§ 853. Right to impose conditions for use of highways. A state legislature or a subordinate public corporation to whom the authority has been delegated can, in the grant of the right to either steam or street railroads to use the public highways, impose those conditions which may be considered advisable in respect to the exercise of the granted authority.790 The conditions pany authorized by its charter to build "three foot standard narrow gauge railway" cannot enlarge its tracks to standard gauge without the consent of the city authorities where its tracks are laid. City of Hartford v. Hartford St. R. Co., 73 Hun, 327, 47 Atl. 330; City of Concord v. Concord Horse R. Co., 65 N. H. 30, 18 Atl. 87. Turnout. Brooklyn Cent. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City Ry. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 358. McClean v. Westchester Elec. R. Co., 25 Misc. 383, 55 N. Y. Supp. 556. Extensions should be connected with the original line. Eldert v. Long Island Elec. R. Co., 165 N. Y. 651, 59 N. E. 1122; Harner v. Columbia St. Car R. Co., 29 Wkly. Law Bul. 387. Sims v. Brooklyn St. R. Co., 37 Ohio 556. A municipal ordinance granting authority to a street railway company to extend its tracks is not an act conferring corporate powers within the prohibition of Ohio Const. art. 13, § 1. City of Philadelphia v. Citizens' Pass. R. Co., 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 16; Willis v. Erie City Pass. R. Co., 188 Pa. 56, 41 Atl. 307; Borough of Shamokin v. Shamokin & M. C. E. R. Co., 196 Pa. 166, 46 Atl. 382. 790 Macon Consol. St. R. Co. v. City of Macon, 112 Ga. 782, 38 S. E. 60. A municipal corporation cannot make a contract which abrogates or restricts the lawful exercise of its legislative or discretion ary power with reference to the location of the tracks of a street car company. Des Moines St. R. Co. v. Des Moines B. G. R. Co., 74 Iowa, 585, 38 N. W. 496. A city cannot require the use of a different gauge by a railroad company in making extensions. Getchell & M. Lumber Mfg. Co. v. Des Moines Union R. Co., 115 Iowa, 734, 87 N. W. 670; Old Colony R. Co. v. Rockland & A. St. R. Co., 161 Mass. 416, 37 N. E. 370. City of Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & B. I. R. Co., 95 Mich. 456, 54 N. W. 958, 20 L. R. A. 79. A reserved power in a street railroad franchise on the part of a city to make such further regulations as may be necessary to protect the interests includes the right to require a street car company to keep for the accommodation of the public, tickets for sale on its cars. Rapid R. Co. v. City of Mt. Clemens, 118 Mich. 133, 76 N. W. 318. A street railway constructing a Y upon the condition that if ordered to do so by the city, it must remove it on sixty days' notice, is bound by that condition. Hutchinson v. Borough of Belmar (N. J. Err. & App.) 45 Atl. 1092, affirming 61 N. J. Law, 443, 39 Atl. 643. The requirement that a railroad company shall pay the expense of the passage of the ordinance and a reasonable counsel fee is not illegal or improper. Abraham v. Meyers, 29 Abb. N. may roughly be classed as those which have for their object the payment of a tax or license fee for the privilege granted, those which have as their basis an exercise of the police power of the state or those which have for their purpose the maintenance of C. 384, 23 N. Y. Supp. 225, 228. It is a reasonable condition to require purchasers to deposit one-half of the amount necessary to complete a proposed road. Brooklyn El. R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 2 App. Div. 98, 37 N. Y. Supp. 560. The expense of protecting an elevated road from settling because of the construction of a sewer by the city must be met by the railroad company. Staten Island Midland R. Co. v. Staten Island Elec. R. Co., 34 App. Div. 181, 54 N. Y. Supp. 598. Condition applied to changed use of certain tracks. People v. Barnard, 48 Hun, (N. Y.) 57. A condition that a company shall keep accurate books of account open at all times to the inspection of the city authorities is improper. In re Atlantic El. R. Co., 136 N. Y. 292, 32 N. E. 771; City of Philadelphia v. Lombard & S. Sts. Pass. Co., 3 Grant Cas. (Pa.) 403. City of Reading v. United Traction Co., 202 Pa. 571, 52 Atl. 106. A railroad company may be required at its own expense to lower its tracks to conform to a change in the grade of a street. City of Philadelphia v. Ridge Ave. Pass. R. Co., 143 Pa. 444, 22 Atl. 695; Woonsocket St. R. Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 22 R. I. 64, 46 Atl. 272. An ordinance regulating the use of streets may be unreasonable. Smith v. East End St. R. Co., 87 Tenn. 626, 11 S. W. 709; Dern v. Salt Lake City R. Co., 19 Utah, 46, 56 Pac. 566. Legislation relative to conditions can only be prospective. Spokane St. R. Co. v. City of Spokane, 5 Wash. 634, 32 Pac. 456. A condition applied in respect to the right of the city to control and use its streets. Wood v. City of Seattle, 23 Wash. 1, 62 Pac. 135, 52 L. R. A. 369. A condition requiring compulsory arbitration in disputes between a street railway company and its employees held good. Ashland St. R. Co. v. City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 271, 47 N. W. 619. A street railway must change at its own expense the grade of its tracks to correspond with changes in the grade of a street used by them. Fitts V. Cream City R. Co., 59 Wis. 323; Pacific R. Co. v. Leavenworth City, 1 Dill. 393, Fed. Cas. No. 10,649. See Nellis, pp. 206, 207. "A grant to a corpora. tion of the right to own property and transact business confers no immunity from any police control to which a citizen could be subjected; and a reasonable regulation of the enjoyment of the franchise is not a denial of the right nor an invasion of the franchise, or a deprivation of this property, or interference with the business of the corporation. Under this power, ordinances regulating the use of the streets by street railways have become frequent, especially so since the introduction of electricity as a motive power; with its capacity of a high rate of speed, as well as other dangerous and obstructive capacities. Their operation must be reasonably safe, rea St. Surface R. R. c. 4, the highway as nearly as may be in its original condition and its use by the railroad in such a manner as to least interfere with the public travel. Tickets and transfers or fares. The authorities hold that transportation is a commodity and the property of the one by whom it is supplied. Regulations, therefore, cannot be adopted by a public corporation relative to fares which will, in effect, amount to a taking of property without compensation even under the osthe parties in respect to the subject of this paragraph may also tensible exercise of the police power.791 The relative rights of be controlled by special franchise or contract provisions and it. naturally follows that regulations which impair these contract obligations will not be considered valid.72 In particular controversies the relative rights of the parties will be determined by the language of a particular grant,793 and that rule universally ob sonably consistent and in harmony with the legal customary use of the street by the general public; and ordinances to enforce this rule of law are reasonable in purpose and effect." See §§ 115 et seq., ante. But see Fair Haven & W. R. Co. v. City of New Haven, 74 Conn. 102, 49 Atl. 863. Conditions imposed should be relevant and material to the rights granted. 791 Ex parte Lorenzon, 128 Cal. 431, 61 Pac. 68, 50 L. R. A. 55. An ordinance relative to use of transfers within the time limit specified and prohibiting passengers from selling or giving them away held reasonable and not oppressive. Parker v. Elmira, C. & N. R. Co., 165 N. Y. 274; Ellis v. Milwaukee City R. Co., 67 Wis. 135; Nellis, St. Surface R. R. p. 221. But see People v. Suburban R. Co., 178 Ill. 594, 53 N. E. 349, 49 L. R. A. 650, where it is held that the legislature may enact laws to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination by street railways in the transportation of passengers. 792 City of Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & B. I. R. Co., 95 Mich. 456, 54 N. W. 958, 20 L. R. A. 79. An ordinance requiring tickets to be kept for sale on the cars of a street railway company does not impair the granted rights and franchises of the company within the meaning of Howell's Ann. St. c. 94, § 3527, which prohibits city authorities from making any regulations whereby rights or franchises granted shall be destroyed or unreasonably impaired. 793 City of Indianapolis v. Navin, 151 Ind. 144, 47 N. E. 526, 51 N. E. 80, 41 L. R. A. 340. Validity of three-cent fare ordinance sustained. State v. Omaha & C. B. R. & Bridge Co., 113 Iowa, 30, 84 N. W. 983, 52 L. R. A. 315. An ordinance giving residents of a city the special privilege of obtaining transportation on a street railway at a less rate than other residents of the state violates Iowa Const. art. 1, § 6, relative to laws of a general nature and uniform operation. Forman v. New Orleans & C. R. Co., 40 La. Ann. 446, 4 So. 246; City of Cambridge v. tains that a municipal corporation in respect to rates charged has no extra territorial jurisdiction 794 though it may prescribe reasonable rates within its limits.795 Police regulations. In regard to conditions based upon the police power, the doctrine is established beyond question and necessarily so that in case of their omission from the grant of authority, the state or its subordinate agencies will still have the power, and a continuing one, to adopt and enforce all necessary measures for the protection of life and property. 796 The rule is also established beyond doubt that municipal authorities of cities and large towns have the right to adopt such measures without any special legislative sanction by virtue of the general supervision and control which they have over the police protection of their respective jurisdictions.797 Cambridge R. Co., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 50; Rice v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. R. Co., 122 Mich. 677, 81 N. W. 927, 48 L. R. A. 84; Sternberg v. State, 36 Neb. 307, 54 N. W. 553, 19 L. R. A. 570. The city of Lincoln may fix the rates of fare to be charged by a street railway company. Ellis v. Milwaukee City R. Co., 67 Wis. 135, 30 N. W. 218. 794 City of South Pasadena v. Los Angeles Terminal R. Co., 109 Cal. 315, 41 Pac. 1093. 795 City of Indianapolis v. Navin, 151 Ind. 144, 47 N. E. 526, 51 N. E. 80, 41 L. R. A. 340; Forman v. New Orleans & C. R. Co., 40 La. Ann. 446; Baltimore & Y. Turnpike Road v. Boone, 45 Md. 344; Rice v. Detroit, Y & A. A. R. Co., 122 Mich. 677, 81 N. W. 927, 48 L. R. A. 84; City of Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & B. I. R. Co., 95 Mich. 457, 20 L. R. A. 79; Sternberg v. State, 36 Neb. 307, 54 N. W. 553, 19 L. R. A. 570; Barnett v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 53 App. Div. 432, 65 N. Y. Supp. 1068. Separate fare on branch road. People v. Barnard, 110 N. Y. 548; Ellis v. Milwaukee City R. Co., 67 Wis. 135, 30 N. W. 218; Nellis, St. Surface R. R. c. 4, § 3. 796 City of Baltimore v. Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co., 166 U. S. 673; Metropolitan City R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 96 Ill. 620; Drady v. Des Moines & Ft. D. R. Co., 57 Iowa, 393; New Orleans, C. & L. R. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 748; City of Kalamazoo v. Michigan Taction Co., 126 Mich. 525, 85 N. W. 1067; Jackson & S. Traction Co. v. Commissioners of Railroads, 128 Mich. 164, 87 N. W. 133. A street railroad company may be compelled to elevate its tracks at the crossing of a steam railroad. Consolidated Traction Co.. v. City of Elizabeth, 58 N. J. Law, 619, 34 Atl. 146, 32 L. R. A. 170; Trenton Horse R. Co. v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 53 N. J. Law, 132, 11 L. R. A. 410; Hewlett v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 63 App. Div. 423, 71 N. Y. Supp. 531; Town of Mason v. Ohio River R. Co., 51 W. Va. 183, 41 S. E. 418. See §§ 115 et seq., ante. 797 Whitson v. City of Franklin, 34 Ind. 392. Speed ordinance. Allen v. City of Jersey City, 53 N. J. Law, § 854. Conditions based upon the police power. The police power of the state is ample to secure the purpose sought to be accomplished by its existence and exercise. It is an inherent sovereign and continuing power and cannot be granted. or bargained away.798 The failure in a grant of authority to refer to it cannot be regarded as the equivalent of a surrender of the power. Under it the state or subordinate public corporations may adopt all needful rules and regulations, that may be determined. upon from time to time by changing circumstances and conditions, to protect property and life and the good morals of the people.799 Familiar illustrations of an exercise of this power in connection with the use of public highways by either steam or street railroads include the adoption of laws or regulations relative to limiting the speed of trains in the streets of cities and towns,800 requiring the erection of safety gates or the maintenance of flagmen at highways crossings,801 obstructing streets or blockading crossings,802 522, 22 Atl. 257; Inhabitants of Trenton v. Trenton Pass. R. Co. (N. J. Eq.) 27 Atl. 483. A municipal corporation must exercise a power conferred upon it in the manner esspecially prescribed by statute and if this is not done, in any appropriate way. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Richmond, 26 Grat. (Va.) 83. 798 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Town of Westbrook's Appeal, 57 Conn. 95; Horn v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co., 35 N. H. 169; Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140. See, also, § 115, ante, and notes cited in notes 51 and 52. 799 City of San Jose v. San Jose & S. C. R. Co., 53 Cal. 475; Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 159 Ill. 369, 42 N. E. 781; City of Clinton v. Clinton & L. Horse R. Co., 37 Iowa, 61; City of Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & E. R. Co., 90 Mich. 646, 51 N. W. 688. 800 Denver & S. F. R. Co. v. Domke, 11 Colo. 247, 17 Pac. 777; Evison v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 45 Minn. 370, 11 L. R. A. 434; Merz v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 88 Mo. 672, 1 S. W. 382; Ruschenberg v. Southern Elec. Co., 161 Mo. 70, 61 S. W. 626. The maximum speed fixed in a franchise is a part of the contract and a street railway is entitled to run its tracks at that speed although in excess of the rate fixed by general ordinances. Attorney General v. London & N. W. R. Co., 68 Law J. Q. B. 4 [1899] 1 Q. B. 72; Pennsylvania Co. v. James, 81 Pa. 194. 801 Hayes v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 111 U. S. 228; St. Louis, A. & T. H. Co. v. City of Belleville, 122 Ill. 376; City of Leavenworth v. Hurdle, 63 Kan. 886, 66 Pac. 238; Green v. Eastern R., 52 Minn. 79, 53 N. W. 808; Long Island City v. Long Island R. Co., 79 N. Y. 561. Such an ordinance cannot apply to a railroad whose road was constructed before the date of the charter under which the ordinance was passed. 802 Gude v. State, 76 Ala. 100; |