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instances, the right of occupation may be granted only upon the consent of the owners of abutting property. Whether the right of the occupation of a highway by a steam railway is derived from one or more of these sources, the extent of its rights will be determined largely by the language of the grant which must be express, the authority of the grantor of the right and the power or the capacity of the grantee to accept the grant.775 The language of the grant of authority whether an act of the legislature or a resolution or ordinance of some municipal council or body will determine the extent of the rights granted and whatever their character in this respect, they can only be given because of a proposed public service or use. Irrespective of the question of compensation to the abutting owner, the basic right of a railroad of any class for the occupation of a highway or any portion of it is this public use. The authority for the occupation or use of a highway can

776

774 Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co., 107 Wis. 493, 83 N. W. 851. Abutting owners control only streets adjoining them. See, also, authorities cited in §§ 836, 837, ante.

775 Williams v. Citizens' R. Co., 130 Ind. 71, 15 L. R. A. 64; Koch v. North Ave. R. Co., 75 Md. 222, 15 L. R. A. 377; Detroit Citizens' St. R. Co. v. City of Detroit, 110 Mich. 384, 35 L. R. A. 859; Traphagen v. Jersey City, 52 N. J. Law, 65, 18 Atl. 586, 696. A city has no power to confer upon a railroad company a right to occupy exclusively any portion of a public street.

Kelly v. City of Paterson, 35 N. J. Law, 196; De Grauw v. Long Island Elec. R. Co., 163 N. Y. 597, 57 N. E. 1108. Under authority to "convey persons and property in cars for compensation," cars may be operated by street surface railroads designed and used exclusively for carrying express matter, freight or property. Gillette v. Chester & M. R. Co., 2 Pa. Dist. R. Co., 450. Act May 14th, 1889, providing for

the operation of street roads "by any power other than by locomotives," authorizes the use of electricity.

Com. v. Borough of West Chester, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 542. Act May 14th, 1889, authorizes the construction and operation of electric railroads operated by means of permanent overhead wires carried on poles set within a street line. Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Africa, 100 Tenn. 26; Schwede v. Hemrich Bros. Brewing Co., 29 Wash. 21, 69 Pac. 362. A private corporation can secure no right to construct a railroad track on a public street through the granting of a permit to this effect by a board of public works.

776 Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Ocala St. & S. R. Co., 39 Fla. 306, 22 So. 692; Hanbury v. Woodward Lumber Co., 98 Ga. 54, 26 S. E. 477; Chicago Gen. R. Co. v. Chicago City R. Co., 62 Ill. App. 502; Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co. v. City of Chicago, 173 Ill. 91, 50 N. E. 256, 40 L. R. A. 621; Cook v. City of Burlington, 36 Iowa, 357; O'Neil v.

not be granted either by the legislature or a body to whom the power has been declared except upon a consideration of the principle that such use is subordinate to the rights of the public at large, and if it appears that a highway is already burdened by existing grants a further one may be withheld. The right to use. is also taken, affected with the implied condition that the highway shall not be used in such a manner as to destroy its proper and legitimate use by the public at all times.778

Lamb, 53 Iowa, 725. The presumption is that the railroad is for a public not a private use.

Heath v. Des Moines & St. L. R. Co., 61 Iowa, 11; Mikesell v. Durkee, 36 Kan. 97, 12 Pac. 351, 34 Kan. 509; Bradley v. Pharr, 45 La. Ann. 426, 12 So. 618; Green v. City of Portland, 32 Me. 431; Gustafson v. Hamm, 56 Minn. 334, 57 N. W. 1054, 22 L. R. A. 565; St. Louis R. Co. v. Southern R. Co. (Mo.) 15 S. W. 1013. A street railway operated solely for the carrying of passengers is a public highway and its use a public one.

Lackland v. North Missouri R. Co., 31 Mo. 180; Brown v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 137 Mo. 529, 38 S. W. 1099. All railroads are declared public highways within the meaning of Mo. Const., art. 12, § 14. Glaessner v. Anheuser-Busch Brew. Co., 100 Mo. 508, 13 S. W. 707; City of Newark v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 196, 7 Atl. 123; Montgomery v. Inhabitants of Trenton, 36 N. J. Law, 79; Taylor v. Dunn, 652, 16 S. W. 732; Cereghino V. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 26 Utah, 467, 73 Pac. 634.

777 Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Pointer, 9 Kan. 620; Jeffersonville, M. & I. R. Co. v. Esterle, 76 Ky. (13 Bush.) 667; Middlesex R. Co. v. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 262; City of Detroit v. Ft. Wayne & E. R. Co., 90 Mich. Abb. Corp. Vol. III — 3

646, 51 N. W. 688; City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 34 L. R. A. 184.

Armstead v. Mendenhall, 83 Minn. 136, 85 N. W. 929. A street car company operating cars in public streets and the public lawfully using a street have rights alike except that the cars cannot leave the track, in which respect the company has a permanent right over its tracks. Newark Pass. R. Co. v. Block, 55 N. J. Law, 605, 27 Atl. 1067, 22 L. R. A. 374. The principle applied to rate of speed of cars.

Buhrens v. Dry-Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co., 53 Hun, 571, 6 N. Y. Supp. 224. Street cars have no greater rights where they cross over streets than those of other vehicles. Kellinger v. Forty-second St. & G. St. Ferry R. Co., 50 N. Y. 206; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Carson, 66 Tex. 345, 1 S. W. 107; Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah, 31, 33 Pac. 229, 24 L. R. A. 610.

778 City of Baltimore v. Baltimore Trust & Guarantee Co., 166 U. S. 673; People v. Rich, 54 Cal. 74; Commonwealth v. City of Frankfort, 92 Ky. 149, 17 S. W. 287; Detroit City R. Co. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634; Watson v. Robberson Ave. R. Co., 69 Mo. App. 548; Lockwood v. Wabash R. Co., 122 Mo. 86, 26 S. W. 698; Schulenberg & B. Lumber Co.

The grant of authority may, by its terms, be regarded as a privilege, irrevocable in its character or only upon certain conditions and, therefore, a contract obligation protected by the Federal constitution against an unwarranted interference with the rights acquired under it, or it may be considered as a mere license revocable at pleasure and conveying no rights of the char

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v. St. Louis, K. & N. W. R. Co., 129 Mo. 455, 31 S. W. 796; Mahady v. Bushwick R. Co., 91 N. Y. 148; Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah, 31, 4 Am. Electrical Cas. 189, 24 L. R. A. 610.

779 Baltimore Trust and Guarantee Co. v. City of Baltimore, 64 Fed. 153; Town of Arcata v. Arcata & M. R. Co., 92 Cal. 639, 28 Pac. 676; Denver Tramway Co. v. Londoner, 20 Colo. 150, 37 Pac. 723; Fair Haven & W. R. Co. v. City of New Haven, 74 Conn. 102, 49 Atl. 863; Atlanta R. & P. Co. v. Atlanta Rapid Transit Co., 113 Ga. 481, 39 S. E. 12; People v. Chicago West Div. R. Co., 118 Ill. 113.

City of Chicago v. Union Stock Yards & Transit Co., 164 Ill. 224, 35 L. R. A. 281. Where a city has acquiesced in the use for twenty years by a railroad company of its streets, has authorized its construction and required it to make many improvements, it is estopped to deny the rightful authority to so use and occupy the streets. Harvey v. Aurora & G. R. Co., 186 III. 283, 57 N. E. 857; City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co. (Ind.) 52 N. E. 157; City of Burlington v. Burlington St. R. Co., 49 Iowa, 144; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bowling Green R. Co., 23 Ky. L. R. 273, 63 S. W. 4; New Orleans C. & L. R. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 748; State v. New Orleans & C. R. Co., 44 La. Ann. 1026, 11 So. 709.

Medford & C. R. Co. v. Inhabit

ants of Somerville, 111 Mass. 232. What is sufficient notice of a revocation of the authority to construct a street railway discussed. Electric R. Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 84 Mich. 257, 47 N. W. 567. Conditions are void imposed after a grant of privileges with an acceptance.

Union St. R. Co. v. Saginaw Circ. Judge, 113 Mich. 694; Nash v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 261, 33 N. W. 787; Union Depot R. Co. v. Southern R. Co., 105 Mo. 562, 16 S. W. 920. A street railway company accepting the provisions of a city charter enacted after its organization stands in the same position that it would had the charter been in effect before it was incorporated. Newark & H. Traction Co. v. Borough of North Arlington, 67 N. J. Law, 161, 50 Atl. 345; City of Elmira v. Maple Ave. R. Co., 51 Hun, 638, 4 N. Y. Supp. 943. The right to operate lines in a specified manner cannot be subsequently interfered with. Herzog v. New York El. R. Co., 37 N. Y. State Rep. 567, 14 N. Y. Supp. 296; Brooklyn Heights R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 18 N. Y. Supp. 876; Brooklyn Cent. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 358; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 65 Hun, 464, 20 N. Y. Supp. 448. A municipality cannot revoke authority granted by the legislature. City of Troy v. Troy & L. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 657; City of New York v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 389, 23 N. E. 550; Akron, B. & C.

acter above indicated.780 The question of the right of the legislature or a subordinate public corporation to grant an exclusive

R. Co. v. Village of Bedford, 6 Ohio N. P. 276.

City of Columbus v. Columbus St. R. Co., 45 Ohio St. 98, 12 N. E. 651. A street railway company by the construction and operation of its road under a franchise granted by a city ordinance accepts the whole ordinance, its burdens and privileges alike. Mill Creek Valley St. R. Co. v. Village of Carthage, 18 Ohio Circ. R. 216; Cincinnati & S. R. Co. v. Village of Carthage, 36 Ohio St. 631; Scranton & P. Traction Co. v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 409; Hannum v. Media, M. & A. & C. R. Co., 8 Del. Co. R. (Pa.) 91; Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. R. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 89 Pa. 210; Junction Pass. R. Co. v. Williamsport Pass. R. Co., 154 Pa. 116, 26 Atl. 295. The state alone has the power to enforce the forfeiture.

Pawcatuck Valley St. R. Co. v. Town Council of Westerly, 22 R. I. 307, 47 Atl. 691. An ordinance permitting the company to use certain streets and prescribing the use of a certain kind of rails in respect to the rails is not a contract so as to prohibit the city council from subsequently changing the rails. State v. Lebanon & N. Turnpike Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 61 S. W. 1096; City of Houston v. Houston Belt & M. P. R. Co., 84 Tex. 581, 19 S. W. 786; Dern V. Salt Lake City R. Co., 19 Utah, 46, 56 Pac. 566.

Spokane St. R. Co. v. City of Spokane Falls, 6 Wash. 521, 33 Pac. 1072. A city may be estopped by acquiescence in the use of streets by a railroad company and the col

lection of taxes upon its property from afterwards denying its legal right to occupy these streets for the sole purpose of giving a similar right to another company. Sinnott v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 81 Wis. 95, 50 N. W. 1097. But see Des Moines St. R. Co. v. Des Moines B. G. St. R. Co., 73 Iowa, 513, 35 N. W. 602; City of Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo. 645, 40 S. W. 757, 37 L. R. A. 446. See, also, the cases of Pawcatuck Val. St. R. Co. v. Town Council of Westerly, 22 R. I. 307, 47 Atl. 691. An ordinance requiring change of rails not a violation of a franchise. Easton, S. E. & W. E. P. R. Co. v. Easton, 133 Pa. 505, 19 Atl. 486.

780 Southern R. Co. v. Atlanta R. & P. Co., 111 Ga. 679, 36 S. E. 873, 51 L. R. A. 125. A railroad corporation cannot complain because a street railway company is subsequently permitted to construct and operate an electric line on streets upon which its track it laid. The steam road's right to occupy streets is a mere easement subject to the inconvenience that may result from the growth and development of the city and consequent increase of or change in modes of travel. It cannot recover damages for a subsequent crossing by an electric line.

Chicago City R. Co. v. People, 73 Ill. 541; City of Bellville v. Citizens' Horse R. Co., 152 Ill. 171, 38 N. E. 584, 26 L. R. A. 681; City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co. (Ind.) 52 N. E. 157. A street railway company and a city are bound by their construction of an ordinance granting privileges. Atchison St. R. Co. v. Nave,

privilege or right will be considered later.781 A grant of the use of streets must be definite and accepted within the time fixed or a reasonable one.782

§ 852 Construction of grant of authority.

The rules of interpretation or construction to be applied in a particular instance will depend upon the nature of the grant. If this is one exclusive in its character or in derogation of common right, the rule of strict construction will apply and no privileges not clearly appearing will be read into the instrument through an

38 Kan. 744, 17 Pac. 587; Lake Roland El. R. Co. v. City of Baltimore, 77 Md. 352, 26 Atl. 510, 20 L. R. A. 126.

City of St. Paul v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 63 Minn. 330, 356, 34 L. R. A. 184. "But such a license lawfully granted and subsequently acted on by the licensee is not revocable in the ordinary sense of the word, that is, it is not revocable at the mere arbitrary pleasure or whim of the city or municipality. The licensee in such a case has vested rights under the license subject only to the permanent rights of the general public for the use to which it was dedicated." But see People v. Suburban R. Co., 178 Ill. 594, 53 N. E. 349, 49 L. R. A. 650.

781 See §§ 921 et seq., post.

782 City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 166 U. S. 557; People v. Los Angeles Elec. R. Co., 91 Cal. 338, 27 Pac. 673. Where a forfeiture is claimed because of a failure to commence construction within the time required, the pleadings must state dates and facts sufficient to give a cause of action. Williamson v. Gordon Heights R. Co. (Del.) 40 Atl. 933; City R. Co. v. Citizens' St. R. Co. (Ind.) 52 N. E. 157; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bowling Green R

Co., 110 Ky. 788, 63 S. W. 4. A failure to declare a forfeiture based upon a nonuse of streets specified within the time named will result in the loss of the right after the streets have been occupied.

United R. & E. Co. v. Hayes, 92 Md. 490, 48 Atl. 364. Where an ordinance required that a street railroad company should construct its tracks and begin running its cars within a prescribed time or forfeit its rights, to be excepted from the operation of the ordinance streets not graded or paved. A street macademized is not paved within the meaning of the ordinance. State v. Helena Power & Light Co., 22 Mont. 391, 44 L. R. A. 692; Inhabitants of Trenton v. Trenton Horse Ry. Co. (N. J. Eq.) 19 A. 263; Moore v. West Jersey Traction Co., 62 N. J. Law, 386, 792, 41 Atl. 946; People v. Broadway R. Co., 56 Hun, 45, 9 N. Y. Supp. 6. The failure to build one line within the time limited will not work a forfeiture in respect to other lines constructed in time. Junction Pass. R. Co. v. Williamsport Pass. R. Co., 154 Pa. 116, 26 Atl. 295. See, as to conditional acceptance, McNeil v. Chicago City R. Co., 61 Ill. 150.

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