not fully supported by the other testimony in the case. On the contrary, the question before me is whether the testimony of Michell can reasonably be regarded as an essential part of the testimony necessary to fully sustain the verdict rendered. If, after rejecting the testimony of Michell, there manifestly remains sufficient evidence to support the verdict, I cannot feel myself at liberty for this reason to disregard it. I have carefully re-examined the testimony in the case other than that of Michell, and am fully convinced that the verdict of the jury was correct, and the sentence of the Court such as the law prescribes. I find, indeed, that Judge Reed, in passing sentence and reciting the leading features of the evidence, used the following language: "Next morning, when you (Bunch) had had time to cool, you repeated your declaration that you had shot 'one Irishman, and, thank God, he was not a native,' and when you got the chance again you would shoot others." Bunch at this point shook his head, and, the judge observing him, continued: "This may not be true; but, after a fair trial, and a defence by able and zealous counsel, after a fair hearing, the jury have pronounced you guilty of the murder of that unfortunate man, John Donahue." This seems to show clearly that the judge did not regard the testimony of Michell as essential to sustain the verdict of murder. The other testimony in the case seems to me to show affirmatively that the deed was done with malice as well as excessive brutality. The testimony tending to show that Bunch was at the time of the homicide under the influence of intoxicating drink was before the jury, and must be presumed to have been fully weighed by them. The unusual interest manifested in urging Executive clemency for this unfortunate man has excited my deepest personal sympathies in his behalf, and I have been more than willing to find a ground upon which I could avert his fate. The power lodged in the Governor in such cases brings a fearful responsibility, which nothing but experience can enable one to fully appreciate. Doubts and misgivings thicken around me whenever I am called upon to pass upon the life or death of a fellow-being. The only clear light which I can see is the light of my official duty. I am appointed and sworn to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed, in mercy," but still that they are executed. The fact that the duty which I feel I am now discharging has been so often imposed upon me is due, I cannot refrain from saying here, to the failure on the part of those who have preceded me to discharge their duty. I am fully persuaded that public duty forbids me from interfering to any extent with the execution of the sentence imposed upon Bunch. D. H. CHAMBERLAIN, Governor. THE STATE vs. GEORGE HARDEE-MURDER. George Hardee was tried and convicted of murder in the same court and at the same term with Denis R. Bunch. The execution of the sentence of death was likewise postponed in the same manner until the 28th of May, 1875. Upon the urgent appeals of his friends I have again carefully examined his case. It is due, perhaps, to Judge Reed, as well as to myself, that I should state that Judge Reed, in a communication to me, dated April 5, 1875, recommended that the punishment of George Hardee should be commuted to imprisonment for life. This recommendation was entitled to the greatest weight with me, and has induced me again and again to examine the testimony taken at the coroner's inquest, as well as in the general sessions. I cannot discover any evidence or circumstances which reduce the crime of George Hardee below murder. If the law of the State as it now stands is to be executed in any case, it should, in my judgment, be executed in this case. There are, no doubt, degrees of atrocity in murder, and the case of George Hardee does not present those revolting features which sometimes attend the commission of this crime, but, as I remarked in a former statement of this case, "I see no evidence that he was under the influence of passion arising from the quarrel to such a degree as to reduce his offence below murder, nor do I see any evidence under which his action can be regarded as selfdefence." D. H. CHAMBERLAIN, Governor. In this place the following letter may properly be quoted, although it has reference to the correction of an abuse of power in the matter of pardons rather than to its legitimate exercise. It also shows how some of the Governor's associates in administration were lying in wait to take advantage of any opportunity to assert their authority in opposition to him. EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, COLUMBIA, S. C., August 13, 1875. Hon. J. P. Reed, Judge First Judicial Circuit, Charleston, S. C. : DEAR SIR-At the June term, 1875, of the Court of General Sessions for Charleston County, Joseph Gibbes and John Smith were convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to be hanged on the 30th June, 1875. I now learn that, during my recent temporary absence from the State, the Lieutenant Governor, Hon. R. H. Gleaves, has assumed the authority to commute the sentence of Joseph Gibbes, as above stated, to imprisonment in the penitentiary for twenty years, and that in consequence of this action of the Lieutenant Governor the execution of Joseph Gibbes did not take place on the day fixed by you, and has not yet taken place. I have no information of any kind in regard to this matter, except what I have observed in the newspapers, no order, or copy or notice of the order, of the Lieutenant Governor having been sent to this office. Joseph Gibbes, I assume, in the absence of official information, is still in the jail at Charleston. The action of the Lieutenant Governor as above stated is, in my judgment, wholly without authority of law, and hence null and void; and my purpose in addressing you at this time is to call your attention to what I consider the necessity of action on your part, if you agree with me in regarding the action of the Lieutenant Governor as unauthorized and void. It is proper to add that at the time of leaving the State I informed the Lieutenant Governor by letter of my proposed absence, and that I should be in direct communication with my office in case any necessity for the official action of the Governor should arise. You will remember, also, that the question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to act as Governor during the temporary absence of the Governor was directly involved in the recent cases of Hardee and Bunch, in Charleston.' In those cases, however, the action of the Lieutenant Governor extended only to the postponement of the execution of the sentence. In the present case it extends to the change of the sentence, and involves the right to exercise all the powers of the Governor. It presents a case, therefore, which compels me to seek a judicial determination of the question involved, and to this end I beg to call your attention to the case, and to say that, in my judgment, your Honor should regard the action of the Lieutenant Governor as null and void, and proceed to enforce upon the said Joseph Gibbes the sentence of your court, subject to such action by the Executive as he may take whenever the case may be submitted to him for his action. Very respectfully your Honor's obedient servant, D. H. CHAMBERLAIN, Governor. Judge Reed took no action in line of this suggestion, and the Lieutenant Governor's interference with the course of justice could not be undone. 1 See the Governor's statement in the case of Denis R. Bunch, p. 254. CHAPTER XVI. The State Convention for Choosing Delegates to the National Republican Convention-Governor Chamberlain a Candidate for Delegate-The Opponents of His Policy Resolved to Defeat Him-Extraordinary Efforts and Combinations to That End-Apparent Success of the Scheme-Only a Minority of Delegates Favorable to Him-Turbulent and Bitter Contests in the Convention-The Governor and His Friends Defeated Again and Again-The Governor Assailed and Denounced in a Violent Speech by Judge R. B. Carpenter-His Eioquent Reply Produces a Revolution of Sentiment, and He is Chosen a Delegate at Large by a Great Majority-Descriptions of This Oratorical Combat by Eye-Witnesses-Abstracts of the Speeches-Further Proceedings-The Governor's Action at Cincinnati. I' N April, before the adjournment of the Legislature, a Republican State Convention met in Columbia for the purpose of choosing the party's representatives in the National Convention to be held in Cincinnati in June. This presented the first occasion since his inauguration for a judgment of his party on his course, and the Governor challenged a judgment by allowing it to be known that he desired such an expression of approbation and confidence as would be implied by his selection as one of the delegates at large to the Cincinnati Convention. He knew, and all knew, that the fate of reform in South Carolina, so far as it depended on the Republican party, was involved in his ability to maintain his leadership. The convention to be held later in the year for the nomination of candidates for State offices would be greatly influenced by the action of the earlier convention. The Governor's enemies were alive to the significance of the occasion. It was their opportunity. They determined to rebuke him decisively and "read him out" of the party. The Republicans in the Legislature, whom he had thwarted and exposed, and whose wrath was hot, had powerful allies. United States Senator John J. Patterson came from Washington to South Carolina, avowedly in the interest of Senator Morton and to secure the defeat of |