COURTS OF A STATE.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 2, 3;

JURISDICTION, A, 8.

COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. The provision in Rev. Stat. § 721 that "the laws of the several States,
except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United
States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in
cases where they apply" is not applicable to proceedings in equity, or
in admiralty, or to criminal offences against the United States. Bucher
v. Cheshire Railroad Co., 555.

2. The courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the
highest court of a State in questions which concern merely the consti-
tution or laws of that State; also where a course of those decisions,
whether founded on statutes or not, have become rules of property
within the State; also in regard to rules of evidence in actions at
law; and also in reference to the common law of the State, and its
laws and customs of a local character, when established by repeated
decisions. Ib.

3. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts having, in a cause
between the same parties litigating in this action, arising out of the
transaction herein litigated, and on facts herein established, Held; (1)
that the plaintiff when injured by the negligence of the defendants'
servants was not travelling "for necessity or charity" within the
meaning of those terms as used in the General Statutes of Massachu-
setts, c. 84, § 2; (2) that the provision in those statutes, c. 84, § 2, that
whoever travels on the Lord's Day except for necessity or charity shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding ten dollars is a bar to recovery in
an action against a railroad company by a person injured through the
negligence of its servants while travelling on its railroad on Sunday,
not for necessity or charity; and (3) that the act of the Massachusetts
legislature of May 15, 1877, that this prohibition against travelling on
the Lord's Day shall not constitute a defence to an action against a
common carrier of passengers for any tort or injury suffered by the
person so travelling, does not apply to a case happening before the
passage of the act; Held, that these adjudications are sustained by a
long line of numerous decisions, which establish a local rule of law
within the State of Massachusetts, binding upon this court, though
not meeting its approval. Ib.

See COURT AND JURY, 2;
JURISDICTION, A, B;

RES JUDICATA.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See JURISDICTION, A, 8.

CRIMINAL OFFENCES.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

CUSTOMS DUTY.

1. "Goat's hair goods," composed of 80 per cent of goat's hair and 20 per
cent of cotton, used chiefly for women's dresses, and which were im-
ported into the United States between January 24, 1874, and June 25,
1874, were subject to the duty imposed by the act of July 14, 1870, 16
Stat. 264, c. 255, § 21, upon "manufactures of hair not otherwise
herein provided for," as modified by the act of June 6, 1872, 17 Stat.
231, and not to the duty imposed by the act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat.
561, c. 197, § 2, upon "women's and children's dress goods and real or
imitation Italian cloths, composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted,
the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other like animals”. it being found
by the jury that they were not known in commerce among merchants
and importers as "women's and children's dress goods." Arthur v.
Butterfield, 70.

2. In the absence of a settled designation of a cloth by merchants and im-
porters, its designation as hair, silk, cotton, or woollen for the pur-
poses of customs revenue depends upon the predominance of such
article in its composition, and not upon the absence of any other
material. Ib.

3. The words "not otherwise herein provided for in a section in a cus-
toms revenue act, mean not otherwise provided for in that act. Ib.
4. To place an article among those designated as "enumerated," so as to

take it out of the operation of the similitude clause of the customs
revenue laws, Rev. Stat. § 2499, it is not necessary that it should be
specifically mentioned. Ib.

5. The words "manufactures of hair" are a sufficient designation to place
such manufactures among the enumerated articles. Ib.

6. Velvet ribbons made of silk and cotton, silk being the material of chief
value, known as "trimmings," chiefly used for making or ornamenting
hats, bonnets, and hoods, but sometimes used for trimming dresses,
being imported into the United States, are subject to a duty of twenty
per centum ad valorem under Schedule M of the act of March 3, 1883,
22 Stat. 512, as "hats and so forth, materials for . . . trimmings;"
and not to a duty of fifty per centum ad valorem under Schedule L of
that act, Ib. 510, as "goods, wares, and merchandise not specially
enumerated or provided for in this act, made of silk, or of which silk
is the component material of chief value." Hartranft v. Langfeld, 128.
7. Quilts composed of cotton or silk and eider-down, eider-down being in
each case the component material of chief value, are subject to a
duty, on importation into the United States, of twenty per cent ad
valorem as manufactured articles not enumerated. Hartranft v. Shep-
pard, 337.

8. A vessel arrived at a port of the United States from a foreign port on

the 30th of June, 1883, and was entered at the custom-house on that
day. A custom-house inspector took charge of it, and the vessel re-
mained with unbroken hatches until after the following 1st of July.
Held, that the goods on board, being in the custody and under the
control of officers of the customs, were in "a public store," or "bonded
warehouse," within the meaning of those terms as used in § 10 of the
act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 488, 525, and were subject to the duty
imposed by the provisions of that act. Hartranft v. Oliver, 525.

1. The conclusions of a master in chancery, depending upon the weighing

of conflicting testimony, have every reasonable presumption in their
favor, and are not to be set aside unless there clearly appears to have
been error or mistake on his part. Tilgman v. Proctor, 136.

2. The general rule that when the answer of the defendant in a cause in
equity is direct, positive, and unequivocal in its denial of the allega-
tions in the bill, and an answer on oath is not waived, the complain-
ant will not be entitled to a decree unless these denials are disproved
by evidence of greater weight than the testimony of one witness, or
by that of one witness with corroborating circumstances, applies when
the equity of the complainant's bill is the allegation of fraud. South-
ern Development Co. v. Silva, 247.

3. In order to rescind a contract for the purchase of real estate on the
ground of fraudulent representation by the seller, it must be estab-
lished by clear and decisive proof that the alleged representation was
made in regard to a material fact; that it was false; that the maker
knew that it was not true; that he made it in order to have it acted
on by the other party; and that it was so acted upon by the other

party to his damage, and in ignorance of its falsity and with a reason-
able belief that it was true. Ib.

4. Whether a receiver of the property of a railroad company shall be ap-
pointed by a court of equity, is a matter within the discretion of the
court, and this discretion is to be exercised sparingly, and with great
caution, and with reference to the special circumstances of each case
as it arises. Sage v. Memphis & Little Rock Railroad, 361.

5. A bill in equity, brought by a judgment creditor of a railroad company
against the company, which alleges in substance that the property of
the company is so heavily mortgaged that if the plaintiff should at-
tempt to enforce payment of his debt by seizure and sale on execution
there would be no bidders at more than a nominal amount, while, if
the property were placed in the hands of a receiver by the court, and
held together and carefully used in transporting passengers and
freight, there would be a large surplus each year for the payment of
the plaintiff's debt, contains ample averments to give a court of equity
jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of the property: but this point is
decided on the facts of the present case, and the court does not mean
to say that one or more of the judgment creditors of a railroad com-
pany can, as a matter of right, require such a property to be put in
the hands of a receiver merely because the company fails or refuses to
pay its debts. Ib.

6. The fact that a judgment creditor filing a bill in equity to obtain the
appointment of a receiver of the debtor's property did not first sue out
execution and have a return of nulla bona is immaterial, if not objected
to by the debtor, and if it appears on the admitted facts that so doing
would have been an idle ceremony. Ib.

7. If a court of equity is induced by imposition to appoint a receiver of
the property of a railroad company when one would not have been
appointed had the court been aware of the exact situation, and the
receiver is discharged on learning of the imposition, and during the
receivership a fund has accumulated from surplus earnings, trustees,
representing mortgage creditors of the corporation, who did not inter-
vene in the suit pending the receivership and set up no claim to the
fund during the receivership, and had no claim to it except as mort-
gage trustees out of possession, are not entitled to the fund. Ib.
8. It is again held that the mortgagor of a railroad is not required to ac-
count to the mortgagee for earnings, even though the mortgage covers
income, while the mortgaged property remains in the mortgagor's
possession, and no demand has been made for it or for surrender of its
possession under the provisions of the mortgage. Ib.

9. Mortgage bondholders of a railroad company who obtain judgment on
their bonds or coupons and intervene individually and without the
appearance of their trustees in a suit brought by a judgment creditor
of the company whose debt is not secured by the mortgage, in which a
receiver has been appointed, do not thereby deprive the plaintiff credi-

tor of his priority of right in the accumulating income from the prop-
erty in the hands of the receiver.

Ib.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES,

JUDGMENT;

LACHES ;

MORTGAGE;

PATENT FOR INVENTION, 2, 3, 4;

RAILROAD, 2, 3, 4, 5.

ESTOPPEL.

1. When the plaintiff and the defendant both claim title under the same
original application, and one introduces it in evidence and establishes
its identity, the other is estopped from denying the genuineness of the
signature to it of the party under whom both claim. Williams v.
Conger, 397.

2. The plaintiff sued the defendants in a state court and recovered judg-
ment. The highest appellate court of the State, reviewing the case,
decided the points of law involved in it against the plaintiff, set aside
the judgment for error in the ruling of the court below, and sent the
case back for a new trial. The plaintiff then became non-suit, and
brought the present suit in the Circuit Court of the United States on
the same cause of action. Held, that he was not estopped. Bucher v.
Cheshire Railroad Co., 555.

See JUDGMENT.

EVIDENC

1. In a suit in rem against certain diamonds seized as forfeited for a viola-
tion of the customs revenue laws, it was competent for the United
States to give in evidence the declarations of S., not the claimant, who
was intrusted by the latter with the custody of the diamonds for sale,
such declarations having been made to a customs officer who took the
diamonds from a person with whom S. had deposited them, and in
the course of an investigation by the officer to determine whether he
should seize them, and having been part of the res gesta. Friedenstein
v. United States, 224.

2. It was also competent for the officer to testify that he did not seize the
diamonds till after the declarations were made. Ib.

3. In an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court of the United States,
sitting in the State of Pennsylvania, which involves a question con-
cerning the location of the boundary of a private estate, that rule of
evidence respecting the admission of declarations of deceased persons
touching the disputed boundary which is laid down by the highest
court of that State is the rule to govern the action of the Circuit
Court at the trial; and it is well settled in that State that declarations
of a deceased person touching the locality of a boundary which was