which can be applied to determine absolutely, therefore, the liability of a corporation through the giving of notice to a particular signated person. The cases hold differently as depending upon custom or varying statutory or charter provisions.374 Where a policeman is charged with the duty of reporting or remedying defects, notice to him is notice to the city. Lundon v. City of Chicago, 83 Ill. App. 208; Reid v. City of Chicago, 83 Ill. App. 554. Unless a policeman is charged with the duty of reporting sidewalk defects, notice to him of one is not notice to the city. City of Lafayette v. Larson, 73 Ind. 367; City of Logansport v. Justice, 74 Ind. 378. Notice to city councilmen sufficient. City of Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 25 N. E. 65. Notice to city councilmen is notice to the city. Smith v. City of Des Moines, 84 Iowa, 685, 51 N. W. 77; Cook v. City of Anamosa, 66 Iowa, 427. Notice to city marshal not sufficient, he being clothed with no power or charged with no duty in respect to sidewalks. Owen v. City of Ft. Dodge, 98 Iowa, 281, 67 N. W. 281. Notice to member of city council sufficient. Keyes v. City of Cedar Falls, 107 Iowa, 509, 78 N. W. 227. Knowledge of an alderman of the defect is knowledge of the city. Rich v. City of Rockland, 87 Me. 188, 32 Atl. 872. Notice to foreman employed by road commissioners not sufficient. Dundas v. City of Lansing, 75 Mich. 499, 42 N. W. 1011, 5 L. R. A. 143; Fuller v. City of Jackson, 82 Mich. 480, 46 N. W. 721. Notice to street commissioner or aldermen good. Platz v. McKean Tp., 178 Pa. 601, 36 Atl. 136; City of Bonham v. Crider (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 419. Notice to aldermen sufficient. McKeigue v. City of Janesville, 68 Wis. 50, 31 N. W. 298; Jaquish v. Town of Ithaca, 36 Wis. 108. Notice to member of town Goldsboard supervisors good. worthy v. Town of Linden, 75 Wis. 24, 43 N. W. 656. Notice to highway overseers charged by the city with the duty of keeping highways in repair is notice to the town. 376 City of Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo. 375, 16 Pac. 30. Knowledge of chief of police held sufficient to charge a city with notice. City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 96 Ga. 177, 22 S. E. 709, Id., 102 Ga. 293, 29 S. E. 749. Where policemen are required to report defects in sidewalks, notice to one is notice to the city. City of Salina v. Trosper, 27 Kan. 544. Notice to mayor and marshal sufficient. City of Erie v. Phelps, 56 Kan. 135, 42 Pac. 336. Notice to marshal sufficient. City of Pittsburg v. Broderson, 10 Kan. App. 430, 62 Pac. 5. If the members of a committee of the city council on streets and bridges have knowledge of a dangerous and defective condition, it is sufficient to charge the city with negligence. Tuell v. Inhabitants of Paris, 23 Me. 556; Mason v. Inhabitants of Ellsworth, 32 Me. 271; Ham v. Inhabitants of Wales, 58 Me. 222. Notice to any intelligent inhabitant is notice to the town. Blake v. Lowell, 143 Mass. 296; City of Lincoln v. Woodward, 19 Neb. 259. Street commissioner. Rehberg v. City of New York, 91 N. Y. 137. Knowledge by policemen is notice to the city § 1036. Actual notice. Actual notice exists where a knowledge of the defect is given to or possessed by one who is authorized by law to charge his principal, the public corporation, with this knowledge. Actual notice obtains where a memorandum or entry is made of the defect in books kept for that purpose 378 or written or oral information of the defect is given to or acquired by the proper officer.379 § 1037. Statutory notice. In some states actual notice in respect to certain defects is provided for by charter or statutory provisions 380 which designate its character and form, 381 upon what officials to be served,382 and when the police are charged with the duty of removing nuisances from the street. Frazier v. Borough of Butler, 172 Pa. 407, 33 Atl. 691; Burger v. City of Philadelphia, 196 Pa. 41, 46 Atl. 262. City inspector. Jordan v. Peckham, 19 R. I. 28, 31 Atl. 305. Notice to individual member of town council not notice to town. See, also, authorities cited in preceding note. 377 Village of Sorento v. Johnson, 52 Ill. App. 659; City of Mattoon v. Russell, 91 Ill. App. 252. City aldermen. Village of Mt. Morris v. Kanode, 98 Ill. App. 373; Madison Tp. v. Scott, 9 Kan. App. 871, 61 Pac. 967; Shipley v. City of Bolivar, 42 Mo. App. 401. Actual knowledge implied from the frequent passing over the defect by defendant's officers. Cropper v. City of Mexico, 62 Mo. App. 385. Knowledge of a member of the city council of a city of the third class is notice to the city. Michels v. City of Syracuse, 92 Hun, 365, 36 N. Y. Supp. 507; Fee v. Borough of Columbus, 168 Pa. 382, 31 Atl. 1076; City of Lynchburg v. Wallace, 95 Va. 640, 29 S. E. 675; Cantwell v. City of Appleton, 71 Wis. 463, 37 N. W. 813; Barrett v. Village of Hammond, 87 Wis. 654; Mauch v. City of Hartford, 112 Wis. 40, 87 N. W. 816. 378 City of Joliet v. Looney, 159 Ill. 471, 42 N. E. 854; Blake v. Lowell, 143 Mass. 296, 9 N. E. 627. 379 Trapnell v. City of Red Oak Junction, 76 Iowa, 744, 39 N. W. 884; Fortin v. Easthampton, 142 Mass. 486. 380 McAllister v. City of Bridgeport, 72 Conn. 733, 46 Atl. 552; Tarba v. City of Rochester, 41 App. Div. 188, 58 N. Y. Supp. 755; Seamons v. Fitts, 21 R. I. 236. But see Hari v. Ohio Tp., 62 Kan. 315, 62 Pac. 1010. See, also, Madison Tp. v. Scott, 9 Kan. App. 871, 61 Pac. 967; McNally v. City of Cohoes, 53 Hun, 202, 6 N. Y. Supp. 842, 127 N. Y. 350, 27 N. E. 1043. 381 Carleton V. Inhabitants of Caribou, 88 Me. 461, 34 Atl. 269; Littlefield v. Inhabitants of Webster, 90 Me. 213, 38 Atl. 141; Gurney v. Inhabitants of Rockport, 93 Me. 360, 45 Atl. 310. 382 Smith v. City of Rochester, 64 Hun, 637, 19 N. Y. Supp. 459; Elias. v. City of Rochester, 162 N. Y. 614, 62 N. E. 1095, affirming 49 App. Div. the time which must elapse between the service of the notice prescribed and the time from which a liability of the corporation will accrue unless the defect described in the notice is remedied.383 Statutes of this character are construed strictly 384 and to create the rights contemplated by them they must be strictly followed in respect to the form of the notice, and the manner and time of its service. 385 § 1038. Constructive notice. Constructive notice obtains where a defective condition has existed for that length of time in which the public corporation acting through its proper officers and the usual means by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, might have discovered and remedied the defect.386 It arises or is presumed from the existence of facts with which ignorance is incompatible unless a failure to exercise care and diligence is assumed.387 Constructive notice is, 597, 63 N. Y. Supp. 712; Sprague v. City of Rochester, 159 N. Y. 20, 53 N. E. 697, reversing 88 Hun, 613, 34 N. Y. Supp. 1126; Sullivan v. City of Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 508. But see Conlon v. City of St. Paul, 70 Minn. 216, 72 N. W. 1073. 383 Bradbury v. City of Lewiston, 95 Me. 216, 49 Atl. 1041; Touhey v. City of Rochester, 64 App. Div. 56, 71 N. Y. Supp. 661. 384 McNally v. City of Cohoes, 53 Hun, 202, 6 N. Y. Supp. 842. 385 Hurley v. Inhabitants of Bowdoinham, 88 Me. 293, 34 Atl. 72; Wormwood v. Waltham, 144 Mass. 184, 10 N. E. 800. But see Schumacher v. City of New York, 166 N. Y. 103, 59 N. E. 773. 386 Seward v. City of Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 189, 42 Atl. 451; Pierce v. City of Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 306, 43 Atl. 162; Village of Lockport v. Richards, 81 Ill. App. 533; City of Chicago v. Baker, 95 Ill. App. 413; City of Sterling v. Merrill, 124 Ill. 522, 17 N. E. 6; City of Joliet v. Johnson, 177 Ill. 178, 52 N. E. 498; City of Frankfort v. Coleman, 19 Ind. App. 368, 49 N. E. 474; Porter County Com'rs v. Dombke, 94 Ind. 72; Huntington County Com'rs v. Bonebrake, 146 Ind. 311; Murray v. Woodson County Com'rs, 58 Kan. 1; City of Covington v. Huber, 23 Ky. L. R. 2107, 66 S. W. 619; Holt v. Inhabitants of Penobscott, 56 Me. 15; Germaine v. City of Muskegon, 105 Mich. 213, 63 N. W. 78; Cleveland v. City of St. Paul, 18 Minn. 279 (Gil. 255); Williams v. City of Hannibal, 94 Mo. App. 549, 68 S. W. 380; City of Lincoln v. Pirner, 59 Neb. 634, 81 N. W. 846; Howe v. Plainfield, 41 N. H. 135; Duncan v. City of Philadelphia, 173 Pa. 550, 34 Atl. 235; Tucker v. Salt Lake City, 10 Utah, 173, 37 Pac. 261; Piper v. City of Spokane, 22 Wash. 147, 60 Pac. 138; Born v. City of Spokane, 27 Wash. 719, 68 Pac. 386. 387 Dotton v. Village of Albion, 50 Mich. 129. therefore, a presumption arising from the existence of certain facts and conditions. The principle element constituting it is the lapse of time. No rule or principle can be laid down from which it can be arbitrarily decided when constructive notice or knowl-edge exists. It is dependent upon the facts and the circumstances surrounding each particular case.388 The existence of a defect for months has been held not to constitute constructive notice, and on the other hand this has been presumed from the existence of a defect for a period of twenty-four hours. In the notes will be found. many cases arranged simply as a matter of convenience according to a specified length of time,389 and also some where no liability 388 City of Birmingham v. Starr, 112 Ala. 98; City of Chicago v. Gillett, 91 Ill. App. 287; City of Ft. Wayne v. Patterson, 3 Ind. App. 34, 29 N. E. 167; Columbia City v. Langohr, 20 Ind. App. 395, 50 N. E. 831; Cason v. City of Ottumwa, 102 Iowa, 99, 71 N. W. 192; Keyes v. City of Cedar Falls, 107 Iowa, 509, Colley v. Inhabitants of Westbrook, 57 Me. 181; Olson v. Worcester, 142 Mass. 536; Stoddard v. Inhabitants of Winchester, 154 Mass. 149; Sawyer v. City of Newburyport, 157 Mass. 430; Bingham v. City of Boston, 161 Mass. 3; Baker v. City of Grand Rapids, 111 Mich. 447; Atherton v. Village of Bancroft, 114 Mich. 241; L'Herault v. City of Minneapolis, 69 Minn. 261; City of Lincoln v. Smith, 28 Neb. 762; Davis v. City of Omaha, 47 Neb. 836; Parsons v. Manchester, 67 N. H. 163; Barr v. Village of Bainbridge, 42 App. Div. 628, 59 N. Y. Supp. 132; Donnelly v. City of Rochester, 166 N. Y. 315, 59 N. E. 989; McCloskey v. Moies, 19 R. I. 297; Poole v. City of Jackson, 93 Tenn. 62, 23 S. W. 57; City of Palestine v. Hassell, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 519; City of Austin v. Colgate (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 896. City of Dallas v. Jones, 93 Tex. 38, 49 S. W. 577, 53 S. W. 377; Brown v. Town of Swanton, 69 Vt. 53; Bergevin v. City of Chippewa Falls, 82 Wis. 505, 52 N. W. 588; Woodward v. City of Boscobel, 84 Wis. 226; Crites v. City of New Richmond, 98 Wis. 55; Rhyner v. City of Menasha, 107 Wis. 201, 83 N. W. 303. Constructive notice does not depend upon the lapse of a certain period of time alone but on all the facts and circumstances of the case. 389 Hours: Parsons V. City of Manchester, 67 N. H. 163, 27 Atl. 88; Masters v. City of Troy, 50 Hun, 485, 3 N. Y. Supp. 450. Days: City of Griffin v. Johnson, 84 Ga. 279, 10 S. E. 719; Town of Monticello v. Kennard, 7 Ind. App. 135, 34 N. E. 454. Three days. City of Ft. Wayne v. Duryee, 9 Ind. App. 620, 37 N. E. 299. Four. City of Mt. Vernon v. Hoehn, 22 Ind. App. 282, 53 N. E. 654; Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 9 Utah 491, 35 Pac. 509; Bloor v. Town of Delafield, 69 Wis. 273, 34 N. W. 115. Weeks: Barr v. Kansas City, 105 Mo. 550, 16 S. W. 483; Young v. Webb City, 150 Mo. 333, 51 S. W. 709. Six. Chosen Freeholders of was held because of the shortness of the time between the occurrence of the defect and the happening of the injury.390 The de Morris County v. Hough, 55 N. J. Law, 628, 28 Atl. 86. Two. Warner v. Village of Randolph, 18 App. Div. 458, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1112. Six or more. Burns v. Town of Farmington, 31 App. Div. 364, 52 N. Y. Supp. 229; Tarba v. City of Rochester, 41 App. Div. 188, 58 N. Y. Supp. 755; McDonald v. City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 47 N. W. 434; Sullivan v. City of Oshkosh, 55 Wis. 508. Months: City of Montgomery v. Wright, 72 Ala. 411; Brownlee v. Village of Alexis, 39 Ill. App. 135; City of Decatur v. Besten, 169 Ill. 340, 48 N. E. 186. Six or more, question for jury. Waud v. Polk County, 88 Iowa, 617, 55 N. W. 528; Finnegan v. Sioux City, 112 Iowa, 232, 83 N. W. 907; City of Newport v. Miller, 93 Ky. 22, 18 S. W. 835; Mulliken V. City of Corunna, 110 Mich. 212, 68 N. W. 141; Rodda v. City of Detroit, 117 Mich. 412, 75 N. W. 939; Urtel v. City of Flint, 122 Mich. 65, 80 N. W. 991; Laverdure v. City of New York, 28 App. Div. 65, 50 N. Y. Supp. 882. April to following September. Parker v. City of Laredo, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 221, 28 S. W. 1048. Three or four. Lorence v. City of Ellensburgh, 13 Wash. 341, 43 Pac. 20; Sutton v. City of Snohomish, 11 Wash. 24, 39 Pac. 273; Devenish v. City of Spokane, 21 Wash. 77, 57 Pac. 340. One to four. Hall v. City of Fond du Lac, 42 Wis. 275; Schuenke v. Town of Pine River, 84 Wis. 669, 54 N. W. 1007. Several. West v. City of Eau Claire, 89 Wis. 31, 61 N. W. 313. Miscellaneous: Downs v. Town of Smyrna, 2 Pen. (Del.) 132, 45 Atl. 717; City of Anna v. Boren, 77 Ill. App. 408. Sidewalk out of repair so long that witnesses cannot remember when it was otherwise. Tilton v. Inhabitants of Wenham, 172 Mass. 407, 52 N. E. 514; Hart v. New Haven, 130 Mich. 181, 89 N. W. 677. Two years. Whitfield v. City of Meridian, 66 Miss. 570, 6 So. 244, 4 L. R. A. 834; Turner v. City of Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301, 16 N. E. 344; Bullock v. Town of Durham, 64 Hun, 380, 19 N. Y. Supp. 635. Four years. Fisher v. City of Mt. Vernon, 41 App. Div. 293, 58 N. Y. Supp. 499. More than a year. Grimm v. Town of Washburn, 100 Wis. 229, 75 N. W. 984. 390 Ince v. City of Toronto, 27 Ont. App. 410. Five hours. City of Montezuma v. Wilson, 82 Ga. 206, 9 S. E. 17. Afternoon before plaintiff was injured. City of Warsaw v. Dunlap, 112 Ind. 576, 14 N. E. 568. One hour and forty-five minutes. City of Lafayette v. Blood, 40 Ind. 62; Town of Lewisville v. Batson, 29 Ind. App. 21, 63 N. E. 861. From between three and five o'clock in the afternoon until nine o'clock that night, time of the injury. Jones v. City of Clinton, 100 Iowa, 333, 69 N. W. 418; Stoddard v. Inhabitants of Winchester, 154 Mass. 149, 27 N. E. 1014; Bingham v. City of Boston, 161 Mass. 3, 36 N. E. 473. Question for jury. Reed v. City of Detroit, 99 Mich. 204, 58 N. W. 44. Morning before accident. Thomas v. City of Flint, 123 Mich. 10, 81 N. W. 936, 47 L. R. A. 499. Two or three days. Dittrich v. City of Detroit, 98 Mich. 245, 57 N. W. 125; Butler v. Town of Oxford, 69 |