provement which the public authorities may lawfully make,1078 but a municipal corporation is unquestionably liable for any injury to these appurtenances where it has been negligent in the making of street improvements.1079

There must be an acceptance of the grant whatever its source. The authorities are agreed upon this proposition.1080 The acceptance may be formal or informal in its character. In the latter ease by acts and in the former by writing or by some designated mode. 1081 The grant must be accepted unconditionally and within the time designated if this is prescribed or within a reasonable time if no limit is fixed.1082 An acceptance upon condition is generally regarded as none,1083 and an offer not accepted within a reasonable time may be withdrawn. Where doubt exists as to the

fact of acceptance, many courts have held that one will be presumed where the grant is beneficial to the grantee.

902. Construction of grant.

Since the occupation of a highway by private persons for the purpose of supplying water, light, telephone, transportation or telegraphic service, is a use of public property for private gain, the universal rule obtains that licenses, contracts or privileges, exclusive or otherwise, granted for these purposes are to be construed strictly.1084 Courts are careful to see that public rights are guarded and that nothing passes beyond what has been fairly granted. This rule, however, is not applied to the extent of defeating a grant when a more liberal one or one which has been acquiesced in for many years would enable the company to carry out the purpose for which it is organized and the powers it was reasonably intended should be exercised.1085 No rule of construc

1084 Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & S. H. Co., 111 U. S. 746; Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24; Chicago General St. R. Co. v. Ellicott, 88 Fed. 941; Southern Bell Tel. & T. Co. v. D'Alemberete, 39 Fla. 25, 21 So. 570; Louisville & P. R. Co. v. Louisville City R. Co., 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 175; Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. Town of Monroe, 48 La. Ann. 1102. The right of a railroad company to occupy a street cannot be collaterally attacked by the city. Edison Elec. Ill. Co. v. Hooper, 85 Md. 110; City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 65 N. W. 649, 34 L. R. A. 184; State v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10, 31 S. W. 594, 31 L. R. A. 798; Tallon v. City of Hoboken, 60 N. J. Law, 212, 37 Atl. 895; People v. Newton, 48 Hun, 477, 1 N. Y. Supp. 197; City of Utica v. Utica Tel. Co., 24 App. Div. 361, 48 N. Y. Supp. 916; Jones v. Erie & W. B. R.

Co., 169 Pa. 333, 32 Atl. 535; In re Barre Water Co., 62 Vt. 27, 20 Atl. 109, 9. R. A. 195. See, also, § 926, post.

1085 City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U. S. 558, affirming 88 Fed. 720; Buckner v. Hart, 52 Fed. 835; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 124 Cal. 368, 57 Pac. 210, 571; City of Denver v. Denver City Cable R. Co., 22 Colo. 565, 45 Pac. 439; Western Pav. & Supply Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 128 Ind. 525, 26 N. E. 188, 10 L. R. A. 770; Consumers' Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. Congress Spring Co., 61 Hun, 133, 15 N. Y. Supp. 624; Hudson River Tel. Co. v. Watervliet Turnpike & R. Co., 135 N. Y. 393, 17 L. R. A. 674; Appeal of Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. 4, 7 Atl. 778; Pittsburg & W. E. Pass. R. Co. v. Point Bridge Co., 165 Pa. 37, 30 Atl. 511, 26 L. R. A. 323. The words "any street or highway" in Act of May 14, 1889 (P. L. 211), authorizing the con

tion is necessary where the language of the grant is definite and certain for, as courts have said, they construe and interpret instruments and contracts, not make them.1086 The strict rule has been well stated by a recent author.1087 "Every public grant of property or of privileges or franchises, if ambiguous, is to be construed against the grantee and in favor of the public, because an intention on the part of the government to grant to private persons or to a particular corporation, property or rights in which the whole public is interested, cannot be presumed, unless unequivocally expressed, or necessarily to be implied in the terms of the grant and because the grant is supposed to be made at the solicitation of the grantee and to be drawn up by him or his agents and, therefore, the words are to be treated as those of the grantee."

903. Same subject.

The presumption of law, however, exists that a statute or ordinance is presumed to be valid both in respect to the power of the public body to pass or adopt it, its form or passage, and its subject-matter,108 and the existence of this presumption shifts the burden of proof to the one attacking the validity of the law. In

struction of street railways includes bridges as a part of said streets or highways. See, also, as holding the same, Berks County v. Reading City Pass. R. Co., 167 Pa. 102, 31 Atl. 474, 663.

Taggart v. Newport St. R. Co., 16 R. I. 668, 7 L. R. A. 205; City of Houston v. Houston City St. R. Co., 83 Tex. 548, 19 S. W. 127; Gray v. Dallas Terminal R. & Union Depot Co., 13 Tex. Civ. App. 158, 36 S. W. 252. An ordinance granting a street railway license indefinite as to some streets is not void as to other streets clearly specified. Ogden City R. Co. v. Ogden City, 7 Utah, 207, 26 Pac. 288. Joyce, Elec. Law, §§ 165 et seq.

1086 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 88 Va. 920.

1987 Joyce, Elec. Law, § 163. New

Abb. Corp. Vol. III — 9.

Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650; Hamilton Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Hamilton City, 146 U. S. 258; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685, affirming 143 N. Y. 596, 38 N. E. 983, 26 L. R. A. 270; Skaneateles Water-Works Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 184 U. S. 354, affirming 161 N. Y. 154, 55 N. E. 562, 46 L. R. A. 687; Colby University v. Village of Canandaigua, 69 Fed. 671; Ft. Plain Bridge Co. v. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44; Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Syracuse, 116 N. Y 167, 22 N. E. 381, 5 L. R. A. 546; Warsaw Water Works Co. v. Village of Warsaw, 161 N. Y. 176, 55 N. E. 486.

1088 Lewis, Sutherland, Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) §§ 499 et seq.

the making of a grant the rule also is true that every word used is supposed to have some clear and definite meaning. The burden of proof is again, therefore, because of this presumption, upon the one attacking the meaning or uncertainty of words used in a grant.

§ 904. Exercise of the grant; the element of time.

In determining the right of the grantee of a privilege or license. to occupy public highways in respect to the element of time, the principle obtains that because of the nature of the license, namely, a use of public property, for private profit, the grantee is limited strictly in the exercise of his rights to the time named in the grant and this rule applies both to the time of commencement and the termination of the privilege.1089 Acts of a grantee before or after these periods are unlawful and can lead to the establishment of no rights as between the parties in respect to the granting of the license itself.1000 The question has been raised of the legal power of a municipal corporation to make a contract or grant a license extending over a period in excess of the official term of that legislative body granting the privilege or the license for the reason that all legislative bodies are limited in their legal capacity in such a manner as not to deprive succeeding bodies of the right to deal with matters involving the same questions as they may arise from time to time in the future and as the then present ex

1089 Detroit Citizens' Street Ry. Co. v. City of Detroit (C. C. A.) 64 Fed. 628, 26 L. R. A. 667, reversing 56 Fed. 867, and 60 Fed. 161. Louisville Trust Co. v. City of Cincinnati (C. C. A.) 76 Fed. 296; Gas Light & Coke Co. v. City of New Albany, 156 Ind. 406, 59 N. E. 176; State v. Lake, 8 Nev. 276; Blaschko v. Wurster, 156 N. Y. 437, 51 N. E. 303. A grant of rights in a street made by municipal authorities in excess of the period allowed by general statute is not good even for the latter time. Cincinnati Inclined Plane R. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St. 609, 44 N. E. 327.

1090 Montgomery Gas-Light Co. v.

City Council of Montgomery, 87 Ala. 245, 6 So. 113, 4 L. R. A. 616; Southern California R. Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (Cal.) 43 Pac. 1123; Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 Iowa, 234, 91 N. W. 1081. A water company is entitled to remain in possession of streets for its pipes and connections for such reasonable time as may be necessary to negotiate with the city for an extension of its lines or close out its business without unnecessary sacrifice. See, also, National Water-Works Co. v. Kansas City (C. C. A.) 62 Fed. 853, 27 L. R. A. 827.

igencies may require.1091 Cases will be found upon this question both for 1992 and against the contention as stated. The weight of authority sustains the doctrine that contracts, privileges or license rights exclusive or otherwise, may be granted by a legislative body to be exercised for a reasonable time or one authorized by law in the future and in excess of the legislative life of a governing body, 1098 The Supreme Court of the United States in a