Opinion of the Court.

judgment was merely one of nol. pros. - a decree entered by default and is, therefore, not a bar to the prosecution of this suit. To sustain this view of the case he has recourse to a statement by the clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, (wherein the decree was rendered,) under his hand and seal, dated nearly two years after said decree was rendered, to the effect that no proof or testimony was filed in said cause in his office either for the complainant or the defendant; that at the time of the granting of said decree, May 4, 1882, the complainant did not appear, nor was he represented by counsel; and that said decree dismissing the complainant's bill was granted on default of the complainant.

The decree itself is in the words and figures following, to wit:

"The United States of America,

88:

Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio, "At a stated term of the Circuit Court of the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio, in the sixth judicial circuit of the United States of America, begun and had in the court-rooms at the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, in said district, on the first Tuesday of April, being the fourth day of that month, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixth.

"Present: The Hon. John Baxter, Circuit Judge, and Hon. Philip B. Swing, District Judge.

"On Thursday, the fourth day of May, 1882, among the proceedings had were the following, to wit:

"Nelson Lyon

V.

The Perin and Gaff Manufacturing Co.

3180. In Equity.

“This cause coming on for hearing, and, being submitted to the court upon bill, answer, and replication, and having been duly considered, the court finds, adjudges, and decrees that the equities are with the defendant; that the bill of complaint be dismissed, and that defendant recover its costs, to be taxed."

Opinion of the Court.

This is the record to which the court must look, and not to the statement of the clerk of the court made two years afterwards. This decree on its face is absolute in its terms, is an adjudication of the merits of the controversy, and, therefore, constitutes a bar to any further litigation of the same subject between the same parties. As was said by this court in Durant v. Essex Company, 7 Wall. 107, 109, "A decree of that kind, unless made because of some defect in the pleadings, or for want of jurisdiction, or because the complainant has an adequate remedy at law, or upon some other ground which does not go to the merits, is a final determination. Where words of qualification, such as 'without prejudice,' or other terms indicating a right or privilege to take further legal proceedings on the subject, do not accompany the decree, it is presumed to be rendered on the merits."

To the same effect see Bigelow v. Windsor, 1 Gray, 299, 301, where it is said: "Sometimes, indeed, a party plaintiff in equity, who, because he is not prepared with his proofs, or for other reasons, desires not to go into a hearing, but rather to have his bill dismissed, in the nature of a discontinuance or non-suit in an action at law, may be allowed to do so; but we believe the uniform practice in such case is to enter 'dismissed without prejudice.'

Likewise Cooper Eq. Pl. 270, as follows: "A plea in bar, stating a dismissal of a former bill, is conclusive against a new bill, if the dismissal was upon hearing, and if that dismissal be not, in direct terms, without prejudice."" See also Story's Eq. Pl. § 793, and authorities there cited.

The authorities to sustain this view of the case might oe multiplied, but those cited are sufficient, and demonstrate the uniformity of the rule. It is clear to this court that the decree below dismissing the bill is in harmony with the law, and it is, therefore,

Affirmed

INDEX.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

ACTION.

See PUBLIC LAND, 1.

ADMIRALTY.

See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1.

AGENT.

From the evidence in this case it is clear that the assignor of the defend
ants in error employed the plaintiffs in error as their agents to enter
at the Custom House in New York importations of sugar imported by
them, and, after protest, to commence suits to recover an excess of
duty imposed upon the importations, and that the plaintiffs in error
undertook to perform those services; and, it being settled in actions
brought by other persons under similar circumstances and on like
importations, that such duties were illegally exacted, and the plaintiffs
in error having failed to commence suits within the period limited by
law to recover such as were illegally exacted from the assignor of the
defendants in error, Held, that the judgment of the court below for
their recovery must be affirmed. Bowerman v. Rogers, 585.

See POWER.

ANCIENT DEED.

See EVIDENCE, 7, 8;
RES JUDICata.

APPEAL.

An appeal, docketed here January 7, 1888, from a judgment of the Court
of Claims which was entered February 4, 1884, is dismissed for want
of due prosecution. United States v. Burchard, 176.

ARKANSAS.

See RAILRoad.

ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
See INSOLVENT DEBTOR.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.

An assignment, as error, that the court below rejected certain patents of
land offered in evidence by the plaintiff is fatally defective, if the
record does not contain copies of the patents. Clement v. Packer, 309.

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

See PUBLIC LAND, 2.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.

A paper headed "Bill of Exceptions" not bearing the signature of the
judge, but containing at its foot these words, " Allowed and ordered
on file November 22, '83, A. B.," the trial having taken place in June,
1883, cannot be regarded as a bill of exceptions, because not signed
by the judge, as required by § 953 of the Revised Statutes. Origet v.
United States, 240.

BILL OF REVIEW.

On a pure bill of review nothing will avail for a reversal of the decree but
errors of law apparent on the record. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch, 1.

BRIDGES OVER NAVIGABLE STREAMS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1, 2, 3;
JURISDICTION, A, 7;

NAVIGABLE STREAMS.

CASES AFFIRMED OR APPLIED.

Passaic Bridge Cases, 3 Wall. 782, applied. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch, 1.

Potts v. United States, ante, 173, affirmed and applied to the case. Burchard
v. United States, 176.

United States v. Symonds, 120 U. S. 46, affirmed and applied. United States
v. Strong, 656.

CASES DISTINGUISHED.

State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, dis-
tinguished. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 1.

Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333, distinguished. Clement v. Packer, 309.
Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412, distinguished. Clement v. Packer, 309.
Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5, distinguished. Missouri ex rel. Walker v.
Walker, 339.

Jeffries v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 305, distinguished. Missouri ex
rel. Walker v. Walker, 339.

CITIZEN.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 9.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

Congress enacted August 7, 1882, 22 Stat. 734, "that the Quartermaster
General of the United States is hereby authorized to examine and
adjust the claims of Julia A. Nutt, widow and executrix of Haller
Nutt, deceased, late of Natchez, in the State of Mississippi, growing
out of the occupation and use by the United States Army during the
late rebellion, of the property of said Haller Nutt during his lifetime,
or of his estate after his decease, including live stock, goods and
moneys taken and used by the United States or the armies thereof;
and he may consider the evidence heretofore taken on said claims, as
far as applicable, before the Commissioners of Claims, and such other
evidence as may be adduced before him on behalf of the legal repre-
sentatives of Haller Nutt or on behalf of the United States, and shall
report the facts to Congress to be considered with other claims reported
by the Quartermaster General." The Quartermaster General made
the examination and reported to Congress the aggregate value of the
property taken. Held, that this reference of the claim did not consti-
tute a submission to arbitration on the part of Congress, and that the
finding of the Quartermaster General was neither an award, nor the
equivalent of an account stated between private individuals. Nutt v.
United States, 650.

Some time after this report of the Quartermaster General, Congress appro-
priated sundry amounts to various persons named in the bill as “an
allowance of certain claims reported by the accounting officers of the
United States Treasury Department," "the same being in full for, and
the receipt for the same to be taken and accepted in each case as a
full and final discharge of the several claims examined and allowed."
Among these amounts was an appropriation to Mrs. Nutt of an amount
much less than that reported by the Quartermaster General, which
reduced amount she accepted. Held, that this did not amount to an
adoption by Congress of the report of the Quartermaster General, and
that there was no inference that the appropriation actually made was
intended to be a recognition of a larger amount as due. Ib.

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