Constitution of the United States; and do not impose a disproportion-
ate and unequal tax upon them in violation of the provisions of the
constitution of that State. Ib.
It is the manifest intent of Rev. Stat. § 5219, to permit the State in which
a national bank is located to tax all the shares in its capital stock with-
out regard to ownership, subject only to the limitations prescribed in
that section; and in this case the law permits the taxation of the shares
in the bank of the plaintiff in error which are owned by other national
banks, on the same footing with all other shares. Ib.
The act of Congress of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 244, § 10 of which authorized
a bridge to be constructed across the Missouri River at the city of
Kansas, required that the distance of one hundred and sixty feet
between the piers of the bridge, which were called for by the act,
should be obtained by measuring along a line between said piers
drawn perpendicularly to the faces of the piers and the current of the
river; and as such a line drawn between the piers of the bridge of the
plaintiff in error measures only one hundred and fifty-three feet and a
fraction of a foot, instead of the required one hundred and sixty feet,
it is not a lawful structure within the meaning of that act. Hannibal
& St. Joseph Railroad v. Missouri River Packet Co., 260.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 4.
OFFICER IN THE NAVY.
See SALARY, 1, 2, 3;
STATUTE, A, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 2.
1. The second claim in reissued letters-patent No. 8914, dated September
30, 1879, to Frederick W. Weir, for an improvement in railroad frogs,
(the original patent being No. 215,548, dated May 20, 1879,) whether
construed by itself, or with reference to the state of the art at the time
of the alleged invention, is a claim for a combination of parts, viz.: (1)
two centre rails B B joined to form the V-shaped point; (2) the outside
diverging or wing rails; (3) the channel irons of a U shape uniting the
centre rails together, and also to the outside or wing rails, so that the
whole shall constitute a frog with the characteristics imparted by
the features of this combination: and no invention was required to
divide the U iron, shown in patent No. 173,804, issued to William J.
Morden, February 22, 1876, so as to connect the centre rails with the
outer rail. Weir v. Morden, 98.
2. One having an interest in all fees and other sums to be recovered under
a patent, but not shown to have any interest, legal or equitable, in the
patent itself, need not be made a party to a bill in equity for its
infringement. Tilghman v. Proctor, 136.
3. Upon a bill in equity by the owner against infringers of a patent, the
plaintiff, although he has established license fees, is not limited to the
amount of such fees, as damages; but may, instead of damages, recover
the amount of gains and profits that the defendants have made by the
use of his invention, over what they would have had in using other
means then open to the public and inadequate to enable them to obtain
an equally beneficial result. Ib.
4. Upon a bill in equity for infringing a patent, if the defendants have
gained an advantage by using the plaintiff's invention, that advantage
is the measure of the profits to be accounted for, even if from other
causes the business in which the invention was employed by the defend-
ants did not result in profits; and if the use of a patented process pro-
duced a definite saving in the cost of manufacture, they must account
to the patentee for the amount so saved. Ib.
5. The liability of infringers of a patent to account to the patentee for all
the profits, gains and savings, which they have made by the use of his
invention during the whole period of their infringement, is not affected
by the fact that in the midst of that period an erroneous decision was
made in favor of a distinct infringer, in no way connected with these
defendants. Ib.
6. In determining the amount of gains and profits derived by infringers of
a patent from the use of the invention, over what they would have
made in using an old process open to the public, the expense of using
the new process is to be ascertained by the manner in which they have
conducted their business, and not by the manner in which they might
have conducted it; but the cost at which they used the old process is
not conclusive against them, if other manufacturers used that process
at less cost. lb.
7. As a general rule, in taking an account of profits against an infringer of
a patent, interest is not to be allowed before the date of the submission
of the master's report, but only after that date and upon the amount
shown to be due by his report and the accompanying evidence. Ib.
8. The other questions decided were questions of fact. Ib.
9. Claims 2 and 3 of reissued letters patent No. 8876, granted to Frank H.
Fisher September 2, 1879, on an application filed March 29, 1879, for
an "improvement in hydraulic mining apparatus," the original patent
No. 110,222, having been granted to Fisher December 20, 1870, namely,
"2. A ball-and-socket joint for connecting the discharge pipe of a
hydraulic mining apparatus with the end of a swivel section, B, sub-
stantially as above described. 3. The discharge pipe, E, having a semi-
cylindrical or ball-shaped enlargement at its base, in combination with
a corresponding cup-shaped socket, D, on the end of the horizontally
swivelling section, B, substantially as, and for the purpose described,”
are invalid. Hoskin v. Fisher, 217.
10. A copy of the original patent being found in the record under a proper
certificate from the clerk of the court below, and there being a stipula-
tion under which it might have been introduced in evidence from the
proceedings in another case, it is to be considered, although there is no
separate memorandum of its introduction in evidence. Ib.
11. There was a first reissue of the patent, granted as No. 5193, December
17, 1872, but no copy of it being found in the record, it cannot be pre-
sumed that claims 2 and 3 of the second reissue were found in the first
reissue.
12. The plaintiffs having stated in their bill that the first reissue or a copy
of it was ready in court to be produced, it was for them to put it in
evidence, if they desired to excuse the delay of more than eight years
and three months in applying for the second reissue by showing that
the first reissue, granted a little less than two years after the date of
the original patent, contained claims 2 and 3 of the second reissue.
Ib.
13. The question of such delay is to be considered as if there never had
been any first reissue. Ib.
14. Claims 2 and 3 of the second reissue being claims to sub-combinations
less than the whole combination covered by the single claim of the
original patent, and the descriptive parts and drawings of the two
specifications being alike, and it not being indicated in the original
that the invention consisted in anything less than a combination of all
the elements embraced in such single claim, and the delay not being
explained, such claims were unlawful expansions of the original pa-
tent. lb.
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15. A patent granted in 1871, for an improvement in post-office boxes was
reissued in 1872, and again in 1877, and again in 1879. The original
patent limited the invention to a metallic frontage made continuous
by connecting the adjoining frames to each other, and not merely to
the woodwork. There was no mistake, and the original patent was
not defective or insufficient, in either the descriptive portion or the
claims. In the progress of the first reissue through the Patent Office,
the applicant, on its requirement, struck out of the proposed specifica-
tion everything which suggested any other mode of fastening than
one by which the frames were to be fastened to each other: Held,
that the first reissue could not have been construed as claiming any
other mode of fastening; that therefore the third reissue could not
be construed as claiming any other mode of fastening; and that, as
the defendant's structures would not have infringed any claim of the
original patent, they could not be held to infringe any claim of the
third reissue. Yale Lock Manufacturing Co. v. James, 447.
See JURISDICTION, A, 4, 5, 6.
PENNSYLVANIA.
See LOCAL LAW, 1, 2, 3, 4.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10.
A petition for a rehearing of a case decided by a divided court is denied
on the ground that no important constitutional question is involved.
Shreveport v. Holmes, 694.
POLICE POWER.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4, 5.
A contract, made under authority of a statute, by a State with an individ-
ual to prosecute at his own expense before Congress and the Depart-
ments certain specified claims of the State against the United States,
and to receive as full compensation for his services a certain rate of
commission on the amounts collected by him, does not confer upon
the agent a power, coupled with an interest in the subject of the con-
tract, which will make the contract of agency irrevocable. Missouri
ex rel. Walker v. Walker, 339.
A power of attorney authorized the donee to take possession of real estate
by himself or by a person in his confidence, to cultivate it, to sell it, to
exchange it or to alienate it. He indorsed it to A by a writing stat-
ing: "I transfer all my powers in favor of A, in order that in my
name and as my attorney he may take possession," &c. Held, that the
indorsement only gave it power to take possession, but no power to
sell. Williams v. Conger, 397.
See EVIDENCE, 8, 9;
LOCAL LAW, 6, 7.
1. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is strictly part of the
record, and is so considered on writ of error from this court. New
Orleans Waterworks v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 18.
2. The parties having compromised the suit, and stipulated that the plain-
tiff in error shall dismiss it, the court makes an order to enforce the
stipulation, unless cause to the contrary be shown. Addington v.
Burke, 693.
3. It being made to appear that one party to this suit had sold out to the
other, and that the suit was prosecuted by the purchasing party for
his own benefit, the court of its own motion, after notice and hearing,
dismissed the case. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad Co.
v. Southern Telegraph Co., 695.
See APPEAL;
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS;
BILL OF REVIEW;
JURISDICTION, A, 2, 6, 8, 9;
PETITION FOR REHEARING.
1. A suit may be brought by the United States in any court of competent
jurisdiction to set aside, cancel, or annul a patent for land issued in
its name, on the ground that it was obtained by fraud or mistake.
United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 273.
2. The initiation and control of such a suit lies with the Attorney General
as the head of one of the Executive Departments. Ib.
3. But the right to bring such a suit exists only when the government has
an interest in the remedy sought by reason of its interest in the land,
or the fraud has been practised on the government and operates to its
prejudice, or it is under obligation to some individual to make his
title good by setting aside the fraudulent patent, or the duty of the
government to the public requires such action. Ib.
4. When it is apparent that the only purpose of bringing the suit is to
benefit one of the two claimants to the land, and the government has
no interest in the matter, the suit must fail. Ib.
5. In the case before us the alleged fraud, for which it is sought to annul
the patent, is in the survey of a confirmed Mexican grant, on which
the patent was issued; and it is charged that at the time the survey
was made the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the Surveyor
General for California, the chief clerk of the latter's office, and the
deputy who made the survey, were interested in the ownership of the
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