district from another, persons having no visible means of support.278 Such a statute does not, however, prevent the return to the state of former residents or those whose residence is within the state. 279 § 1096. Legal character. 280 A poor district or official board performing equivalent duties is regarded as a public quasi corporation and therefore subject to the rules of law in respect to liability since the relief to the poor is regarded as a governmental function." A different rule will obtain where a general or special liability may be imposed by law. Expenditures. The expenditures which can be lawfully made are limited in the first place by the character of the organization. They are created for the special object of affording relief to the poor and unfortunate and expenses for other purposes are therefore unlawful and obligations incurred cannot ordinarily be enforced. They are also limited in the amount of their expenditures by the moneys set apart or raised by taxation or otherwise for 278 in re Ah Fong, 3 Sawy. 144, Fed. Cas. No. 102; Board of Com'rs of Pitkin County v. Law, 3 Colo. App. 328, 33 Pac. 143; Union County v. Axley, 53 Ill. App. 670; Inhabitants of Greenfield v. Cushman, 16 Mass. 393. Intent must appear to warrant a conviction under the statute; Inhabitants of Palmer v. Wakefield, 102 Mass. 214; Luton v. Newaygo Circ. Judge, 70 Mich. 152, 38 N. W. 13; Superintendents of the Poor of Newaygo County v. Nelson, 75 Mich. 154, 42 N. W. 797; Montfort v. Wheelock, 78 Minn. 169, 80 N. W. 955. The board of St. Paul workhouse directors are mere city officials and not a body corporate. State v. Cornish, 66 N. H. 329, 21 Atl. 180, 11 L. R. A. 191; Winfield v. Mapes, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 571; Bartlett v. Ackerman, 66 Hun, 627, 21 N. Y. Supp. 53; Heard v. Com'rs of Charities, 51 N. Y. Supp. 375. The commissioners of charities of the city of New York, laws 1895, c. 912, have no corporate existence and cannot be sued as a body. Chapline v. Overseers of Poor, 7 Leigh (Va.) 231; Town of Marshfield v. Edwards, 40 Vt. 245; Town of Dover v. Wheeler, 51 Vt. 160; Town of Weybridge v. Cushman, 64 Vt. 415, 24 Atl. 1114. But see Gould v. Bailley, 2 N. J. Law (1 Penning.) 1; Mathews v. City of Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 147. 279 Inhabitants of Middleborough v. Clark, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 28; Inhabitants of Sturbridge v. Winslow, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 83; State v. Benton, 18 N. H. 47; State v. Cornish, 66 N. H. 329, 21 Atl. 180, 11 L. R. A. 191. 280 See, also, Smith v. Peabody, 106 Mass. 262. this special purpose.281 These expenses may arise either from the grant of relief to those legally entitled within their limits 282 or by authority of law in connection with disbursements made for paupers or others whose legal settlement is within another district but temporarily or permanently cared for by them and which in this case then become a legal charge upon that other district and can be collected in the manner prescribed.283 282 Auburn v. City of Lewiston, 85 Me. 282, 27 Atl. 159; Sullivan v. City of Lewiston, 93 Me. 71, 44 Atl. 118. 283 Park County V. Jefferson County, 12 Colo. 585, 21 Pac. 912; Town of Beacon Falls v. Town of Seymour, 44 Conn. 210; Town of Canton v. Town of Burlington, 58 Conn. 277; Town of Bristol v. Town of New Britain, 71 Conn. 201, 41 Atl. 548. An action will lie by one town to recover money voluntarily paid to another town to reimburse it for the support of a pauper. Town of Fox v. Town of Kendall, 97 III. 72; Town of Bristol v. Town of Fox, 159 Ill. 500, 42 N. E. 887; reversing 45 Ill. App. 330; Cerro Gordo County v. Wright County, 50 Iowa, 439; Hardin County v. Wright County, 67 Iowa, 127; Inhabitants of Camden v. Inhabitants of Lincolnville, 16 Me. 384; Inhabitants of New Vineyard v. Phillips, 45 Me. 405; City of Bangor v. Inhabitants of Fairfield, 46 Me. 558. Inhabitants of Ripley v. Inhabitants of Hebron, 60 Me. 379. Requisites of declaration stated in an action by one town against another to recover the value of supplies furnish a pauper. Inhabitants of West Gardiner V. Inhabitants of Hartland, 62 Me. 246; City of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Wareham, 153 Mass. 192, 26 N. E. 451; Inhabitants of Easton v. Inhabitants of Wareham, 131 Mass. 10; City of Northhampton V. Inhabitants of Plainfield, 164 Mass. 506, 41 N. E. 785, overruling City of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Wareham, 153 Mass. 192, 26 N. E. 451. Lander County V. Humboldt County, 21 Nev. 415, 32 Pac. 849. A county is liable for relief furnished by another county only when the indigent is a pauper. Washoe County v. Eureka County, 25 Nev. 356, 50 Pac. 376; Strafford County v. Rockingham County, 71 N. H. 37, 51 Atl. 677; Town of Plymouth v. Grafton County, 68 N. H. 361, 44 Atl. 523; Stilwell v. Coons, 122 N. Y. 242, 25 N. E. 316; Burke County Com'rs v. Buncombe County Com'rs, 101 N. C. 520, 8 S. E. 176; Town of St. Johnsbury v. Town of Waterford, 15 Vt. 692; Town of Pawlet v. Town of Sandgate, 19 Vt. 621; Town of Westfield v. Sauk County, 18 Wis. 624; Town of Ettrick v. Town of Bangor, 84 Wis. 256, 54 N. W. 401; Town of Dakota v. Town of Winneconne, 55 Wis. 522; City of Ply-. mouth v. Sheboygan County, 101 Wis. 200, 77 N. W. 196; Portage County v. Town of Neshkoro, 109 Wis. 520, 85 N. W. 414; Board of § 1097. Settlement. The determination of the legal settlement of paupers is a question of local statutes and as these differ widely, no general principle can be stated which will determine accurately the question. As districts or official bodies performing the duty under consideration are regarded as governmental agencies and public quasi corporations, it follows that the legislature has full power to change their boundaries or authority as it deems best and to fix the settlement of paupers. The term as used in the legal decisions in respect to the liability of any public quasi corporation for the support of paupers means "the place from which the pauper is entitled to support in case of need, and in which he is entitled to reside. There is a clear distinction between the place of legal settlement and the place of residence, and also between the place of settlement and the place of domicile, as the latter term is used in general or international law." 284 The right of settlement is usually regarded as a personal privilege and is acquired through the operation of laws passed determining the question. A strict compliance with these is necessary to acquire rights under them. Such laws are construed technically and strictly as there is no disposition on the part of any particular district to expend more for this purpose than is absolutely necessary. § 1098. Settlement; how acquired. Settlement is acquired either as a matter of personal right or by derivation, settlement of the latter class being termed a derivative one. Settlement by right may be acquired through the residence of an individual for the time prescribed within the limits of a certain district.285 A legal settlement of this nature Com'rs of Sweetwater County v. 284 22 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 949; Inhabitants of Jefferson v. Inhabitants of Washington, 19 Me. 293. 285 Town of Guilford v. Town of New Haven, 56 Conn. 465, 16 Atl. 240; Inhabitants of Searsmont v. Inhabitants of Lincolnville, 83 Me. 75, 21 Atl. 747; Inhabitants of Augusta v. Inhabitants of Turner, 24 Me. 112. Settlement may be ob depends upon two essentials, namely, duration of residence 286 and its continuity.287 A settlement by right is also established through birth 288 and this will be taken as conclusive until it be shown that a person has a settlement elsewhere." tained through residence by one non compos mentis. Inhabitants of Kirkland v. Inhabitants of Bradford, 33 Me. 580; Inhabitants of Newry v. Inhabitants of Gilead, 60 Me. 154; Inhabitants of Belmont v. Inhabitants of Vinalhaven, 82 Me. 524, 20 Atl. 89; City of Fitchburg V. Inhabitants of Athol, 130 Mass. 370; Inhabitants of Dedham v. Inhabitants of Milton, 136 Mass. 424; Wellcome v. Town of Monticello, 41 Minn. 136, 42 N. W. 930; Town of Sunapee v. Town of Lempster, 65 N. H. 655, 23 Atl. 525; Eatontown V. Shrewsbury, 49 N. J. Law, 482, 9 Atl. 718; McLorinan v. Bridgewater Tp., 49 N. J. Law, 614, 10 Atl. 187; In re Town of Hector, 24 N. Y. Supp. 475. Italian laborers leaving their families in Italy and employed in con structing railroads, liable to be discharged at any time and free to leave their employment when they see fit, do not gain a settlement in a town in which they work for a year. City of Syracuse v. Onondaga County, 25 Misc. 371, 55 N. Y. Supp. 634; People v. Maynard, 160 N. Y. 453, 55 N. E. 9; Henrietta Tp. v. Brownhelm Tp., 9 Ohio, 76; Town of Hartford v. Town of Hartland, 19 Vt. 392; Town of Chittenden v. Town of Stockbridge, 63 Vt. 308, 21 Atl. 1102; Town of Fairfax v. Town of Westford, 67 Vt. 390, 31 Atl. 847; City of Rutland v. Town of Proctor, 68 Vt. 153, 34 Atl. 427; City of Rutland v. Chittenden, 74 Vt. 219, 52 Atl. 426; Town of Washington v. Abb. Corp. Vol. III―30. 289 Town of Corinth, 55 Vt. 468. Continuous residence and the payment of taxes are both necessary to give a legal settlement. State v. Dodge County, 56 Wis. 79; Town of Craftsbury v. Town of Greenboro, 66 Vt. 585, 29 Atl. 1024; St. Johnsbury v. Waterford, 67 Vt. 641, 32 Atl. 630. But see Town of Londonderry v. Town of Landgrove, 66 Vt. 264, 29 Atl. 256. 286 Town of New Haven v. Town of Middlebury, 63 Vt. 399, 21 Atl. 608; Town of Vershire v. Town of Hyde Park, 64 Vt. 638, 25 Atl. 431. 287 Rockingham v. Springfield, 59 Vt. 521, 9 Atl. 241. The fact that the head of the family goes about working from town to town does not change the residence of the family. Town of Northfield V. Town of Vershire, 33 Vt. 110. Imprisonment in another town will not interrupt the legal residence of a man having a home to which he intends to return when he regains his liberty. Town of Baltimore v. Town of Chester, 53 Vt. 315. Imprisonment in a state's prison does not interrupt the legal residence of the prisoner under the pauper law when he has a family and a home in a town and resides there at the time he is imprisoned. See, also, Inhabitants of South Thomaston v. Inhabitants of Friendship, 95 Me. 201, 49 Atl. 1056. 288 Inhabitants of Danbury v. Inhabitants of New Haven, 5 Conn. 584; Town of Salem v. Town of Lyme, 29 Conn. 74; Town of Washington v. Town of Kent, 38 Conn. (a) Settlement through ownership of property. The ownership of property 290 may determine the legal settlement of an individual and it is not always necessary that this be owned in fee simple. An interest less than this may establish the right.201 249; Town of Windham v. Town of Lebanon, 51 Conn. 319; Town of Guilford v. Town of Norwalk, 73 Conn. 161, 46 Atl. 881; Inhabitants of Houlton v. Inhabitants of Lubec, 35 Me. 411. An illegitimate child cannot obtain a settlement by birth. Inhabitants of Brewer v. Inhabitants of Eddington, 42 Me. 541; Inhabitants of Starks v. Inhabitants of New Portland, 47 Me. 183; City of Lewiston v. Inhabitants of Harrison, 69 Me. 504. The receipt of aid will interrupt the gaining of the settlement. See, also, on the same point Inhabitants of Glenburn v. Inhabitants of Naples, 69 Me. 68, and City of Bangor v. Inhabitants of Wiscasset, 71 Me. 535. Inhabitants of Topsham v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 74 Me. 236. Imprisonment for five years in state's prison does not interrupt continuity of residence required for a settlement Overseers of Paterson v. Byram, 23 N. J. Law (3 Zab.) 394; Overseers of Poor of Northumberland v. Overseers of Poor of Milton (Pa.) 9 Atl. 449; Wayne Tp. v. Jersey Shore, 81* Pa. 264; Town of Exeter v. Town of Warwick, 1 R. I. 63. 289 Shrewbury Overseer of Poor v. Holmdel Overseer of Poor, 42 N. J. Law, 373. 290 Town of Clinton v. Town of Westbrook, 38 Conn. 9; Inhabitants of Freeport v. Inhabitants of Sidney, 21 Me. 305; Inhabitants of Salem v. Inhabitants of Andover, 3 Mass. 436; Inhabitants of Wellfleet v. Inhabitants of Truro, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 137; Inhabitants of Conway v. Inhabitants of Deerfield, 11 Mass. 327; Inhabitants of Sudbury v. Inhabitants of Stow, 13 Mass. 463; Inhabitants of Southbridge v. Inhabitants of Charlton, 15 Mass. 248; Inhabitants of Spencer v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 140 Mass. 224. The rule does not apply to a married woman. Gilsum v. Sullivan, 36 N. H. 368; Derry v. Rockingham County, 62 N. H. 485. The assessor's valuation of property is not conclusive as to its value. Eatonton v. Shrewsbury, 49 N. J. Law, 188, 6 Atl. 319; Overseers of Poor of Cascade v. Overseers of Poor of Lewis, 148 Pa. 333, 23 Atl. 1003; Beaver Poor Dist. v. Rose Poor Dist., 98 Pa. 636; Town of Kirby v. Town of Waterford, 15 Vt. 753; Town of Newfane v. Town of Somerset, 49 Vt. 411. But see Overseers of Tewksbury v. Overseers of Readington, 8 N. J. Law (3 Halst.) 319. 291 Inhabitants of Oakham v. Inhabitants of Rutland, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 172. Interest necessary to acquire settlement by ownership of property. Inhabitants of Ipswich v. Inhabitants of Topsfield, 46 Mass. (5 Metc.) 350; Inhabitants of Oakham v. Inhabitants of Sutton, 54 Mass. (13 Metc.) 192; Inhabitants of Randolph v. Inhabitants of Norton, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 395; Overseers of Newark v. Overseers of Pompton, 3 N. J. Law (3 Penning.) 1038; Rouse's Estate v. Directors of Poor of McKean County, 169 Pa. 116, 32 Atl. 541; Smith V. Angell, 14 R. I. 192; Town of Wal |