both in respect to private life and business affairs and governmental acts. The powers they are permitted to exercise and the duties they are required to perform are regarded as of governmental nature only and therefore to be exercised and performed for the benefit of the community or the public at large. The establishment, improvement and maintenance of highways is considered as one of various governmental functions. The rule, therefore, exists established by such a weight of authority as to be regarded universal that no liability attaches to a public quasi corporation for a failure to maintain in a reasonably fit and safe condition for public travel, the highways within their jurisdietion.137 Even where the duty is specifically imposed by statute, it is still regarded, in some cases, as public in its character, not corporate, and no liability is thereby created.13. Exceptions. In a few states, however, a limited liability exists at common law or by force of some statute dealing only with designated conditions.139 In Iowa a liability attaches in respect to defective bridges only.140 137 Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; Covington County v. Kinney, 45 Ala. 176; Barbour County v. Horn, 48 Ala. 649; Scales v. Ordinary of Chattahoochee, 41 Ga. 225; Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346; Abbett v. Johnson County Com'rs, 114 Ind. 61, 16 N. E. 127; Jasper County Com'rs v. Allman, 142 Ind. 573, 42 N. E. 206, 39 L. R. A. 58; Cones v. Benton County Com'rs, 137 Ind. 404, 37 N. E. 272; Shrum v. Washington County Com'rs, 13 Ind. App. 585, 41 N. E. 349; Yeager v. Tippecanoe Tp., 81 Ind. 46; Fulton County Com'rs v. Rickel, 106 Ind. 501; Packard v. Voltz, 94 Iowa, 277, 62 N. W. 757; Eikenberry v. Bazaar Tp., 22 Kan. 556; Wheatly v. Mercer, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 704; Sinkhorn v. Lexington H. & P. Turnpike R. Co., 23 Ky. L. R. 1479, 65 S. W. 356; Frazer v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 76 Me. 531; Niles High way Com'rs v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557; Altno v. Town of Sibley, 30 Minn. 186; Weltsch v. Town of Stark, 65 Minn. 5, 67 N. W. 648; Peck v. Village of Batavia, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 634; Markey v. Queen's County, 154 N. Y. 675, 49 N. E. 71, 39 L. R. A. 46; Reiss v. Town of Pelham, 53 App. Div. 459, 65 N. Y. Supp. 1033; Vail v. Town of Amenia, 4 N. D. 239; Prindle v. Town of Fletcher, 39 Vt. 255. 138 But see Willey v. City of Ellsworth, 64 Me. 57. 139 Munson v. Town of Derby, 37 Conn. 298; Pleasant Grove Tp. v. Ware, 7 Kan. App. 648, 53 Pac. 885; Calvert County Com'rs v. Gibson, 36 Md. 229; Hartford County Com'rs v. Hamilton, 60 Md. 340; Richardson v. Inhabitants of Danvers, 176 Mass. 413, 57 N. E. 688. A bicycle is not a carriage within the meaning of Pub. St. c. 52, § 1, which provides that highways shall § 984. Of chartered municipalities. Municipal corporations proper, on the other hand, are not only governmental agents but in a certain sense are regarded as quasi private corporations possessing special privileges which are exercised for the benefit of their citizens alone. They possess local, private and proprietary powers which are exercised for the advantage and convenience of a local community not solely for the benefit or advantage of the community or the public at large. They are governed almost universally by charters from the state, not arbitrarily imposed, but voluntarily assumed. The conditions of life are complex and varied. From these considerations the rule arises that they are charged with a liability express or implied for a failure to preserve and maintain the public ways within their limits in a reasonably safe condition for public travel.141 The responsibility cannot be evaded by its delegation be kept in repair "so that the same may be reasonably safe and convenient for travelers with their horses, teams, and carriages at all seasons of the year." Woodman v. Town of Nottingham, 49 N. H. 387; Van Vane v. Inhabitants of Center Tp., 67 N. J. Law, 587, 52 Atl. 359; McCalla v. Multnomah County, 3 Or. 424; Gardner v. Wasco County, 37 Or. 392, 61 P. 834, 62 P. 753; Dean v. New Milford Tp., 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 545; Burrell Tp. v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353, 11 Atl. 619. Perry Tp. v. John, 79 Pa. 412. The original construction of roads is to be controlled by the topographical features, population and taxable ability of the township and in an action to recover damages for injuries caused by the alleged narrowness of the way, it is error to exclude evidence that the road could not have been made wider at that point without incurring enormous expense such as the township could not bear. Shadler v. Blair County, 136 Pa. 488, 20 Atl. 539. 140 Chandler v. Fremont County, 42 Iowa, 58; Huston v. Iowa County, 43 Iowa, 456; Krause v. Davis County, 44 Iowa, 141; Miller v. Boone County, 95 Iowa, 5. 141 City of Jacksonville v. Smith (C. C. A.) 78 Fed. 292; City of Selma v. Perkins, 68 Ala. 145; Lord v. City of Mobile, 113 Ala. 360; Doeg v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 58 Pac. 707; City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328; City of Boulder v. Niles, 9 Colo. 415, 12 Pac. 632; Mead v. Town of Derby, 40 Conn. 205; Makepeace v. City of Waterbury, 74 Conn. 360, 50 Atl. 876; Hall v. City of Norwalk, 65 Conn. 310, 32 Atl. 400; City of Savannah v. Cullens, 38 Ga. 334; Giffen v. City of Lewiston, 6 Idaho, 231, 55 Pac. 545; City of Pekin v. Newell, 26 Ill. 320. The liability exists though the street may have been constructed in a different manner from that authorized by law. City of Sterling v. Thomas, 60 Ill. 264; City of Frankfort v. Coleman, 19 Ind. App. 368, 49 N. E. 474. Upon the annexation of territory to a state the liability exists in respect to the annexed streets. Town of Williamsport v. Lisk, 21 Ind. App. 414, 52 N. E. 628; Byerly v. City of Anamosa, 79 Iowa, 204; Ford v. City of Des Moines, 106 Iowa, 94; Cline v. Crescent City R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851; Bliss v. Inhabitants of Deerfield, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 102; Raymond v. City of Haverhill, 168 Mass. 382; Fox v. City of Chelsea, 171 Mass. 297; Johnson v. City of Worcester, 172 Mass. 122; Nicodemo v. Inhabitants of Southborough, 173 Mass. 455; Southwell v. City of Detroit, 74 Mich. 438, 42 N. W. 118; Face v. City of Ionia, 90 Mich. 104, 51 N. W. 184. Where the liability is imposed by statute it will be strictly construed. Roberts v. City of Detroit, 102 Mich. 64, 60 N. W. 450, 27 L. R. A. 572. There is no common-law liability of a municipal corporation for injuries caused by a neglect to repair highways or sidewalks. Sebert v. City of Alpena, 78 Mich. 165, 43 N. W. 1098; Moon v. City of Ionia, 81 Mich. 635; Shietart V. City of Detroit, 108 Mich. 309; Walker v. City of Ann Arbor, 111 Mich. 1; Doak v. Saginaw Tp., 119 Mich. 680; Shartle v. City of Minneapolis, 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284); McHugh v. City of St. Paul, 67 Minn. 441; Tarras v. City of Winona, 71 Minn. 22; Hall v. City of Austin, 73 Minn. 134, 75 N. W. 1121; Cunningham v. City of Thief River Falls, 84 Minn. 21, 86 N. W. 763; May v. City of Anaconda, 26 Mont. 140, 66 Pac. 759; City of Wahoo v. Reeder, 27 Neb. 770; McDonough v. Virginia City, 6 Nev. 90; Carter v. City of Rahway, 55 N. J. Law, 177; Lane v. Town of Hancock, 67 Hun, 623, 22 N. Y. Supp. 470; Seymour v. Village of Salamanca, 137 N. Y. 364, 33 N. E. 304; City of Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 47 N. Y. 475. The duty cannot be evaded by contract with third persons for its performance. Bieling v. City of Brooklyn, 120 N. Y. 98, 24 N. E. 389; Ludlow v. City of Fargo, 3 N. D. 485, 57 N. W. 506; City of Circleville v. Sohn, 59 Ohio St. 285, 52 N. E. 788; City of Dayton v. Taylor's Adm'r, 62 Ohio St. 11, 56 N. E. 480; City of Guthrie v. Swan, 5 Okl. 779, 51 Pac. 562. Since municipal corporations have been granted the power to levy taxes for the opening, improving and maintaining of streets and have been given special powers of control over them, they are liable for personal injuries caused by negligence in permitting a street to be left in an unsafe condition even in the absence of an express statutory provision imposing such a liability. Sheridan v. City of Salem, 14 Or. 328, 12 Pac. 925; Farquar v. City of Roseburg, 18 Or. 271, 22 Pac. 1103; Munn v. City of Pittsburg, 40 Pa. 364; City of Barthold v. City of Philadelphia, 154 Pa. 109, 26 Atl. 304; Seamans v. Fitts, 20 R. I. 443; State v. City of Loudon, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 263; Hopkins v. Ogden City, 5 Utah, 390; City of Roanoke v. Harrison (Va.) 19 S. E. 179; Sutton v. City of Snohomish, 11 Wash. 24, 39 Pac. 273; Griffin v. Town of Williamstown, 6 W. Va. 312; Kittredge v. City of Milwau kee, 26 Wis. 46; Burns v. Town of Elba, 32 Wis. 605; McFarlane v. City of Milwaukee, 51 Wis. 691; Bills v. Town of Kaukauna, 94 Wis. to third parties either by contract, by imposing the duty upon a butting owners, or otherwise.142 § 985. Exceptions to the above rule. The principle stated in the preceding section is not followed in a number of states, notably in New England, where it held that chartered municipalities, unless the liability is imposed by statute or charter, have no obligation resting upon them to maintain and repair their public ways.143 The reasons for this are given in 310. See, also, note 53 Cent. Law J. 123. 142 City of Cleveland v. King, 132 U. S. 295; City of Jacksonville v. Drew, 19 Fla. 106; City of Rockford v. Hildebrand, 61 Ill. 155; Hogan v. City of Chicago, 168 Ill. 551, 48 N. E. 210; Gaff v. Hutchinson, 38 Ind. 341; Rowell v. Williams, 29 Iowa, 210; Union St. R. Co. v. Stone, 54 Kan. 83, 37 Pac. 1012; Wellcome v. Inhabitants of Leeds, 51 Me. 313; Prentiss v. City of Boston, 112 Mass. 43; Blessington v. City of Boston, 153 Mass. 409, 26 N. E. 1113; Hayes v. West Bay City, 91 Mich. 418, 51 N. W. 1067; Estelle v. Village of Lake Crystal, 27 Minn. 243; Blake v. City of St. Louis, 40 Mo. 569; Russell v. Town of Columbia, 74 Mo. 480; Carpenter V. Nashua, 58 N. H. 37; Davis v. City of Omaha, 47 Neb. 836, 66 N. W. 859; City of Lincoln v. Pirner, 59 Neb. 634, 81 N. W. 846; Scanlon v. City of Watertown, 14 App. Div. 1, 43 N. Y. Supp. 618; People v. City of Brooklyn, 65 N. Y. 349; City of Circleville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465; McAllister v. City of Albany, 18 Or. 426, 23 Pac. 845; Mahony Tp. v. Scholly, 84 Pa. 136; Watson v. Tripp, 11 R. I. 98; Patterson v. City of Austin (Tex. Civ. App.) 29 S. W. 1139; Willard v. Town of Newbury, 22 Vt. 458; McCoull v. City of Manchester, 85 Va. 579, 8 S. E. 379; Sproul v. City of Seattle, 17 Wash, 256, 49 Pac. 489. 143 City of Ft. Smith v. York, 52 Ark. 84, 12 S. W. 157, following City of Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139, 4 S. W. 450; Winbigler v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. 36; Chope v. City of Eureka, 78 Cal. 588, 21 Pac. 364, 4 L. R. A. 325; Arnold v. San Jose, 81 Cal. 618, 22 Pac. 877; McGowan v. Town of Windham, 25 Conn. 86; Falls Village Water Power Co. v. Tibbetts, 31 Conn. 165; Haines v. City of Lewiston, 84 Me. 18, 24 Atl. 430; Carter v. City of Rahway, 57 N. J. Law, 196, 30 Atl. 863, affirming 55 N. J. Law, 177, 26 Atl. 96; Pray v. Jersey City, 32 N. J. Law, 394; Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Or. 577, 65 Pac. 1066. The provisions of the city charter of Astoria exempting the city and the members of the council from liability on account of damages resulting from defective streets is contrary to Constitution, art. 1, § 10, which guarantees to every person a remedy by due course of law for injuries sustained by him in person or property. Taylor v. Peckham, 8 R. I. 349; Parker v. Village of Rutland, 56 Vt. 224. a leading decision 144 where all the authorities at that time were reviewed and considered. The question arising in this case was the liability of a city for an injury to a child caused by a defective school building, but the discussion in the decision includes generally the performance of governmental duties. A case in Arkansas 145 also considers fully the reason for this rule. In some of the states where the above common law is maintained, special liabilities have been imposed by statute. § 986. Reasons for different doctrines. From an examination of the authorities as cited in a few preceding sections, it will be found that the courts, while maintaining substantially the same doctrine, namely, absolving quasi corporations from liability and imposing it upon municipal corporations proper, are widely at variance in the legal reasons given for maintaining the distinction. As a matter of fact, both quasi and municipal corporations are alike subdivisions of the state or sovereign created for public, although local in each case, governmental purposes. A difference is not found altogether in the condition that the one is given greater powers than the other unless the power is given not for governmental purposes but to engage in some enterprise of a quasi private nature and more frequently to municipal corporations from which they derive a pecuniary benefit in their corporate or proprietary capacity as for example, power to construct lighting plants or waterworks, to supply light or water for sale to private consumers or to maintain toll bridges or ferries from each of which a revenue would be derived. In this class of cases it is universally held that corporations are liable for their wrongful or negligent acts because done in what is termed their private or corporate character and not in their public capacity as governing agents in the discharge of duties imposed for the public or general benefit.146 The gov ernmental powers given to each class of corporations are conferred for political purposes and in each case because they are governmental agencies. As stated in the Arkansas case, the 144 Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344. 145 Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139, 4 S. W. 450. 146 Snider v. City of St. Paul, 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 753, 18 L. R. A. 151. 147 City of Arkadelphia v. Wind |