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vehicles or traffic to be allowed on certain streets as boulevards or park ways,907 prohibiting the use of vehicles having tires less than a certain width,908 or the use of sidewalks except by pedestrians, controlling the use of bicycle paths or bicycles,910 requiring the hitching of horses, 11 regulating the passage of vehicles or ani

909

907 Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R. A. 696. An ordinance, however, is unreasonable and invalid which leaves to an unregulated official discretion a matter which should be controlled by permanent local provisions operating generally and impartially. Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450, 3 L. R. A. 221; Boston & A. R. Co. v. City of Boston, 140 Mass. 87; City of St. Paul v. Smith, 27 Minn. 364; State v. Bradford, 78 Minn. 387, 47 L. R. A. 144. A portion of a public highway may be set apart as a bicycle path for the exclusive use of bicyclists. City of St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S. W. 976, 42 L. R. A. 686; In re Wright, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 357; Doll v. Devery 27 Misc. 149, 57 N. Y. Supp. 767. But see State v. Rohart, 83 Minn. 257, 86 N. W. 93, 333, 54 L. R. A.

947.

V.

908 Cook v. State, 26 Ind. App. 278, 59 N. E. 489, citing Gordon State, 46 Ohio St. 607, 6 L. R. A. 749; Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clinton County Com'rs, 1 Ohio St. 77. Particular statute held void because of uncertainty. State v. Messenger, 63 Ohio St. 398, 59 N. E. 105.

900 City of Indianapolis v. Higgins, 141 Ind. 1, 40 N. E. 671; Wheeler v. City of Boone, 108 Iowa, 235, 78 N. W. 909, 44 L. R. A. 821. Such an ordinancce would not include a tricycle operated by hand for the convenience of one unable to walk. Swift v. City of Topeka, 43

Kan. 671, 23 Pac. 1075, 8 L. R. A. 772; State v. Aldrich, 70 N. H. 391, 47 Atl. 602; In re O'Keefe, 46 N. Y. State Rep. 557, 19 N. Y. Supp. 676. But dirt from excavations may be carried across a sidewalk. State v.. Brown, 109 N. C. 802, 13 S. E. 940; Nelson v. Braman, 22 R. I. 283, 47 Atl. 696. See, also, cases cited in the following note. But see Hand v. Klinker, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. (22 J. & S.) 433. Delivery wagon backing across sidewalk for purpose of delivering goods not a nuisance per se. Ordway v. Cornelius, 23 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 281.

910 Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. 450, 20 N. E. 132, 3 L. R. A. 221; Purple v. Inhabitants of Greenfield, 138 Mass. 1; Lee v. City of Port Huron, 128 Mich. 533, 87 N. W. 637, 55 L.. R. A. 308; Thompson v. Dodge, 58. Minn. 555, 28 L. R. A. 608; State v.. Bradford, 78 Minn. 387, 81 N. W. 202, 47 L. R. A. 144; Lechner v. Village of Newark, 19 Misc. 452, 44 N.. Y. Supp. 556; State v. Lucas, 124 N.. C. 804; Westgate v. Spalding, 8 Pa. Dist. R. 490; Porter v. Shields, 200 Pa. 241, 49 Atl. 785; State v. Collins, 16 R. I. 371, 3 L. R. A. 394; Crouch v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 145; State v.. Bruce, 23 Wash. 777. 63 Pac. 519.

911 Higgins v. Wilmington City R.. Co., 1 Marv. (Del.) 352, 41 Atl. 86; Tenney v. Tuttle, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 185; Norris v. Kohler, 41 N. Y. 42; Becker v. Schutte, 85 Mo. App. 57; Wagner v. New York Condensed Milk Co., 46 N. Y. Supp. 939; Davis

mals through streets,912 requiring the registration or licensing of automobiles,913 are regulations which have for their purpose the prevention of acts suggested in this section. They are regarded as a lawful and reasonable exercise either of the police power of a public corporation or of its right to regulate and control the use of and to maintain public highways. The use of highways by the owners of public conveyances is a right, however, not a privilege or an occupation and consequently, a municipality is not authorized to impose a license upon them for its exercise.914 The regulation and control of municipal parks and boulevards is generally regarded as a discretionary power and a matter of purely local concern, these public grounds being held and owned by the corporation, not in its political or governmental capacity, but in a quasi private relation in which the authorities act for the exclusive benefit of the corporation.915 Public authorities can adopt all necessary rules and regulations respecting their use equally with other public grounds or highways.916

v. Kallfelz, 22 Misc. 602, 50 N. Y. Supp. 928; Sondheim V. Nassau Brewing Co., 60 App. Div. 463, 69 N. Y. Supp. 880; Loeser v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 378; Bowen v. Flanagan, 84 Va. 313.

912 Roberts v. Ogle, 30 Ill. 459; Creamer v. McIlwain, 89 Md. 343, 45 L. R. A. 531; Commonwealth v. Curtis, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 266; Com. v. Bean, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 52; Com. v. Derby, 162 Mass. 183, 38 N. E. 440.

913 City of Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94; Com. v. Boyd, 188 Mass. 79, 74 N. E. 255; People v. Schneider (Mich.) 103 N. W. 172; State v. Cobb (Mo. App.) 87 S. W. 551; People v. Ellis, 88 App. Div. 481, 85 N. Y. Supp. 120; People v. Mac Williams, 91 App. Div. 176, 86 N. Y. Supp. 357; Com. v. Hawkins, 14 Pa. Dist. R. 592; Com. v. Densmore, 29 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 217.

914 City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, 51 N. E. 907, 49 L. R. A.

408; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185; Trustees of Flemingsburg v. Wilson, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 203. But see Gartside v. City of East St. Louis, 43 Ill. 47; Farwell v. City of Chicago, 71 Ill. 269; Joyce v. City of East St. Louis, 77 Ill. 156.

915 McDonald v. City of St. Paul, 82 Minn. 308, 84 N. W. 1022. A city may set apart a portion of a public street as a boulevard. State v. Schweickhardt, 109 Mo. 496, 19 S. W. 47; State v. Long, 94 N. C. 896; State v. Eastman, 109 N. C. 785; City of Portland v. Whittle, 3 Or. 126; Com. v. Bowman, 3 Pa. 206; State v. Wilkinson, 2 Vt. 480.

916 Ewing v. City of Minneapolis, 86 Minn. 51, 90 N. W. 10; State v. Long, 94 N. C. 896; Langley v. Town of Gallipolis, 2 Ohio St. 107. The use or beneficial purpose of a public common or square in a city or village where no special use or limitation is prescribed by the dedication is such that it may be improved and

Road law. To prevent blockades or accidents, officials may also, under proper authority, adopt regulations relative to carrying lights or ringing bells,917 or pass laws prescribing the manner in which highways may be used with reference to the direction. in which individuals or teams shall go upon meeting 18 or passing others,919 or the side of street to be used.920 In the carriageway of a street, vehicles have an equal right with foot passengers, but at crossings the right of the latter is a superior one. 921 A viola

ornamented
health; for public buildings or as a
place for the transaction of public
business or for both the purposes of
pleasure and business at the discre-
tion of the municipal authorities.
Com. v. Bowman, 3 Pa. 206.

for recreation and

917 Baucher v. City of New Haven, 40 Conn. 456; Cook v. Fogarty, 103 Iowa, 500, 72 N. W. 677, 39 L. R. A. 488; City of Emporia v. Wagoner, 6 Kan. App. 659, 49 Pac. 701; Kidder v. Inhabitants of Dunstable, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 342; Lyon v. City of Cambridge, 136 Mass. 419; Miller v. City of St. Paul, 38 Minn. 134; Campbell v. City of Providence,

9 R. I. 262.

919 Diehl v. Roberts, 134 Cal. 164, 66 Pac. 202; Dunn v. Moratz, 92 Ill. App. 477; City of Decatur v. Stoops, 21 Ind. App. 397; Cook Brewing Co. v. Ball, 22 Ind. App. 656, 52 N. E. 1002; Perlstein v. American Exp. Co., 177 Mass. 530, 59 N. E. 194; Dudley v. Bolles, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 465; Savage v. Gerstner, 36 App. Div. 220, 55 N. Y. Supp. 306. The meeting law does not apply to pedestrians. Quinn v. Pietro, 38 App. Div. 484, 56 N. Y. Supp. 419; Rowland v. Wanamaker, 193 Pa. 598, 44 Atl. 918; State v. Collins, 16 R. I. 371, 17 Atl. 131, 3 L. R. A. 394. A bicycle is a vehicle or carriage within the meaning of the Stats of R. I. c. 66, § 1, relative to turning to the

right when meeting others on pub-
lic ways.
May v. Hahn, 22 Tex. Civ
App. 365; O'Malley v. Dorn, 7 Wis.
236.

919 McLane v. Sharpe, 2 Harr. (Del.) 481; Walkup v. May, 9 Ind. App. 409; Loyacano v. Jurgens, 50 La. Ann. 441; Odom v. Schmidt, 52 La. Ann. 2129; Adams v. Swift, 172 Mass. 521 52 N. E. 1068; Daniels v. Clegg, 28 Mich. 32; Beach v. Parmeter, 23 Pa. 196; Angell v. Lewis, 20 R. I. 391.

920 Mooney V. Trow Directory Print. & Book Binding Co., 2 Misc. 238, 21 N. Y. Supp. 957; Schaffer v. Baker Transfer Co., 29 App. Div. 459, 51 N. Y. Supp. 1092; Foote v. American Product Co., 195 Pa. 190; 45 Atl. 934; 49 L. R. A. 764; Angell v. Lewis, 20 R. I. 391, 39 Atl. 521; Winter v. Harris, 23 R. I. 47, 49 Atl. 398, 54 L. R. A. 643. But see Yore v. Muller Coal, Heavy Hauling & Transfer Co., 147 Mo. 679, 49 S. W. 855; Brownstein v. Imperial Elec. Light Co., 17 Rap. Jud. Que. C. S. 292.

921 Carswell v. City of Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 360, 43 Atl. 169. The driver of a fire engine though entitled to the right of way is subject to the same rules as other travelers in regard to using due care. Holland v. Bartch, 120 Ind. 46, 22 N. E. 83; Thompson v. Dodge, 58 Minn. 555, 60 N. W. 545,

tion of a road law resulting in injury or damage to another may create a liability.922

§ 873. Stock ordinances.

The authorities have also the right under a grant of the power to control public highways, or as a police measure, to pass ordinances prohibiting the running at large of stock923 of any particular kind,924 and to provide for impounding animals found run

28 L. R. A. 608. A bicycle is a vehicle, and a person driving a horse on a highway has no rights superior to those of the person riding the bicycle.

Dieter v. Zbaren, 81 Mo. App. 612; Barker v. Savage, 31 N. Y. Super. Ct. (1 Sweeny) 288; Savage v. Gerstner, 36 App. Div. 220, 55 N. Y. Supp. 306; Taylor v. Union Traction Co., 184 Pa. 465, 40 Atl. 159, 47 L. R. A. 289. A bicycle is not a vehicle in an ordinance giving vehicles right of way under certain circumstances.

Citizens' R. Co. v. Ford, 93 Tex. 110, 53 S. W. 575, 46 L. R. A. 457. An ordinance requiring persons riding or driving to check up for pedestrians in approaching alleys or street crossings does not apply to street cars.

922 Diehl v. Roberts, 134 Cal. 164, 66 Pac. 202; Payne v. Smith, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 497; Peoples' Ice Co. v. Steamer "Excelsior," 44 Mich. 229; Pigott v. Engle, 60 Mich. 221; Mittelstadt v. Morrison, 76 Wis. 265. But see Clifford v. Tyman, 61 N. H. 508.

923 Folmar v. Curtis, 86 Ala. 354, 5 So. 678; Amyx v. Tabor, 23 Cal. 370; Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 11 S. E. 1018. Ga. Act Dec. 26, 1888, relative to stock running at large held unconstitutional because of

lack of uniformity. Erlinger V. Boneau, 51 Ill. 94; Welch v. Bowen, 103 Ind. 252; Gilmore v. Holt, 21 Mass. (4 Pick) 258. Such a law refers to animals found at large within the limits of a town though their owners reside outside its limits. See, as holding to the contrary, the case of Town of Marietta v. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 429.

Com. v. Bean, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 52; Fritz v. First Div. St. Paul & P. R. Co., 22 Minn. 404; State v. Aubuchon, 8 Mo. App. 325; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523. The power to pass must be expressly given to a municipal corporation. Johnson v. Mocabee, 1 Okl. 204, 32 Pac. 336; Goodale v. Sowell, 62 S. C. 516, 40 S. E. 970; Batsel v. Blaine (Tex. App.) 15 S. W. 283; Armstrong v. Traylor, 87 Tex. 598, 34 S. W. 440. But see State v. Johnson, 41 Minn. 111, 42 N. W. 786. See, also, p. 270, ante.

924 Gosselink v. Campbell, 4 Iowa, 296; Com. v. Curtis, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 266; Spitler v. Young, 63 Mo. 42. Ordinance sustained notwithstanding owner resided outside corporate limits. Shepherd v. Hees, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 433; Jones v. Duncan, 127 N. C. 118, 37 S. E. 135. Such an ordinance operates upon all animals whether the owners live inside or outside the cor

ning at large in violation of these regulations.925 An exercise of this power necessarily includes the right to impose fines and to provide for the sale of stock in case of a nonpayment.920

§ 874. Use of highways by public authorities.

The public authorities may, equally with individuals, use the highways or act in such a manner as to cause a nuisance or an obstruction and for which they will be liable under the same rules applicable to private individuals,927 but, on the other hand, there are certain well recognized uses to which they can put highways and which are regarded as lawful in their character. The improvement of a highway in any manner is such a use,' and the construction of drains or sewers, 929 the laying of water

porate limits. City of Waco v. Powell, 32 Tex. 258; Kelley v. City of Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 83.

925 Smith v. Ewers, 21 Ala. 38; Hyde v. Pryor, 13 Ill. 64; Campau v. Langley, 39 Mich. 451; Wilson v. Beyers, 5 Wash. 303, 32 Pac. 90; Burdett v. Allen, 35 W. Va. 347, 13 S. E. 1012, 14 L. R. A. 337. See cases cited in last two preceding notes.

926 City of Cartersville v. Lanham, 67 Ga. 753; Chamberlain v. City of Litchfield, 56 Ill. App. 652; Slessman v. Crozier, 80 Ind. 487. But towns incorporated under the general laws of Indiana have no such power. Third Municipality v. Blanc, 1 La. Ann. 385; Cochrane v. City of Frostburg, 81 Md. 54, 27 L. R. A. 728; Graves v. Rudd, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 554, 65 S. W. 63; Wilcox v. Hemming, 58 Wis. 144.

927 City of Birmingham v. McCary, 84 Ala. 470; Rowell v. Williams, 29 Iowa, 210.

928 Oliver v. Loftin, 4 Ala. 240; McKibbin v. State, 40 Ark. 480; Pinnix v. City of Durham, 130 N. C. 360, 41 S. E. 932; O'Brien v. City of Erie, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 337.

Abb. Corp. Vol. III — 6.

928

929 Swart v. District of Columbia, 17 App. D. C. 407; Stevens v. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 72, 69 N. W. 227, 36 L. R. A. 777. A right to construct a private sewer cannot be arbitrarily revoked. Boyden v. Walkeley, 113 Mich. 609, 71 N. W. 1099. Private sewer may be constructed under authority of municipality.

Kiley v. Bond, 114 Mich. 447, 72 N. W. 253; Hunt v. City of Lambertville, 45 N. J. Law, 279. The construction of the sewer must have been authorized in the manner required by law. Ainley v. Hackensack Imp. Commission, 64 N. J. Law, 504, 45 Atl. 807. A license to lay a private sewer in a public street is revocable at the option of the city.

Wood v. McGrath, 150 Pa. 451, 24 Atl. 682, 16 L. R. A. 715. The right may be granted by public authorities to construct a private sewer along a public street without the consent of the abutting lot owner. But see Borough of Torrington v. Messenger, 74 Conn. 321, 50 Atl. 873. See, also, §§ 437 et seq., 460, and 818, ante, and 886 et seq., post.

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