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a solid spherical shot of 156 lbs. weight. With a charge of 40 lbs. of powder, this leaves the gun with a velocity of 1720 feet per second; and at 200 yards its force of impact is as nearly as possible three times that of a 68-pounder at the same range. This gun has now been tried against a Warrior' target, and with 50 lbs. of powder sent its 156 lb. spherical balls through that target, punching a clean circular hole, very little larger than the diameter of the ball. With 40 lbs. of powder it smashed the plates and broke in the sides, doing more real damage than with the larger charge. When this gun is rifled it will throw a bolt of 300 lbs. weight; and although at ranges under 500 yards this will not have a force greatly in excess of that of the 156-pounder, it will at all ranges above that maintain an immense superiority over the smooth bore; and we may safely assert that at ranges between 1000 and 2000 yards it would pierce anything that has yet been fabricated of wood and iron. But why should artillery stop there? If guns can be made carrying 300 lb. balls, they can be made to carry them of 600 lbs. Sir William Armstrong is prepared to make guns of that size; and is only waiting for the order to commence the work, having made all the calculations and prepared all the drawings, and having not the least possible doubt of perfect success in making a gun of at least this calibre ; while the Americans talk of 1000-pounders with more show of practical sense than is to be found in most of their schemes.

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There seems to be no limit to the extent to which the powers of artillery may be increased; but, on the other hand, we seem very near the limit of the strength of armour which ships can carry. Neither the Warrior' nor the Defence' class can support the weight of their plating over their whole body; some of the new vessels will be made to do so, but it will be at a considerable sacrifice of other qualities; and consequently the limits within which the weight can be increased are very narrow indeed. Upon another very important question, namely, how far the composition of the armour-plates can be improved, we must refer our readers to the valuable and seasonable pamphlet by Mr. Cheney, 'What is Good Iron?'* But it does not seem to us probable that upon the composition of the best armour-plates now known,

any

"If, a quarter of a century ago," says Mr. Cheney, "a political economist had been asked to name the conditions most favourable to the security and prosperity of the country, he could have devised nothing more promising than that supremacy in commerce and in war should be made dependent on superiority in the manufacture of iron; that iron should be the armour of our navy, and the material of our commercial marine-perhaps, too, the coating of our fortifications. Such conditions have been realised; but instead of the energy imparted by knowledge and experience, instead of the alacrity of anticipated triumph, they find among us error and bewilderment.

any improvement is likely to be made which will affect the controversy. If bad iron be used, some great national disaster must inevitably ensue.

In this condition of matters it may be safely asserted that if the forts proposed by the Commission on National Defences were erected at Spithead, and each were armed with three or four 300lb. or 600lb. rifled Armstrong guns, there is no spot where any ship could take up a position to bombard the dockyard without the certainty of her being destroyed. It is no doubt admitted by the Report of the Commission that a ship might run past the forts without receiving damage. It is probable she might; but it should always be added, that if she runs past the forts she also runs past the dockyard; and, as far as any damage she could do to it, might as well have stayed in the middle of the Channel.* The National Defence Commissioners seem to have recommended in their Report the employment of stationary in preference to floating defences to as great an extent as possible, because they found that the expense of a gun in a floating battery,† moved by steam-power, is nearly four times as great as that of a gun in a fort; because the repairs of a fort when once built are practically nothing, those of a steamship continuous and enormous; and because they believed that it would always be much easier and cheaper to find men to fight guns in a stationary fort than to handle them in a floating battery in action.

They seem also to have been struck with the fact that we know the exact form of a fort which will be serviceable now and for all future time; while we do not know the form of any kind of floating defence which may not be superseded within the next twelve months. If we were to-morrow to set about building a hundred

bewilderment. Instead of pouring into our docks and arsenals a steady supply of impenetrable ship and armour plates, we are disputing about what is good iron, and are struggling to use what is not. Nevertheless, the impulsion is given-ill or well the movement will go on-our wooden walls are rapidly transforming themselves into iron. The cost will be enormous. It depends on the direction for gond or for ill now given to the iron manufacture whether the expenditure be not made in vain."

* It should also be borne in mind that the proposed works are for the defence of the dockyards and arsenals only, and are assumed to be the least that could be sufficient for that limited purpose. They are not schemes for making the nation secure against all chances of invasion; and, though valuable auxiliaries in that respect, much of the criticism that has been lavished upon them arises from confounding the two purposes.

There seems no reason to doubt that the forts may be constructed for the price originally estimated. Though iron is to be substituted for granite, the thinness of iron walls, and the absence of all internal piers, will enable their size to be reduced at least one-third, while carrying the same number of guns, and so equalise the expense within very narrow limits of variation.

'Monitors'

'Monitors' or 'Merrimacs,' or even 'Warriors' or cupola-ships, the progress of discovery in this respect is so rapid, that before they are completed we may find out that we have again to undertake the rather expensive process of reconstructing the Navy,' and may have to repeat that operation every ten years. If, indeed, the Merrimac' and the Monitor' are as perfect as they are assumed to be, both the Warrior' and the cupola pattern of ship are already superseded. It is satisfactory to think that at all events no money has yet been wasted in this last class of vessels, and there is time to adopt Captain Ericsson's invention if it should be proved as superior to Captain Coles's as it is suspected to be.

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But the great fact is that there is no limit to the weight of armour which a fort will carry, or to the size of the guns that can be manœuvred on their steady platforms; while the weight of armour and of artillery which ships can carry, seems already to be very nearly reached. It may also be added that the new invention of rifling ordnance is of very questionable advantage on board ship, owing to the unstable platform from which they must be used. It requires the fixed, steady floor of a fort to enable the guns to be used with that precision which is their peculiar advantage. None of these advantages of forts have been in the smallest degree affected by the result of the American duel; and, so far as our knowledge at present extends, there seems no reason to depart from them.

It is surely unworthy of a great nation like this to say, 'We must stop the forts, because we want the money for ships.' If either or both are necessary for the national safety, surely the money can be easily found. At all events let the question be argued on its own merits, and let it not be said that one department is trying to abstract from the means of the other; or that sailors are clamouring for ships, because they are sailors; or soldiers asking for forts, because the forts belong to their service. But let us look at the question like men of business, and if we can discover what is right, let us set about carrying it out as far as may be practicable. The Commissioners recommended the application of one million of money to floating defences; and if that had been appropriated at the time, it would have been quite as much as ought to be applied to such a purpose in the present transitional state of naval warfare. This sum, if it were taken up now as part of the loan, ought to satisfy all reasonable demands, without infringing on the more permanent works, which are far more essentially necessary for any general and comprehensive scheme of national defence. Neither stationary forts nor floating defences will

alone

alone suffice for the purpose, but only such a combination of both as shall render the special advantages of either available. But so far as can at present be seen, the greater stress ought to be laid on the forts, not only on account of their greater economy, but because of their power of using heavier artillery than ships, and with greater accuracy of aim. Such forts, too, as it is proposed to erect at Spithead appear to be of a singularly formidable description, and being situated on the shingle banks in the middle of the sea, command the whole area of the roadstead with their fire at ranges which would now be efficient against wooden vessels, and which in all probability will be equally so against iron-plated ships with the artillery which may be prepared for them before they are completed. They have also the advantage that they can-without either materially increasing the expense or diminishing the number of guns-be plated with iron of such thickness as shall render them absolutely invulnerable against any artillery; and from this circumstance, and the peculiarity of their situation, they are at the same time impregnable by any means of attack we are acquainted with.

If not capable of being used as the sole means of defence, it must be admitted that such forts must form a very important element in any scheme of defence for an open roadstead; and that with the aid of a certain amount of floating defences they ought to render our harbours as secure as any in the world. It is, however, just this necessity of the combination of the two that renders the question so difficult to decide. The advocates for ships and the advocates for forts have both reason on their sides to a certain point, and when this is the case a little superior talent or superior energy on the side of either party can secure for it at least a temporary triumph. The true statesman sees the advantage of the combination of both, and the real man of genius is he who can appreciate exactly how much of either is necessary to effect successfully the object in view.

INDEX

TO THE

HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH VOLUME OF THE QUARTERLY REVIEW.

A.

AFRICAN slave-trade, 262.
Agglestone, legendary origin of, 308.
Albert's(Prince)speeches, 176-qualities
of his ancestry, 178-his singleness of
object, 179-speech at Merchant Tay-
lors', 180-speech on the extinction of
the Slave-trade, 181-at the Literary
Fund dinner, 182-views for improv-
ing the condition of the labouring
classes, ib.-doctrine of Progress, 183
-attention to the welfare of servants,
185 his exposition of the English
character, 187-speech defining the
relation of the Fine Arts to a nation,
188-at Birmingham, 190-address
at Aberdeen, 192-laudation of Hum-
boldt, 193-had no speciality, 194-
versed in the principles of military
science, 195-camp of instruction at
Chobham suggested by him, ib. —
Presidency of the Commission on the
Fine Arts, ib.bis Essay on Music
and his Hymns, 197-aptitude for Eng-
lish modes of public business, ib.-
equanimity of temper, 198-his cor-
respondence, ib.—his detractors, 199.
Althing, the Icelandic, 132.
Amboyna, massacre of, 505.
America, slavery not the cause of the
civil war in, 240-Republicans, De-
mocrats, and Abolitionists, ib.-Re-
publican Platform' of 1860, 241-
Mr. Lincoln's declaration against in-
terfering with slavery, ib.-fugitive-
slave law, 242-points decided in the
Dred Scott case, ib.-antagonistic in-
terests of the two geographical divi-
sions of the country, 243-relation of
the slave question to political influ-
ence, 244-the Missouri compromise,
ib.-struggle as to the admission of
Texas, ib.-the principle of 'squatter
sovereignty,' 245-struggle in Kan-
sas, ib. the cause of war political,
rather than social or commercial, 246
-protective tariffs, 247, 248-Cole-
ridge's statement of that question, 248
-exasperation caused by the Aboli-
tionists, 249-aggregate value of the
Vol. 111.-No. 222.

slaves, 250-conduct of the North
to the negro, ib.-the Federal Re-
public not homogeneous, 247, 251-
Washington's fears for the perma-
nence of the Union, i.-Was Seces-
sion an act of rebellion? 252-Pro-
fessor Bernard and Mr. Spence on the
question, ib. -the original Congress,
253-Convention of 1787, ib.-Act
passed by the Virginia Convention
in 1788, 254-opinions of Justice
Story and Mr. Motley examined, 255-
opinions of Madison and Hamilton,
256-British Proclamation of Neu-
trality, 257-character of belliger-
ency explained, ib. — illustrated by
the revolt of Greece from Turkey, ib.
-blockade a belligerent right, 259-
must be actual, not constructive, ib.-
opinion of Lord Stowell, ib.-offensive
conduct of America towards this
country, .-burning of the 'Caro-
line,' 261-Lord Ashburton's mission,
ib.-Oregon territory question, ib.-
the Munroe doctrine, 262-San Juan
seized, ib.-right of search, ib.-the
"Trent' question, 263-268-sycophan-
tic tone of the North towards France,
271-attitude of Canada, ib.-Personal
Safety laws, 275 - consequences of
subjugating the South, 276 - the
United States' intended recognition
of Hungary, 277-barbarism of de-
stroying Charleston harbour, 279-
suppression of liberty in America,

537.

Antwerp, saying of Napoleon respect-
ing its importance to England, 541-
Earl Russell's opinion respecting, ib.
Archipelago (Eastern) described, 484.
Armstrong guns, 573.

Arru islands described, 512,

B.

Badbury, scene of the battle of Badan-
byrig, 307.
Barcelona, its flourishing condition in
1491, 151.

2 Q

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