tional burden.1273 The construction and operation of an elevated road is ordinarily regarded as entitling the abutting owner to additional compensation.1274 The construction and operation of telephone, telegraph and electric light or power systems upon a suburban highway, by almost universal authority is regarded as all or a portion of the street to the continued exclusion of the rest of the public. If they do not, then it is not an additional burden. If they do, it is." See, also, very full note in 106 Am. St. Rep. p. 232. See §§ 844 et seq., ante. 1273 Birmingham Traction Co. v. Birmingham & R. Elec. Co., 119 Ala. 137, 24 So. 502, 43 L. R. A. 233; General Elec. R. Co. v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co., 184 Ill. 588, 56 N. E. 963; Snyder v. Ft. Madison St. R. Co., 105 Iowa, 284, 75 N. W. 179, 41 L. R. A. 345; Louisville Bagging Mfg. Co. v. Central Pass. R. Co., 95 Ky. 50; Taylor v. Portsmouth, K. & Y. St. R. Co., 91 Me. 193, 39 Atl. 560; Poole v. Falls Road Elec. R. Co., 88 Md. 533, 41 Atl. 1069; Eustis v. Milton St. R. Co., 183 Mass. 586, 67 N. E. 663; Dean v. Ann Arbor St. R. Co., 93 Mich. 330, 53 N. W. 396; Placke v. Union Depot R. Co., 140 Mo. 634, 41 S. W. 915; Roebling v. Trenton Pass. R. Co., 58 N. J. Law, 666, 34 Atl. 1090, 33 L. R. A. 129; Budd v. Camden Horse R. Co., 70 N. J. Law, 782, 59 Atl. 229; Hudson River Tel. Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike & R. Co., 135 N. Y. 393, 32 N. E. 148, 17 L. R. A. 674; Cumberland Teleg. & Tel. Co. v. United Elec. R. Co., 93 Tenn. 492, 29 S. W. 104, 27 L. R. A. 236; Reid v. Norfolk City R. Co., 94 Va. 117, 26 S. E. 428, 36 L. R. A. 274; La Crosse City R. Co. v. Higbee, 107 Wis. 389, 83 N. W. 701, 51 L. R. A. 923; Younkin v. Milwaukee Light, Heat & Traction Co., 120 Wis. 477, 98 N. W. 215; Western Pav. & Supply Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co. (Ind.) 25 Am. St. Rep. 479, with note. But see Jaynes v. Omaha St. R. Co., 53 Neb. 631, 74 N. W. 67, 39 L. R. A. 751; Street R. Co. v. Doyle, 88 Tenn. 747, 13 S. W. 936, 9 L. R. A. 100. 1274 New York El. R. Co. v. Fifth Nat. Bank, 135 U. S. 432; Freiday v. Sioux City Rapid Transit Co., 92 Iowa, 191, 60 N. W. 656, 26 L. R. A. 246; De Geofroy v. Merchants' Bridge Terminal R. Co., 179 Mo. 698, 79 S. W. 386. But see Jones v. Erie & W. V. R. Co., 151 Pa. 30, 25 Atl. 134, 17 L. R. A. 758. The construction of an electric road of itself imposes no additional servi tude but if it interferes with the private easements of the abutting owner, he is entitled to compensation. See, also, the Illinois cases where it is held that an elevated railroad is not an additional burden, yet, abutting owners are entitled to compensation under the Illinois constitutional provision relative to the taking of private property for a public use without just compensation. See the following cases: Doane v. Lake St. El. R. Co., 165 Ill. 510, 46 N. E. 520, 36 L. R. A. 97; Aldrich v. Metropolitan W. S. R. Co., 195 Ill. 456, 63 N. E. 155, 57 L. R. A. 237, and Aldis v. Union El. R. Co., 203 Ill. 567, 68 N. E. 95. See, also, Baker v. Boston El. R. Co., 183 Mass. 178, 66 N. E. 711, and see 848, ante. an additional servitude for which the owner can recover com- 1273 Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Easton, 170 Ill. 513, 49 N. E. 365, 39 L. R. A. 722; Gray v. York State Tel. Co., 92 App. Div. 89, 86 N. Y. Supp. 771; Donovan v. Allert, 11 N. D. 289, 91 N. W. 441, 58 L. R. A. 775; Kirby v. Citizens' Tel. Co., 17 S. D. 362, 97 N. W. 3; Maxwell v. Central Dist. & Printing Tel. Co., 51 W. Va. 121, 41 S. E. 125; Krueger v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 106 Wis. 96, 81 N. W. 1014, 50 L. R. A. 298. But see McCann v. Johnson County Tel. Co., 69 Kan. 210, 76 Pac. 870; Cumberland Telep. & Tel. Co. v. Avrite, 27 Ky. L. R. 394, 85 S. W. 204; Gulf Coast Ice & Mfg. Co. v. Bowers, 80 Miss. 570, 32 So. 113; Palmer v. Larchmont Elec. Co., 158 N. Y. 231, 52 N. E. 1092, 43 L. R. A. 672. "The care, management and control of the public ways devolve upon the local municipal government in which they are located, and it is the duty of the local government to maintain them in such condition that the public, by the exercise of due care, may pass over them in safety. In the darkness of the night, in crowded thoroughfares, light is an important aid, largely tending to promote the convenience, as well as the safety, of the traveling public. It is not only one of the uses to which the public ways may be devoted, but in the cases of crowded thoroughfares a duty devolves upon the municipality of supplying it. In such cases it is one of the burdens upon the fee which must be borne as an incident to the public right of trav eling over the way, and is deemed one of the uses for which the land was taken as a public highway." See, also, Lowther v. Bridgeman (W. Va.) 50 S. E. 410. See § 833, ante, with cases cited. 1276 Stowers v. Postal TelegraphCable Co., 68 Miss. 559, 9 So. 356, 12 L. R. A. 864; Bronson v. Albion Tel. Co. (Neb.) 93 N. W. 201; Halsey v. Rapid Transit St. R. Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 380, 20 Atl. 859; Callen v. Columbus Edison Elec. Light Co., 66 Ohio St. 166, 64 N. E. 141, 58 L. R. A. 782; Central Union Tel. Co. v. Falley (Ind.) 10 Am. St. Rep. 128, with note; Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. v. MacKenzie, 74 Md. 36, 21 Atl. 690, 28 Am. St. Rep. 229, with full notes. But see Loeber v.. Butte General Elec. Co., 16 Mont. 1; Tuttle v. Brush Elec. Ill. Co., 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. (18 J. & S.) 464; MeLean v. Brush Elec. Lighting Co., 9 Wkly. Law Bul. 65, 1 Am. Electrical Cases, 483. "It seems to me clear then, from principle and authority that although the uses to which a street may be put, under a grant for street purposes, may include not only the sewers, water-pipes and gas-pipes, as these are all put under the ground, and do not interfere with the abutting lot owner, it is equally clear that this right cannot be extended so as of streets proper for furnishing a supply of water or light to a public corporation for street lighting and other public purposes or to effect a sale of these commodities to private consumers. In the former case the weight of authority, as will be found upon an examination of the cases cited, is to the effect that no compensation can be recovered while the latter use is for a private purpose and should impose an additional servitude.1277 The use of urban roads for gas and water pipes lawfully laid either by public authorities or private persons imposes no additional burden 1278 and to impose any burden, no matter how slight, on the original proprietor, or his successor in the ownership of the abutting lot, unless a new grant be made, in short without obtaining the consent of the abutting lot owner, or otherwise acquiring his interest in the highway." See §§ 826 et seq., ante. 1277 Johnson v. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co., 54 Hun, 469, 7 N. Y. Supp. 716; Tiffany v. United States Ill. Co., 51 N. Y. Super. Ct. (19 J. & S.) 286. "Its business is to furnish light to the city corporation for the public lighting of the streets, and to private individuals to light private houses. The former may involve a public and ordinary use of the street; the latter would involve a use of the street for private purposes." Joyce, Elec. Law, § 332. "It can hardly be contended that the use of streets for this purpose (private lighting) is for the furtherance of any of the purposes for which the street is dedicated or taken. It is not a use in aid of travel, commerce, or the communiIcation of intelligence. It is, however, an occupation of a portion of the street to the exclusion of the traveling public, in so far as the portion of the street's surface occupied by it is affected, and is an encroachment upon the rights of the abutting owner, of which he should not be deprived, either without his consent or in pursuance of statutory provisions prescribing certain prerequisites to the taking of private property." 1278 City of Quincy v. Bull, 106 Ill. 337; Lostutter v. City of Aurora, 126 Ind. 436, 26 N. E. 184, 12 L. R. A. 259; City of Boston v. Richardson, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 160; Bishop v. North Adams Fire Dist., 167 Mass. 364, 45 N. E. 925; Witcher v. Holland Water-works Co., 66 Hun, 619, 20 N. Y. Supp. 560; Crooke V. Flatbush Water-works Co., 29 Hun (N. Y.) 245; Jayne v. Cortland Water-works Co., 42 Misc. 263, 86 N. Y. Supp. 571; Smith v. City of Goldsboro, 121 N. C. 350, 28 S. E. 479; Columbia Conduit Co. v. Com., 90 Pa. 307; West v. Bancroft, 32 Vt. 367. But see In re Condemnation of Land at Nahant, 128 Fed. 185, where it was held in condemnation proceedings by the United States that a town having a beneficial interest in an easement of aqueduct was entitled to compensation upon its being taken for another public use and that in laying a water pipe under a public highway, a town acted in the same capacity as a nonmunicipal water company and was not entitled to compensation for the easement in 1279 the reverse of this rule is true in respect to rural highways.1 Where no additional compensation is allowed in any of thesecases, it is because the courts have considered the rendition of the service as a quasi public duty and the adjoining owner is supposed to have received his compensation in the performance of the duty upon reasonable terms and without discrimination.12 III. ITS DISPOSITION. § 935. Power of disposition. 936. Limitations on power of disposition. 938. Disposition by gift. 939. Vacation of highways. 940. Manner of vacation. 941. Petition. 942. Vacation; when effective. 943. Damage to abutting owner. 944. Evidence. 945. Abandonment of highways. 946. Prescriptive title. 947. Reversion. 948. Collateral attack. 1280. 949. Revocation of dedication as affecting right to vacate or abandon § 935. Power of disposition. The purposes for which public property may be acquired and the title obtained have been fully considered in subdivision 1 of this chapter. The control, use and alienation of property depends entirely upon, and the right of disposition is limited by, the highway upon its being appropriated for a superior public use. City of Morrison v. Hinkson, 87 Ill. 587. The erection of a water tank in a street held an additional servitude. See, also, § 440, note 996, §§ 752, 762, 807, 809 and 826 et seq., ante. 1279 Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Huntsinger, 14 Ind. App. 156, 42 N. E. 640; Kincaid V. Indianapolis Natural Gas Co., 124 Ind. 577, 24 N. E. 1066, 8 L. R. A. 602; Board' of Com'rs of Hamilton County, etc. v. Indianapolis Nat. Gas Co., 134 Ind. 209, 33 N. E. 972; Ward v. Triple State Natural Gas & Oil Co., 25 Ky. L. R. 116, 74 S. W. 709; Bloomfield F. R. N. G. Co. v. Calkins, 62 N. Y. 386; Sterling's Appeal, 111 Pa. 35. See, also, authorities cited in preceding note. 1280 Whitcher v. Holland Waterworks Co., 142 N. Y. 626. the character of the title and the purpose and the manner in which acquired. The state as a sovereign may acquire public property in that capacity for purposes of defense and the maintenance of its political organization and in which neither the public as a whole nor any individual has any peculiar or personal rights. It is needless to say that its control and power of disposition in respect to such property is complete, limited only by the character of the title which it may have acquired from private grantors. This condition applies to the state or the sovereign alone and rarely, if ever, to its subordinate political or public agencies.1281 The state together with all its subordinate governmental agencies may, again, acquire public property for public purposes; highways, public buildings, grounds, and the like which it acquires and holds solely as a trustee for the public for special uses and which it can thus acquire only because it is to be devoted to these uses. In respect to this property the power of disposition is limited not only by the purpose for which it has been acquired but also by rights both individual and collective which the public possess in respect to the use and occupation of the property for the purpose for which acquired. The rule obtains here, therefore, that a public corporation cannot divest itself of its title or any interest therein in any manner that may occasion or result in an impairment in the least degree or the destruction of the public rights.1282 This principle has been con 1281 Lewis, Em. Dom. (2d Ed.) § 2. 1282 Mahoning County Com'rs v. Young (C. C. A.) 59 Fed. 96, Id. 51 Fed. 585; Illinois & St. L. R. & C. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 2 Dill. 70, Fed. Cas. No. 7,007; Beebe v. City of Little Rock, 68 Ark. 39, 56 S. W. 791; City & County of San Francisco v. Itsell, 80 Cal. 57, 22 Pac. 74; City of Oakland v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 160; Logan v. Clough, 2 Colo. 323; City of Gainesville v. Caldwell, 81 Ga. 76; Bakewell v. Board of Education of Ill. (III.) 33 N. E. 186, following Board of Education of Ill. v. Bake well, 122 Ill. 339, 10 N. E. 378; Sherlock v. Village of Winnetka, 59 Ill. 389; School Tp. of Allen V. School Town of Macy, 109 Ind. 559, 10 N. E. 578; Giltner v. Trustees of Carrollton, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 680; Inhabitants of West Roxbury V. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158; Green v. Putnam, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 21; Urch v. City of Portsmouth, 69 N. H. 162; Stenberg v. State, 50 Neb. 127, Id., 48 Neb. 299, 67 N. W. 190; Milhau v. Sharp, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 193; City of Southport v. Stanly, 125 N. C. 464, 34 S. E. 641; Thompson v. Nemeyer, 59 Ohio St. 486; McCotter v. Town |