tive power, and not a law of the State; and if the highest court of the
State, in a suit between the waterworks company and the licensee,
gives judgment for the latter, upon the construction and effect of the
charter and the license, and not because of the provision of the state
constitution of 1879 abolishing monopolies, this court has no jurisdic-
tion on writ of error, although the question whether the licensee's
property was contiguous to the river was in controversy. New Orleans
Waterworks v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co., 18.

2. Upon a writ of error to the highest court of a State, under Rev. Stat.
§ 709, the opinion of that court, recorded as required by the statutes
of the State, nray be examined by this court to ascertain the ground
of the judgment. Kreiger v. Shelby Railroad Co., 39.

3. Statutes of a State authorized a district in a county, defined by exact
boundaries, to determine by the vote of its inhabitants to subscribe
for stock in a railroad company, and required bonds to be executed in
its name by the county judge to the railroad company for the amount
of stock so subscribed for. By later statutes, it was enacted that this
district should be entitled to vote on the amount of its stock, and in
so doing be represented by certain magistrates of the county; and
that it should have a certain corporate name, and by that name might
sue and be sued. The highest court of the State held that by the
earlier statutes the district was made a corporation, and entitled to
vote and to receive dividends on its stock in the railroad company,
and that the later statutes made no change in the contract created by
the earlier statutes. Held, that this court had no jurisdiction on writ
of error.

Ib.

4. An action upon an agreement in writing, by which, in consideration of
a license from the patentee to make and sell the invention, the licensee
acknowledges the validity of the patent, stipulates that the patentee
may obtain reissues thereof, and promises to pay certain royalties so
long as the patent shall not have been adjudged invalid, is not a case
arising under the patent laws of the United States, and is within the
jurisdiction of the state courts; and the correctness of a decision of
the highest court of a State upon the merits of the case, based upon
the effect of the agreement, without passing upon the validity of a re-
issue, or any other question under those laws, cannot be reviewed by
this court on writ of error. Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 46.

5. At the time of an action in a state court upon an agreement to pay roy-
alties for making and selling a patented machine, evidence that the
plaintiff afterwards made improvements in the machine, and that
machines made and sold by the defendant upon a later model fur-
nished by a third person were substantially like that mentioned in the
agreement, was admitted, notwithstanding the defendant objected to
it as going to show that the plaintiff invented the new machine, and
as collaterally attacking a patent to the third person. No patent had
then been introduced; and no ruling was requested or made upon the

VOL. CXXV-46

validity or construction of any patent, or upon the legal effect of the
evidence. The jury were instructed that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover royalties only upon machines substantially like that mentioned
in the agreement. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff, and judg-
ment recorded thereon, which was affirmed by the highest court of the
State. Held, that the record presented no federal question within the
jurisdiction of this court on writ of error. Felix v. Scharnweber, 54.
6. A federal question, within the jurisdiction of this court on writ of error
to the highest court of a State, cannot be originated by a certificate of
the chief justice of that court, if no such question appears by the rec-
ord to have been involved in the judgment. Ib.

7. A decision by the highest court of a State upon the question whether
the mere fact that a bridge, constructed under authority derived from
the act of Congress of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 244, had not been con-
structed as required by the statute rendered the owner liable for
injuries happening by reason of its existence to a steamboat navigat-
ing the river, irrespective of the question whether the accident was
the result of the improper construction, presents no federal question
for the decision of this court. Hannibal & St. Jo. Railroad v. Missouri
River Packet Co., 260.

8. A person convicted of crime in the court below having sued out a writ
of error which was docketed here, and having escaped from the juris-
diction of the court below, this court declines to hear the case, and
orders it removed from the docket unless the plaintiff in error comes
within the jurisdiction of the court below on or before the last day of
this term. Bonahan v. Nebraska, 692.

9. The court denies a motion to take action to cause the judgment of a
state court to be reversed in obedience to the mandate of this court
on the ground that it did not appear that the petitioner had applied to
the highest court of the State to carry the mandate of this court into
effect. In re Royall, 696.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. The proper Circuit Court of the United States has jurisdiction, irrespec-
tive of the citizenship of the parties, of an action of ejectment in
which the controversy turns upon the validity of a patent of land from
the United States. Doolan v. Carr, 618.

2. In a suit in equity in a Circuit Court of the United States to obtain a
release of land from liability under a deed of trust, the plaintiff had a
decree. On an appeal to this court by the defendant, no evidence on
the ground of citizenship was found in the record. This court
reversed the decree with costs, and remanded the case for further
proceedings; but, as a further examination of the record showed that
the suit was brought to restrain the enforcement of a judgment in

cjectment recovered in the same Circuit Court, this court vacated its
decree reversing the decree of the court below. Johnson v. Christian,
642.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

C. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

See APPEAL;

COUNTERCLAIM ;

COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

LACHES.

The remedy by bill in equity to compel a specific performance of a contract
to sell personal property upon the payment of a promissory note given
by the other party, payable at a date after the making of the contract,
is lost through the laches of the complainant, if he wait five years after
the maturity of the note before filing his bill, and the property mean-
while greatly increases in value. Davison v. Davis, 90.

LICENSE FEE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

LIEN.

See RAILROAD, 1.

LOCAL LAW.

1. In Pennsylvania, original marks and living monuments are the highest
proof of the location of a survey; the calls for adjoining surveys are
the next most important evidence of it; and it is only in the absence
of both that corners and distances returned by the surveyor to the
land office determine it. Clement v. Packer, 309.

2. Surveys constituting a block are not treated in Pennsylvania as sepa-
rate and individual surveys, but are to be located together as a block
on one large tract; and if the lines and corners of the block can be
found, this fixes its location, as they belong to each and every tract of
the block as much as they do to the particular tract which they
adjoin. Ib.

3. When the location of a survey in Pennsylvania can be determined by
its own marks upon the ground, or by its own calls, courses, and
distances, it cannot be changed or controlled by the marks or lines of
an adjoining junior survey; but when, by reason of the disappearance
of these original landmarks from the senior survey, the location of a
line or the identity of a corner is uncertain and is drawn in contro-
versy, then original and well established marks found upon a later
survey, made by the same surveyor about the same time, and adjoining
the one in dispute, are admissible—not to contest or control the

matter

-

but to elucidate it and thus aid the jury in discovering the
location of the senior survey.

Ib.

4. After the lapse of twenty-one years from the return of a survey in
Pennsylvania, the presumption is that the warrant was located as
returned by the surveyor to the land office, and in the absence of
rebutting facts, the official courses and distances determine the
location of the tract; but this presumption is not conclusive, and may
be rebutted by proof of the existence of marked lines and monuments,
and other facts tending to show that the actual location on the ground
was different from the official courses and distances. Ib.

5. It seems, that under the statutes of Indiana an executor named in a
will, who has never qualified, or been appointed by the Court of
Probate, or taken out letters testamentary, has no power to redeem a
mortgage of real estate, either as an executor, or as trustee under the
will. Wall v. Bissell, 382.

6. In Texas in the year 1833, a power of attorney to take possession of
and convey real estate which was not acknowledged, witnessed, certi-
fied to, written on sealed paper, nor proved before a notary, was
nevertheless a valid instrument, those formalities merely affecting the
mode of authenticating it. Williams v. Conger, 397.

7. The English rule as to the requisites of a power to execute sealed instru-
ments was not in force in Texas when the transactions here in contro-
versy took place. Ib.

MARRIAGE.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

MASSACHUSETTS.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES;
NATIONAL BANK;

TAX AND TAXATION.

MEXICAN GRANT. ·

See EVIDENCE, 11;

PUBLIC LAND, 10.

MISSOURI RIVER.

See NAVIGABLE STREAMS.

MORTGAGE.

In equity, a mortgage of real estate, made to one of two creditors to secure
the payment of a debt due to them jointly, is incident to the debt, and
may be released, after the death of the mortgagee, by the surviving
creditor; and a release, made in good faith by the survivor, of part of
the land from any and all lien by reason of the mortgage, is valid against
himself and the representatives of the deceased, although he is in fact
executor of the latter, and describes himself as such in the last clause
and the signature of the release, and has by law no authority to enter
the release as executor, for want of letters testamentary. Wall v. Bis-
sell, 382.

See EQUITY, 8, 9;
LOCAL LAW, 5;
RAILROAD, 2, 3, 4, 5.

NATIONAL BANK.

The question of exemption from taxation of deposits in savings banks, as
affecting the rule for the state taxation of national bank shares, was
very deliberately considered by this court in Mercantile Bank v. New
York, 121 U. S. 138; and the conclusion reached in that case was
reaffirmed in Davenport Bank v. Davenport Board of Equalization, 123
U. S. 83; and it is impossible to distinguish this case from those cases.
Bank of Redemption v. Boston, 60.

The laws for the taxation of national banks in Massachusetts, Mass. Pub.
Stats. c. 13, §§ 8, 9, 10, do not deny to the banks as taxpayers the equal
protection of the laws, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the