surveyed and located by him, which declarations were made to the witness in pointing out that locality, are admissible in evidence. Clement v. Packer, 309.
4. If the removal of a public record from its place of deposit is not pro- hibited by reason of public policy, it constitutes, when legitimately removed, the best evidence of its contents and of its authenticity. Williams v. Conger, 397.
5. An original muniment of title produced from the public archives in which it is required by law to be deposited, certified by the public officer who has custody of it, and identified by him as a witness, is sufficiently authenticated to authorize it to be offered in evidence. Ib. 6. Papers not otherwise competent cannot be introduced in evidence for the mere purpose of enabling a jury to institute a comparison of hand- writing; but where other writings, admitted or proved to be genuine, are properly in evidence for other purposes, the handwriting of such instruments may be compared by the jury with that of the instrument or signature in question, and its genuineness inferred from such com- parison. Ib.
7. One claiming under a deed forty years old, through several mesne con- veyances, may offer the deed in evidence as an ancient deed, though never seen by any but the first grantee to whom it was given. Ib. 8. A copy made in 1837 of a lost certified copy of a power of attorney is admissible in evidence to show that the original power, found and produced in court, was an ancient instrument. Ib.
9. A recital in an ancient power of attorney that the donor is a citizen raises a presumption of the truth of that fact which can be overthrown only by positive proof. Ib.
10. Want of power in an officer of the Land Office to issue a laud-patent may be shown in an action at law by extrinsic evidence, although the patent may be issued with all the forms of law required for a patent of public land. Doolan v. Carr, 618.
11. Official documentary evidence of a Mexican grant, which has been con- firmed by the proper authorities of the United States, is admissible in the trial of an action of ejectment, to show a want of power in the Land Office to issue a patent for the same land as "public land” under the statute granting "public land" to aid in the construction of the Pacific Railroad. Ib.
12. It would seem that parol testimony is admissible to identify the land as coming within the terms of the grant. Ib.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. See LOCAL LAW, 5.
FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATION.
1. Statements made by the seller of a speculative property like a mine, at the time of the contract of sale, concerning his opinion or judgment as to the probable amount of mineral which it contains, or as to the character of the bottom of the ore chamber, or as to the value of the mine, if they turn out to be untrue, are not necessarily such fraudulent representations as will authorize a court of equity to rescind the con- tract of sale. Southern Development Co. v. Silva, 247.
2. The fact that a representation made by a seller was false raises no pre- sumption that he knew that it was false. Ib.
3. When the purchaser of a property undertakes to make investigations of his own respecting it before concluding the contract of purchase, and the vendor does nothing to prevent his investigation from being as full as he chooses, the purchaser cannot afterwards allege that the vendor made representations respecting the subject investigated which were false.
In this case this court reversed the decree of the general term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a question of fact as to whether a deed of trust and a promissory note secured thereby were forgeries. Cissel v. Dutch, 171.
1. A territorial statute of Oregon, passed in 1852, dissolving the bonds of matrimony between husband and wife, the husband being at the time a resident of the Territory, was an exercise of "the legislative power of the Territory upon a rightful subject of legislation," according to the prevailing judicial opinion of the country and the understanding of the legal profession at the time when the act of Congress establish- ing the territorial government was passed, August 14, 1848, 9 Stat. 323. Maynard v. Hill, 190.
2. The general practice in this country of legislative bodies to grant divorces stated. Ib.
3. The granting of divorces being within the competency of the legislature of the Territory, its motives in passing the act in question cannot be inquired into. Having jurisdiction to legislate upon the status of the husband, he being a resident of the Territory at the time, the validity
of the act is not affected by the fact that it was passed upon his appli- cation, without notice to or knowledge by his wife; who, with their children, had been left by him two years before in Ohio, under prom- ise that he would return or send for them within two years. Ib. 4. Marriage is something more than a mere contract, though founded upon the agreement of the parties. When once formed, a relation is created between the parties which they cannot change; and the rights and obligations of which depend not upon their agreement, but upon the law, statutory or common. It is an institution of society, regulated and controlled by public authority. Legislation, therefore, affecting this institution and annulling the relation between the parties is not within the prohibition of the Constitution of the United States against the impairment of contracts by state legislation. Ib.
5. Nor is such legislation prohibited by the last clause of Article 2 of the Ordinance of the Northwest Territory, declaring that "no law ought ever to be made or have force in said Territory that shall in any man- ner whatever interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements bona fide and without fraud, previously formed;" which clause was, by the organic act of Oregon, enacted and made applicable to the inhabitants of that Territory. lb.
6. Under the Oregon Donation Act, 9 Stat. 496, c. 76, the statutory grant took effect as a complete grant only on the termination of the four years' term of residence and cultivation; and the wife of a resident settling under the act as a married man, who was divorced from him after the commencement of his settlement, but before its completion, took no interest under the act in the title subsequently acquired by him. He had, previous to that time, no vested interest in the land, only a possessory right, — a right to remain on the land so as to enable him to comply with the conditions upon which the title was to pass to him. Ib.
1. The jury having found, in compliance with § 16 of the act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, 18 Stat. 189, that the acts complained of in an informa- tion in rem were done with intent to defraud the United States, and no motion to dismiss the cause for any defect in the information, and no motion in arrest of judgment having been made, any such defect which could have been availed of by demurrer, or exception, or motion in arrest of judgment, must be regarded as having been waived or as having been cured by the verdict. Friedenstein v. United States, 224. 2. An information under the revenue laws for the forfeiture of goods, which seeks no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any person, is a civil action. Ib.
3. Yet it is so far in the nature of a criminal proceeding that a general verdict on several counts in the information is upheld if one count is good. Ib.
4. Where the sections of the Revised Statutes on which the counts of the information are founded do not prescribe any intent to defraud as an element of the forfeitures they denounce, said § 16 does not make it necessary, in an information filed since its enactment, to aver that the alleged acts were done with an actual intention to defraud the United States. Ib.
5. It is not necessary that the judgment should recite the finding by the jury that the acts complained of in the information were done with intent to defraud the United States. Ib.
6. An information in a suit in rem against certain imported goods seized as forfeited for a violation of the customs revenue laws, alleged an entry of the goods, which were subject to duties, with intent to de- fraud the revenue by false and fraudulent invoices, by means whereof the United States were deprived of the lawful duties accruing upon the goods embraced in the invoices. The answer of the claimant de- nied that the goods became "forfeited in manner and form as in said information is alleged." At the trial the jury rendered "a verdict for the informants, and against the claimant for the condemnation of the goods mentioned in the information, and that the goods were brought in with intent to defraud the United States." The decree set forth that the jury having "by their verdict found for the United States, condemning the said goods," they were "accordingly condemned as forfeited to the United States "; Held,
(1) The verdict was a sufficient compliance with the requirement of § 16 of the act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, (18 Stat. 189,) that, in order to a forfeiture the jury should find that "the alleged acts were done with an actual intention to defraud the United States ";
(2) The judgment was sufficient without reciting any special finding by the jury as to an intent to defraud. Origet v. United States, 240.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, B.
1. Whether, in a deed of assignment by a debtor for the benefit of credi- tors made under a state statute, a disregard of and departure from some directions of the statute shall invalidate the assignment or only make the varying provision in it void, will depend upon the general policy of the statute - whether it is intended to restrain or to favor such assignments. Cunningham v. Norton, 77.
2. A provision in an assignment by a debtor for the benefit of his creditors
under the statute of the State of Texas of March 24, 1879, Rev. Stat. Texas, 1879, App. 5, that any surplus shall be paid to the debtor, made in violation of the direction in § 16 of the statute that such surplus shall be paid into court, does not affect the validity of the assignment, but only invalidates the violating provision. Ib.
3. The words "all his lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, chattels, property, and choses in action of every name, nature, and description, wheresoever the same may be, except such property as may be by the constitution and laws of the State exempt from forced sale," are a sufficient description to convey all the debtor's estate, under the Texas statute of March 24, 1879, regulating assignments by insolvent debtors. Ib.
4. A statement in a deed of assignment by a debtor for the benefit of his creditors, that he "is indebted to divers persons in considerable sums of money which he is at present unable to pay in full" is a declara- tion of the insolvency of the grantor. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 16-20
A final decree in a suit in equity that "the cause being submitted to the court upon bill, answer, and replication, and having been duly consid- ered, the court finds, adjudges, and decrees that the equities are with the defendant," and dismissing the bill, is an adjudication upon the merits of the controversy, and constitutes a bar to further litigation upon the same subject between the parties; and it is not open to the complainant to show, in a subsequent suit in equity between the same parties, on the same cause of action, that the decree was made in his absence and default, and that no proof had been filed in the cause on either side. Lyon v. Perin and Gaff Manufacturing Co., 698.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
1. The legislature of Louisiana in 1877 having granted to a corporation the exclusive right of constructing waterworks to supply the city of New Orleans and its inhabitants with water, provided that nothing in this charter should prevent the city council from granting to any per- son, contiguous to the Mississippi River, permission to lay water pipes exclusively for its own use, an ordinance of the city council in 1883, granting such permission to a corporation whose property is separated from the river by a street and a broad quay or levee owned by the city, is but a license from the city council exercising an administra-
« AnteriorContinuar » |