the part of public authorities to open, construct or repair a road or a portion of it legally established 1345 or the payment of taxes by private persons on the land used.1346 As in the case of a dedication of a highway it is necessary to establish the intent of the owner to dedicate,1347 so in its abandonment it is necessary to establish the intent of the proper legal authorities to abandon it 1348 Wesler, 10 Ind. App. 153, 37 N. E. 956; Wolfe v. Town of Sullivan, 133 Ind. 331; Davies v. Huebner, 45 Iowa, 574; Wenzel v. Kempmeier, 53 Iowa, 255; Bradley v. Appanoose County, 106 Iowa, 105, 76 N. W. 519; Stickel v. Stoddard, 28 Kan. 715; In re Railroad Com'rs, 91 Me. 135, 39 Atl. 478; Richardson V. Davis, 91 Md. 390, 46 Atl. 964; State v. Morse, 50 N. H. 9; Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Hoboken, 33 N. J. Law, 13; Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 36 N. J. Law, 540; Riehle v. Heulings, 38 N. J. Eq. (11 Stew.) 20; Amsbey v. Hinds, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 622; Crump v. Mims, 64 N. C. 767; City of Pittsburg v. EppingCarpenter Co., 194 Pa. 318, 45 Atl. 129; Greene v. O'Connor, 18 R. I. 56, 25 Atl. 692, 19 L. R. A. 262; Crocker v. Collins, 37 S. C. 327, 15 S. E. 951; Chafee v. City of Aiken, 57 S. C. 507, 35 S. E. 800; State v. Leaver, 62 Wis. 387; Moore v. Roberts, 64 Wis. 538; City of Madison v. Mayers, 97 Wis. 399, 73 N. W. 43, 40 L. R. A. 635. 1345 London & S. F. Bank v. City of Oakland, 86 Fed. 30; Holmes v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co., 93 Fed. 100; Brown v. Hiatt, 16 Ind. App. 340, 45 N. E. 481; Shea v. City of Ottumwa, 67 Iowa, 39; Uptagraff v. Smith, 106 Iowa, 385; Webb V. Butler County Com'rs, 52 Kan. 375, 34 Pac. 973; Louisiana Ice Mfg. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 43 La. Ann. 217, 9 So. 21; Flersheim v. City of Baltimore, 85 Md. 489, 36 Atl. 1098; State v. Culver, 65 Mo. 607; Kelly Nail & Iron Co. v. Lawrence Furnace Co., 46 Ohio St. 544, 22 N. E. 639, 5 L. R. A. 652; Watts v. Southern Bell Telep. & Tel. Co., 100 Va. 45, 40 S. E. 107; Ralston v. Town of Weston, 46 W. Va. 544, 33 S. E. 326. Reilly v. City of Racine, 51 Wis. 526, 8 N. W. 417. "Until the time arrives when any street or part of a street is required for actual public use, and when the public authorities may be promptly called upon to open it for the public use, no mere non user, of any length of time, will operate as an abandonment of it, and all persons in possession of it will be presumed to hold subject to the paramount right of the public." 1346 Beebe v. City of Little Rock, 68 Ark. 39, 56 S. W. 791; Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 41 Pac. 448; City of Ashland v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 105 Wis. 398, 80 N. W. 1101. But see City of Huntington v. Townsend, 29 Ind. App. 269, 63 N. E. 36. 1347 See §§ 928 et seq., ante. 1348 Shirk v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 298, 63 N. E. 193; Duncombe v. Powers, 75 Iowa, 185, 39 N. W. 261; Larson v. Fitzgerald, 87 Iowa, 402, 54 N. W. 441. 1349 Dingwall V. Weld County Com'rs, 19 Colo. 415, 36 Pac. 148; and in this respect the rule of strict construction will apply and a doubt reserved in favor of the continued existence of the highway rather than its abandonment.1849 The rule is based upon the same reasons as given in a preceding section as applying to the burden of proof and character of the evidence necessary in the vacation of public roads. § 946. Prescriptive title. In preceding sections 1350 the question of the acquirement of a prescriptive title by private persons in public ways, has been considered and the rule there laid down that in the greater number of jurisdictions, and unless expressly provided by statute, the statute of limitations will not run as against the public authorities. The mere fact, therefore, that there may have been a user or even a long continued user by private parties for private uses of a highway or some portion of it will not establish the abandonment of that highway or the portion used 1351 unless expressly held otherwise for the reasons given in the section just referred to. Champlin v. Morgan, 20 II. 181; 1350 See §§ 824, 825, ante. 1351 London & S. F. Bank v. City of Oakland (C. C. A.) 90 Fed. 691, affirming 86 Fed. 30; City & County of San Francisco v. Center, 133 Cal. 673, 66 Pac. 83; Schwerdtle v. Placer County, 108 Cal. 589, 31 Pac. 448; Marsh v. Village of Fairbury, 163 Ill. 401, 45 N. E. 236; Taylor v. Pearce, 179 III. 145, 53 N. E. 622; Wolfe v. Town of Sullivan, 133 Ind. 331, 32 N. E. 1017; Giffen v. City of Olathe, 44 Kan. 342, 24 Pac. 470; Hentzler v. Bradbury, 5 Kan. App. 1, 47 Pac. 330; La Fitte v. City of New Orleans, 52 La. Ann. 2099, 28 So. 327; Heald v. Moore, 79 Me. 271, 9 Atl. 734; City of Baltimore v. Frick, 82 Md. 77, 33 Atl. 435; Village of Crandville v. Jenison, 84 Mich. 54, 47 N. W. 600; Parker v. City of St. Paul, 47 Minn. 317, 50 N. W. 247; Zimmerman v. Snowden, 88 Mo. 218; Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Hoboken, 33 N. J. Law, 13; Hoboken Land & Imp. Co. v. City of Hoboken, 36 N. J. Law, 540; Mangan v. Village of Sing Sing, 164 N. Y. 560, 58 N. E. 1089, affirming 26 App. Div. 464, 50 N. Y. Supp. 647; Fox v. Hart, 11 Ohio, 414; Commonwealth v. Moorehead, 118 Pa. 344, 12 Atl. 424; Hill V. Hoffman (Tenn. Ch. App.) 58 S. W. 929; Johnson v. Llano County, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 421, 39 S. W. 995; Yates v. Town of Warrenton, 84 Va. 337, 4 S. E. 818; Bartlett v. Beardmore, 77 Wis. 356, 46 N. W. 494. But see Rector v. Christy, 114 Iowa, 471, 87 N. W. 489. $947. Reversion. Upon the vacation or abandonment of a highway the title to the property passes to the abutting owner. The owner of the soil is restored to his original rights in the same,1352 for, as has been said, "The land does not revert, because there has been no alienation. The public has only been entitled to a certain specific right, the enjoyment of which is incompatible with the exercise of certain private rights, which are therefore necessarily suspended. When, however, the public right is relinquished, this incompatibility vanishes, and, as an inevitable consequence, the private rights thereby suspended revive." 1353 In some states where the fee is held by the public corporation there are cases holding to the effect that upon the vacation or abandonment of a street or a portion of it, the land does not repass to the abutting owner, 1354 and the rule also obtains in some jurisdictions that upon the vacation or abandonment of a street or a portion of it, land will revert not to the abutting owner but to the original grantor 1355 though the conditions imposed in the original dedi 1352 Beebe v. City of Little Rock, 68 Ark. 39, 56 S. W. 791; Benham v. Potter, 52 Conn. 248; Olin v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 25 Colo. 177, 53 Pac. 454; Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 124 III. 235, 15 N. E. 854; Thomsen v. McCormick, 136 Ill. 135, 26 N. E. 373; Challis v. Depot & R. Co., 45 Kan. 398, 25 Pac. 894; Showalter v. Southern Kan. R. Co., 49 Kan. 421, 32 Pac. 42; Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Showalter, 57 Kan. 681, 47 Pac. 831; Scudder V. City of Detroit, 117 Mich. 77, 75 N. W. 286; Lamm v. Chicago, St. P., M. & C. R. Co., 45 Minn. 71, 47 N. W. 455, 10 L. R. A. 268; Thomas v. Hunt, 134 Mo. 392, 35 S. W. 581, 32 L. R. A. 857; Omaha South R. Co. v. Beeson, 36 Neb. 361, 54 N. W. 557; Village of Bellevue v. Bellevue Imp. Co. (Neb.) 90 N. W. 1002; Blain v. Staab, 10 N. M. 743, 65 Pac. 177; St. Vincent F. C. Asylum v. City of Troy, 12 1353 Angell, Highways, § 326. 1354 Lindsay v. City of Omaha, 30 Neb. 512, 46 N. W. 627; Watson v. City of New York, 67 App. Div. 573, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1027, affirming 34 Misc. 701, 70 N. Y. Supp. 1033. 1355 Wirt v. McHenry, 21 Fed. 233; Gebhardt v. Reeves, 75 Ill. cation may determine to whom the title will pass upon the vacation or abandonment of the road. § 948. Collateral attack. In all proceedings leading to the establishment of a public highway, its vacation or abandonment, the rule almost universally obtains that their validity cannot be made the subject of collateral attack. Questions arising connected with the conditions or rules given in the preceding sections must be raised in proceedings or actions brought directly for that purpose.1356 § 949. Revocation of dedication as affecting right to vacate or abandon. In a previous section 1357 the rule has been stated that if an offer to dedicate or a grant is accepted at any time before the dedication is withdrawn, this is usually held sufficient. The rights of the public authorities accrue only upon the establishment of a public highway as such and if an offer of dedication or grant is withdrawn or revoked before accepted, the principles in respect to the vacation or the abandonment of highways will not apply. The question of what constitutes a revocation or dedication is usually one of fact1358 and will depend upon the existence of the 301; Huff v. Hastings Exp. Co., 195 Ill. 257, 63 N. E. 105. But see Earll v. City of Chicago, 136 Ill. 277, 26 N. E. 370; Board of Education of Van Wert v. Town of Van Wert, 18 Ohio St. 221. 1356 Bailey v. McCain, 92 III. 277; Ellis v. Blue Mt. Forest Ass'n, 69 N. H. 385, 41 Atl. 856, 42 L. R. A. 570; Stanley v. Sharp, 48 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 417; Robson v. Byler, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 374; Haynes v. Lasell, 29 Vt. 167. But see Larson v. Fitzgerald, 87 Iowa, 402, 54 N. W. 441. 1357 See 737. 1358 McKenzie v. Gilmore (Cal.) 33 Pac. 262; People v. Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc. 84 Cal. 634, 24 Pac. 295; Schmitt v. City & County of San Francisco, 100 Cal. 302, 34 Pac. 961. A deed of property before an acceptance will operate as a revocation of an offer to dedicate. Moore V. Kleppish, 104 Iowa, 319, 73 N. W. 830; Rothbager v. Village of Tonawanda, 59 Hun, 628, 13 N. Y. Supp. 937; State Fisher, 117 N. C. 733, 23 S. E. 158. V. intent to dedicate 1859 and a failure to accept on the part of the public authorities.1360 1359 City of Eureka v. Croghan, 81 Cal. 524, 22 Pac. 693, reversing 19 Pac. 485; Lightcap v. Town of North Judson, 154 Ind. 43, 55 N. E. 952; Eckerson v. Village of Haverstraw, 6 App. Div. 102, 39 N. Y. Supp. 635; In re Hunter, 47 App. Div. 102, 62 N. Y. Supp. 169. See, also, Trine v. City of Pueblo, 21 Colo. 102, 39 Pac. 330; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Town of Britt, 105 Iowa, 198, 74 N. W. 933. 1360 People v. Reed (Cal.) 20 Pac. 708; Prescott v. Edwards, 117 Cal. 298; City of Edwardsville v. Barnsback, 66 Ill. App. 381; Hewes v. Village of Crete, 68 Ill. App. 305; Village of Vermont v. Miller, 161 Ill. 210, 43 N. E. 975; McGrew v. Town of Lettsville, 71 Iowa, 150, 32 N. W. 252;; Brown v. Taber, 103 Iowa, 1, 72 N. W. 416; Clendenin v. Maryland Const. Co., 86 Md. 80, 37 Atl. 709; Rosenberger v. Miller, 61 Mo. App. 422; People v. Kellogg, 67 Hun, 546, 22 N. Y. Supp. 490. An acceptance of a dedication after the death of the owner is too late. In re Beck St. Opening, 19 Misc. 571, 44 N. Y. Supp. 1087; Village of Lockland v. Smiley, 26 Ohio St. 94. The giving of a deed before acceptance by a general warranty operates in law as a revocation of land dedicated to a public use. Merchant v. Town of Marshfield, 35 Or. 55; City of Norfolk v. Nottingham, 96 Va. 34; Mahler v. Brumder, 92 Wis. 477, 66 N. W. 502, 31 L. R. A. 695. The refusal of public authorities to approve a plat dedicating a street to a public use operates as a failure to accept. See, also, Lightcap v. Town of North Judson, 154 Ind. 43. |