is issued because of the absence or the inadequacy of ordinary ones. It has been defined 22 as "That process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court or tribunal from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law." The writ is granted to prevent action but, unlike an injunction, is addressed to or operates upon the court while injunction lies against the parties alone and does not interfere with the court itself.23 Indictment. A public corporation or its officers may also be subject to indictment for a neglect or failure to perform properly public duties which are imposed upon it. This method of redress is most frequently used either in respect to the opening and maintenance of highways in a proper condition for travel,24 or where the corporation has been guilty of some act through or by which a public nuisance has been created.25 22 Spelling, Injunctions (2d Ed.) § 1716. 23 Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167; Ex parte Williams, 4 Ark. 537; State v. Young, 29 Minn. 474; Clayton v. Heidelberg, 17 Miss. (9 Smedes & M.) 623; Ward v. Kelsey, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 106; State v. City of Columbia, 16 S. C. 412. Spelling, Injunctions (2d Ed.) §§ 716 et seq. But see Corporation of Bluffton v. Silver, 63 Ind. 262. Proper remedy to prevent execution of contract for construction of -sidewalk held to be injunction, not prohibition. See, also, the following cases where the writ was refused: People v. Election Com'rs, 54 Cal. 404; Spring Valley Waterworks v. Bartlett, 63 Cal. 245. Pro.ceeding to restrain board of supervisors from fixing water rates. La Croix v. Fairfield County Com'rs, 50 Conn. 321. To prohibit grant of. People v. Lake County Dist. Ct., 6 Colo. 534. Investigation of charges against city solicitor. Casby v. Thompson, 42 Mo. 133; Hunter v. 24 Com. v. Town of Hopkinsville, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 38; State v. City of Bangor, 30 Me. 341; State v. Inhabitants of Gorham, 37 Me. 451; Davis v. City of Bangor, 42 Me. 522; State v. Town of Northumberland, 44 N. H. 628; Easton & A. R. Co. v. Inhabitants of Greenwich, 25 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Green) 565; Com. v. Lansford Borough, 3 Pa. Dist. Rep. 365; Pittsburgh, V. & C. R. Co. v. Com., 101 Pa. 192; State v. Town of Cumberland, 7 R. I. 75; State v. Town of Whittingham, 7 Vt. 390; State v. Town of Alburgh, 23 Vt. 262. Thomp. Neg. §§ 6369 et seq. See, also, Nowlin v. State, 49 Ala. 41. 25 Town of Paris v. People, 27 Ill. 74; State v. City of Portland, 74 Me. 268; State v. Hudson County, 30 N. J. Law, 137; Phillips v. Com., 44 Pa. 197; State v. Shelbyville Corp., 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 176; State v. Town of Burlington, 36 Vt. 521; Town of Saukville v. State, 69 Wis. 178. See § 961, note 50. § 1153. Attachment and garnishment. The courts have quite generally held on the ground of public policy that public corporations are not subject to attachment or garnishment.20 The rule of nonexemption would embarass public officials, so it has been held, in the performance of their duties. and might require their attendance in distant tribunals with a consequent absence from their respective offices, thus detrimentally affecting the proper performance of public business.27 A municipal corporation, it has been held, by appearing and submitting to a liability, waives its exemption and becomes liable to the judgment of the court in the same manner as a private person or corporation.28 On the other hand, a few cases have held to the rule of nonexemption.29 A Montana case in discussing this 26 Columbia Brick Co. v. District of Columbia, 1 App. D. C. 351; Clark v. Mobile School Com'rs, 36 Ala. 621; McMeekin v. State, 9 Ark. 553; Boone County v. Keck, 31 Ark. 387; Mesa County Com'rs v. Brown, 6 Colo. App. 43; Gann v. Mineral County Com'rs, 6 Colo. App. 484, 41 Pac. 829; Lewis v. City of Denver, 9 Colo. App. 328, 48 Pac. 317. Salary of public officer exempt. Stermer V. La Plata County Com'rs, 5 Colo. App. 379, 38 Pac. 839; Dotterer v. Bowe, 84 Ga. 769, 11 S. E. 896; Born v. Williams, 81 Ga. 796; Bank of South Western Georgia v. City of Americus, 92 Ga. 361, 17 S. E. 287; Merwin v. City of Chicago, 45 Ill. 133; Triebel v. Colburn, 64 Ill. 376; Wallace v. Sawyer, 54 Ind. 501; Jenks v. Osceola Tp., 45 Iowa, 554; Switzer v. City of Wellington, 40 Kan. 250; First Nat. Bank v. City of Ottawa, 43 Kan. 294, 23 Pac. 485; Wild v. Ferguson, 23 La. Ann. 752; Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203; Dewey v. Garvey, 130 Mass. 86; School Dist. No. 4 v. Gage, 39 Mich. 484; Clarksdale Compress Co. v. W. R. Caldwell Co., 80 Miss. 343, 31 So. 790; Hawthorne v. City of St. Louis, 11 Mo. 59; Fortune v. City of St. Louis, 23 Mo. 239; People v. City of Omaha, 2 Neb. 166; Bliss v. Lawrence, 58 N. Y. 442; Boalt v. Williams County Com'rs, 18 Ohio, 13; City of Erie v. Knapp, 29 Pa. 173; Wilson v. Lewis, 10 R. I. 285; Moore v. City of Chattanooga, 55 Tenn. (8 Heisk.) 850; Herring-Hall-Marvin Co. v. Bexar County, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 673, 40 S. W. 145; City of Dallas v. Western Elec. Co., 83 Tex. 243, 18 S. W. 552; Merrell v. Campbell, 49 Wis. 535. But see City of Denver v. Brown, 11 Colo. 337, 18 Pac. 214; Bailie v. Mosher, 72 Ga. 740. See, also, Shinn, Attachment, §§ 500 et seq. 27 McDougal v. Hennepin County Sup'rs, 4 Minn. (Gil. 130) 184. See, also, Roeller v. Ames, 33 Minn. 132. 28 Briscoe v. Bank of Ky., 11 Pet. (U. S.) 257; Las Anamas County Com'rs v. Bond, 3 Colo. 411; Clapp v. Walker, 25 Iowa, 315. 29 City Council of Montgomery v. Van Dorn, 41 Ala. 505; City of Denver v. Brown, 11 Colo. 337, 18 Pac. doctrine said:30 "By garnishment the waterworks, fire engines, public buildings and revenues of the corporation are not seized. The corporation is simply required to hold, and finally pay over, a sum of money or property, in which it has no interest, to one person rather than another. It's business is not interrupted; its property is not touched; its functions are not deranged. We cannot agree that there is any reason why the great public duties of a county need be imperfectly performed. The county has no suit to defend, no counsel to employ, no witnesses to collect and pay. It has no burden cast upon it, and no duty to perform, except to act as temporary stake holder, to await the determination of a court, in an action in which the county has no interest." The latter rule, it seems to the author, is the better one since any fancied interruption to public business is not sufficiently serious to warrant the public corporation in protecting an officer or employe refusing to pay legitimate claims against him. § 1154. Conditions precedent to right of action; notice of intention to sue. In order that claims against a public corporation may be investigated and their correctness determined by the proper officials, and further, that it may be given an opportunity of settling meritorious ones,31 statutes in some states provide that as a condition precedent to the prosecution of an action against a public corporation the claimant must give within the time,32 and in the man 214; McLoud v. Selby, 10 Conn. 390; Adams v. Tyler, 121 Mass. 380; Whalen v. Harrison, 11 Mont. 63, 27 Pac. 384; Jersey City v. Horton, 38 N. J. Law, 88; City of Newark v. Funk, 15 Ohio St. 462; Wilson v. Lewis, 10 R. I. 285; Herring-HallMarvin Co. v. Bexar County, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 673, 40 S. W. 145; Portsmouth Gas Co. v. Sanford, 97 Va. 124, 33 S. E. 516, 45 L. R. A. 246. 30 Waterbury v. Deer Lodge County Com'rs, 10 Mont. 515, 26 Pac. 1002. 31 McLendon V. Anson County Com'rs, 71 N. C. 38. See, also, §§ 484 et seq., ante. 32 Owen v. City of Ft. Dodge, 98 Iowa, 281; Sachs v. Sioux City, 109 Iowa, 224, 80 N. W. 336; Hutchings v. Inhabitants of Sullivan, 90 Me. 131; Higgins V. Inhabitants of North Andover, 168 Mass. 251; Atherton v. Village of Bancroft, 114 Mich. 241, 72 N. W. 208; Merz v. City of Brooklyn, 11 N. Y. Supp. 778. Holding that the legislature requires such a condition and also 33 ner prescribed by law, a notice of the defect causing an injury or of what might be termed his intention to bring in the manner prescribed by law, an action against the corporation and based upon the facts which are set forth in this notice. A liability to state the principle in another way is made dependent upon the giving of notice. This, it has been held, is jurisdictional,3 35 and no right of action can accrue unless the provisions of the statute provides a limitation of one year for actions of the kind designated. Borst v. Town of Sharon, 24 App. Div. 599, 48 N. Y. Supp. 996; Barry V. Village of Port Jervis, 64 App. Div. 268, 72 N. Y. Supp. 104. Charter provisions requiring notice to be filed within forty-eight hours after cause of action has accrued is unconstitutional under Const. art. 8, § 3, art. 1, § 6, and Const. U. S. Amend. art. 14. Whalen v. Bates, 19 R. I. 274; Lawton v. Town of Weathersfield, 74 Vt. 41, 51 Atl. 1062; Sproul v. City of Seattle, 17 Wash. 256; Gutkind v. City of Elroy, 97 Wis. 649, 73 N. W. 325; Daniels v. City of Racine, 98 Wis. 649, 74 N. W. 553; Harris v. City of Fond du Lac, 104 Wis. 44, 80 N. W. 66. Charter provisions as to notice controls rather than general statute. See, also, Oklahoma City v. Hill, 4 Okl. 521. 33 Griswold v. City of Ludington, 116 Mich. 401, 74 N. W. 663. Claim filed must be verified as required by law. Kennedy v. City of New York, 18 Misc. 303, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1077; Sheehy v. City of New York, 29 App. Div. 263, 51 N. Y. Supp. 519, reversed 160 N. Y. 139, 54 N. E. 749. A notice must contain a statement "of an intention to commence an action." An allegation that the persons filing the notice "claims and demands" a specified sum is insufficient. Spencer v. Town of Sardinia, 42 App. Div. 472, 59 N. Y. Supp. 412. Sufficiency of notice. Place v. City of Yonkers, 43 App. Div. 380, 60 N. Y. Supp. 171. Sufficiency of notice considered. See, also, §§ 1037 and 1061 et seq., ante. 34 Dean v. Town of Sharon, 72 Conn. 667, 45 Atl. 963; Angell v. West Bay City, 117 Mich. 685, 76 N. W. 128; Davis v. Town of Rumney, 67 N. H. 591, 38 Atl. 18; Morgan v. City of Lewiston, 91 Me. 566, 40 Atl. 545. A notice under Rev. St. c. 18, § 80, need not specify the damages or state the amount claimed. White v. City of New York, 15 App. Div. 440, 44 N. Y. Supp. 454; Learned v. City of New York, 21 Misc. 601, 48 N. Y. Supp. 142. A complaint is properly dismissed when it is shown that the notice states incorrectly the place of injury. City of Ft. Worth v. Shero, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 487, 41 S. W. 704. See, also, §§ 1037 and 1061 et seq., post. 35 Pardey v. Town of Mechanicsville, 101 Iowa, 266, 70 N. W. 189;. Harvey v. City of Clarinda, 111 Iowa, 528, 82 N. W. 994, construing Code, § 1051, as applying to different classes. Bausher v. City of St. Paul, 72 Minn. 539, 75 N. W. 745; Stanyon v. have been complied with both in respect to the time and manner of the service of the notice and its form.36 § 1155. Same subject; filing of claim. In other states the filing of the claim, which is the basis of the proposed action, with designated officials 38 at a time pre 37 Town of Peterborough, 69 N. H. 372, 46 Atl. 191; Hamilton v. City of Buffalo, 55 App. Div. 423, 66 N. Y. Supp. 990. Requirement to file notice may be waived by the city. Werner v. City of Rochester, 149 N. Y. 563, 44 N. E. 300. No notice is required as a condition precedent to recovery for injuries to property. 36 Webster v. City of Beaver Dam, 84 Fed. 280. But where an injured person is rendered incapable by the accident of serving such a notice, it is sufficient if it is filed and served as soon as the injured one is able. Barcley v. City of Boston, 173 Mass. 310, 53 N. E. 822. The physical ability of the person injured to give the notice within the time required is a question for the jury. Blumrich v. Highland Park, 131 Mich. 209, 91 N. W. 129; Roberts v. Village of St. James, 76 Minn. 456, 79 N. W. 519. Service on the recorder is sufficient. Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 77 Minn. 76, 79 N. W. 653. Notice is sufficient if served on the assistant city clerk. Dawson v. City of Troy, 49 Hun, 322, 2 N. Y. Supp. 137. Service of summons and complaint on mayor not sufficient. McMahon v. City of New York, 1 App. Div. 321, 37 N. Y. Supp. 289. Notice of intention is sufficiently served by being delivered to the assistant city counsel. Kellogg v. City of New York, 15 App. Div. 326, 44 N. Y. Supp. 39; Krall v. City of New York, 44 App. Div. 259, 60 N. Y. Supp. 661; De Vore v. City of Auburn, 64 App. Div. 84, 71 N. Y. Supp. 747; Missano v. City of New York, 160 N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744. The fact that the legal authority for the notice is wrongly stated does not invalidate it. Maloney v. Cook, 21 R. I. 471, 42 Atl. 692; Seamons v. Fitts, 21 R. I. 236, 42 Atl. 863. Service on the town treasurer insufficient. City of Ft. Worth v. Shero, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 487, 41 S. W. 704. Notice to city secretary insufficient. Parsons v. City of Ft. Worth, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 273, 63 S. W. 889. On the question of inability to file claim, see Chadbourne v. Town of Exeter, 67 N. H. 190, 29 Atl. 408, and Boyd v. Derry, 68 N. H. 272, 38 Atl. 1005. As to effect of admission in the answer that claim was filed, see Durham v. City of Spokane, 27 Wash. 615, 68 Pac. 383. But see Peacock v. City of Dallas, 89 Tex. 438, 35 S. W. 8. See, also, Ward v. City of Troy, 55 App. Div. 192, 66 N. Y. Supp. 925. See §§ 1037 and 1061 et seq., ante. 37 City of Wyandotte v. White, 13 Kan. 191; Selden v. Village of St. Johns, 114 Mich. 698, 72 N. W. 991; Nicholson v. Dare County Com'rs. 121 N. C. 27, 27 S. E. 996. The demand required by Code, § 757, be fore suing a municipal corporation, |