called, are regarded as unusual and improper uses of a highway and which to be lawfully done must have the permission of the public authorities, and, in general, the use of the public highway for any purpose which prevents its reasonable, seasonable, and ordinary use by the general public for purposes connected with their business is unlawful and in the proper case a continuance of that use may be enjoined.868 Montgomery v. Parker, 114 Ala. 118, 21 So. 452; City of Colorado Springs v. Smith, 19 Colo. 554, 36 Pac. 540; Turner v. Holtzman, 54 Md. 148; Masterson v. Short, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. S.; N. Y.) 154; People v. Brookfield, 6 App. Div. 398, 39 N. Y. Supp. 673; Cohen v. City of New York, 113 N. Y. 532, 4 L. R. A. 406; McCaffrey v. Smith, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 117. The abutting owner's consent should be obtained. Branahan v. Cincinnati Hotel Co., 39 Ohio St. 333. 868 Mackall v. Ratchford, 82 Fed. 41. "The marching men seemed to think that they could go and come on and over the county road as they pleased, because it was a public highway. But this was a mistake. The miners working at Montana had the same right to use the public road as the strikers had, and it was not open and free to their use when it was occupied by over 200 men stationed along it at intervals of three and five feet,-men who, if not open enemies, were not bosom friends. That some miners passed through this line is shown. That others feared to do so is plain. That the marching column intended to interfere with the work at the mines would be foolish to deny. A highway is a way over which the public at large have a right of passage. It is a road maintained by the public for the general convenience. True, the strikers had a right to march over it as passengers just the same as all other citizens; but they had no right to make it a parade ground, or stop on its sideways at frequent intervals, and by the hour, at times when other people who had the same right to its use were in the habit of using it for purposes connected with their daily avocations. The miners of the Montana mines, as well as the owners of that property, had the same right to use the public road as had the marching strikers. It seems to the court that the men whose work is interrupted and the people whose property is damaged by the improper use and occupation of the highway are the people who have the true grounds of complaint because of the improper use of what in the early books of the law is called the king's highway.' The building in which we are now holding this court is located on the corner of Third and Pike streets, Clarksburg. All the citizens of that town can use those streets for purposes connected with their business. All persons properly deporting themselves can pass along and upon them for all proper business matters, or for the mere purpose of transit; and all persons, due regard being had for the public interest and safety, may parade, with banners, flags, and bands of music, along and over said streets at reasonable times and seasonable § 866. Limitations upon power of regulating temporary obstructions. Regulations respecting the use of highways by temporary obstructions are regarded as legislative or quasi legislative in their character and are usually adopted by law-making bodies of various subordinate public corporations to which the power has been delegated by the state. In order that regulations of this character be, therefore, legal, it is necessary that they be adopted in the manner prescribed and by the body designated by law,869 and the usual rule applies that if the power has been delegated to a particular body or official to be exercised upon appropriate occasions and according to definite rules of action, it cannot be delegated by that body or official in turn to others.870 The rules in respect to the validity of ordinances or regulations regarded as legislative acts must also be followed. They must be uniform and impartial hours, provided the same does not prevent the reasonable and seasonable use of said streets by those entitled to the same. If such use should close the business houses along said streets, by preventing employes from reaching them, then, if such parades were not prevented by the city authorities, the owners of property so affected would be entitled to the aid of the courts in protecting their rights. No one portion of the community has a right to march along those streets day after day, night after night, and station themselves along them at intervals of three or five feet, for hour after hour, thereby preventing the owners of property located thereon from reaching the same in person, or by their clerks or other employes, for purposes connected with their regular business. Under such circumstances the police of the city would either move the column along, out of the way of the public business, or take into custody the men who without author ity obstruct the streets and public highways. The marching men had then no such right on the county road as they claimed." Hickman v. Maisey, 69 Law J. Q. B. 511. 869 Perry v. New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co., 55 Ala. 413; City of Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Co., 71 Ga. 106; City of Quincy v. Bull, 106 Ill. 337; City of Indianapolis v. Miller, 27 Ind. 394; Cummins v. City of Seymour, 79 Ind. 491; City of North Vernon v. Voegeler, 103 Ind. 327; City of Leavenworth v. Douglass, 59 Kan. 416; Irwin v. Great Southern Tel. Co., 37 La. Ann. 63; City of Grand Rapids v. Hughes, 15 Mich. 54; Com. v. Hauck, 103 Pa. 536. 870 City of Montgomery v. Parker, 114 Ala. 118; Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525; Denver & S. F. R. Co. v. Domke, 11 Colo. 247; City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359; Rich v. City of Napierville, 42 Ill. App. 222; Cushing v. City of Boston, 128 Mass. 330; Garrabad v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, 19 L. R. A. 858. in their operation and effect;871 must not violate constitutional provisions;872 contravene the law of the land,873 or be inconsistent with the general law or the character of the particular corporation.874 These questions have all been considered in previous sections. § 867. Recurring, temporary obstructions. Another class of obstructions occurring frequently are those which have been designated as temporary recurring obstructions. Acts or uses of a highway which constitute these are usually the result of the grant of a general right by the public corporation to some individual or private corporation engaged in the manufacture or supply of gas,875 light,876 water,877 transportation,878 or 871 City Council of Augusta v, Burum, 93 Ga. 68, 26 L. R. A. 340; Bordentown & S. A. Turnpike Road v. Camden & A. R. & T. Co., 17 N. J. Law (2 Har.) 314; Hughes v. Providence & W. R. Co. 2 R. I. 493. 872 City of Newark v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 42 N. J. Eq. (15 Stew.) 196; Buchholz v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 148 N. Y. 640. 873 Potomac, etc., Co. v. U. S., etc., Co., 26 Wash. Law Rep. 19; Pittsburgh & A. Bridge Co. v. Com. (Pa.) 8 Atl. 217; Stormfeltz v. Manor Turnpike Co., 13 Pa. 558. 874 Snyder v. City of Mt. Pulaski, 176 Ill. 397, 44 L. R. A. 407. "The claim of the appellant that the second ordinance, which granted him the privilege of using the well, in part of the whole contract and that without it he would not have accepted the franchise or erected the plant, in no way affects the ques tion of law. * * He must have acted with full knowledge of the fact that the municipality had no right or power to confer on him a right to a private use of the street, giving him a right to a permanent encroachment thereon and allowing him to create a purpresture. There being no power in the city to make a discrimination in the use of the streets in favor of appellant, and permit him to have a permanent private use of the same or to part thereof, if it has done so the most that can be said is, it amounted to a mere license that would not render him amenable to punishment for a violation of an ordinance of the city in obstructing the street. Such permission to so use the street is not binding upon the city, and is not irrevocable. The municipality having no power to grant such permanent use, there can be no estoppel against it from requiring the street to be open in its entirety, because no estoppel can arise from an act of the municipal authorities done without authority of law." Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139; Gould v. City of Topeka, 32 Kan. 485. 875 Missouri v. Murphy, 170 U. S. 78. A gas company having the right to make and vend gas in a certain city and lay all necessary pipes 879 means of communication.87 They exist because of the grant of a and fixtures in a street is not authorized to lay electric wires. City of Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Co., 71 Ga. 106; Citizens' Gas & Min. Co. v. Town of Elwood, 114 Ind. 332, 16 N. E. 624; Kincaid v. Indianapolis Natural Gas Co., 124 Ind. 577, 24 N. E. 1066, 8 L. R. A. 602; Coffeyville Min. & Gas Co. v. Citizens' Natural Gas & Min. Co., 55 Kan. 173, 40 Pac. 326. The claims of rival companies cannot be tested by injunction. Sharp v. City of South Omaha, 53 Neb. 700; Parfitt v. Furguson, 159 N. Y. 111, 53 N. E. 707; Philadelphia Co. v. Borough of Freeport, 167 Pa. 279, 31 Atl. 571. 876 City of Chicago v. Mutual Elec. Light & Power Co., 55 Ill. App. 429; Edison Elec. Illum. Co. v. Hooper, 85 Md. 110; Crocker v. Boston Elec. Light Co., 180 Mass. 516, 62 N. E. 978; National Subway Co. v. City of St. Louis, 169 Mo. 319, 69 S. W. 290; State v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548, 34 L. R. A. 369; Trustees of Presbyterian Church v. State Board of Com'rs of Electric Subways, 55 N. J. Law, 436, 27 Atl. 809; City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Edison Elec. Co., 26 Wkly. Law Bul. 104; City of Allegheny v. Peoples' Natural Gas & Pipeage Co., 172 Pa. 632. 877 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685; Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank v. Arkansas City (C. C. A.) 76 Fed. 271, 34 L. R. A. 518; City & County of San Francisco v. Spring Val. Waterworks, 39 Cal. 473; Hughes v. City of Momence, 163 Ill. 535, 45 N. E. 300; Topeka Water Co. v. Whiting. 58 Kan. 639, 50 Pac. 877, 39 L. R. A. 90. A license to a water company to place its pipings in the street and to flush its mains must be exercised with reasonable care and due regard to the right of persons traveling on the street. Franke v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 11 Ky. L. R. 17, 11 S. W. 432, 718; Wright v. Woodcock, 86 Me. 113, 29 Atl. 953, 25 L. R. A. 499. A water company is not liable to an abutting owner because its pipes lawfully laid under authority prevent him from building steps leading to a cellar. See, also, as holding to the same effect the case of Provost v. New Chester Water Co., 162 Pa. 275, 29 Atl. 914. City of Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co., 66 Mich. 606, 33 N. W. 749; Inhabitants of Franklin Tp. v. Nutley Water Co., 53 N. J. Eq. 601, 32 Atl. 381; Inhabitants of Saddle River v. Garfield Water Co. (N. J. Eq.) 32 Atl. 978; Village of Tarrytown V. Pocantico WaterWorks Co., 48 Hun, 617, 1 N. Y. Supp. 394; Witcher v. Holland Water-Works Co., 66 Hun, 619, 20 N. Y. Supp. 560; Village of Pelham Manor v. New Rochelle Water Co., 143 N. Y. 532, 38 N. E. 711; Wheat v. City Council of Alexandria, 88 Va. 742, 14 S. E. 672; Chapman v. Fylde Water-works Co., 9 Rep. 582, [1894] 2 Q. B. 599. But see Passaic Water Co. v. City of Paterson, 65 N. J. Law, 472, 47 Atl. 462. 878 St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. State, 52 Ark. 51; Fitch v. New York, P. & B. R. Co., 59 Conn. 414, 10 L. R. A. 188; Palatka & I. R. R. Co. v. State, 23 Fla. 546; Sikes v. Town of Manchester, 59 Iowa, 65; Mathews v. Kelsey, 58 Me. 56; Benton v. City of Elizabeth, 61 N. J. Law, 411, 39 Atl. 683, 906: 879 Borough of Brigantine v. Holland Trust Co. (N. J. Eq.) 37 Atl. right continuing in its nature to use highways in such a manner as to cause for a brief period of time, at any one time, its temporary obstruction. It is scarcely necessary to say that public corporations possess the full power to regulate and control the manner of the exercise of such a right; both under its police power and also under the general power which it possesses to control the use of all highways within its jurisdiction in that manner which will preserve to the greatest possible extent the ordinary and usual condition of the highway as a means of public travel.880 Public corporations cannot alienate their plenary powers to grade and improve ways and the right is retained of lowering the grade of the street even if by so doing, water or gas pipes of private companies previously laid are exposed and the necessity of relaying them arises.881 438; Ampt v. City of Cincinnati, 6 Ohio N. P. 401. Ordinance authorizing use of streets for the laying of pneumatic tubes held void because of wording. 880 City Council of Montgomery v. Capital City Water Co., 92 Ala. 361. 9 So. 339. Regulating depth at which water pipes shall be laid. Carlyle Water, Light & Power Co. V. City of Carlyle, 31 Ill. App. 325. A city cannot dictate to a water company the locality of a standpipe. City of Indianapolis v. Consumers' Gas Trust Co., 140 Ind. 107, 39 N. E. 433, 27 L. R. A. 514; Crocker v Boston Elec. Light Co., 180 Mass. 516, 62 N. E. 978; Goodwillie v. City of Detroit, 103 Mich. 283, 61 N. W. 526. An ordinance requiring all water and gas pipes to be laid at least one year before a street shall be ordered paved held invalid. City of Kalamazoo v. Kalamazoo Heat, Light & Power Co., 124 Mich. 74, 82 N. W. 811; Benson v. City of Hoboken, 33 N. J. Law, 280; Springfield Water Co. v. Borough of Darby, 199 Pa. 400, 49 Atl. 275; Northern Liberties Com'rs v. Northern Liberties Gas Co., 12 Pa. 318. A prohibition of the use of streets for the purpose of laying gas mains from Dec. 1st to the following March held a reasonable regulation. Methodist Episcopal Church of Sewickley v. Independent National Gas Co., 22 Pittsb. Leg. J. (N. S.; Pa.) 274. The supply of gas free to churches as a condition for the use of streets held invalid. Philadelphia Co. v. Borough of Freeport, 167 Pa. 279, 31 Atl. 571. But see Springfield Water Co. v. Suburban Gas Co., 8 Del. Co. R. (Pa.) 130. 881 Rockland Water Co. v. City of Rockland, 83 Me. 267, 22 Atl. 166. "The plaintiff had a right under its charter to lay its pipes through the streets of defendant city 'in such manner as not to obstruct or impede travel thereon.' The city, of course. retained the right to repair its streets in the ordinary manner. In picking one of such streets, it is charged with so uncovering one of the plaintiff's pipes as to expose it to frost. Suppose it did. In the absence of any improper method in so doing, it incurred no liability to the |