Opinion of the Court. judgment was merely one of nol. pros. - a decree entered by default and is, therefore, not a bar to the prosecution of this suit. To sustain this view of the case he has recourse to a statement by the clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, (wherein the decree was rendered,) under his hand and seal, dated nearly two years after said decree was rendered, to the effect that no proof or testimony was filed in said cause in his office either for the complainant or the defendant; that at the time of the granting of said decree, May 4, 1882, the complainant did not appear, nor was he represented by counsel; and that said decree dismissing the complainant's bill was granted on default of the complainant. The decree itself is in the words and figures following, to wit: "The United States of America, 88: Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio, "At a stated term of the Circuit Court of the Western Division of the Southern District of Ohio, in the sixth judicial circuit of the United States of America, begun and had in the court-rooms at the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, in said district, on the first Tuesday of April, being the fourth day of that month, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two, and of the independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixth. "Present: The Hon. John Baxter, Circuit Judge, and Hon. Philip B. Swing, District Judge. "On Thursday, the fourth day of May, 1882, among the proceedings had were the following, to wit: "Nelson Lyon V. The Perin and Gaff Manufacturing Co. 3180. In Equity. “This cause coming on for hearing, and, being submitted to the court upon bill, answer, and replication, and having been duly considered, the court finds, adjudges, and decrees that the equities are with the defendant; that the bill of complaint be dismissed, and that defendant recover its costs, to be taxed." Opinion of the Court. This is the record to which the court must look, and not to the statement of the clerk of the court made two years afterwards. This decree on its face is absolute in its terms, is an adjudication of the merits of the controversy, and, therefore, constitutes a bar to any further litigation of the same subject between the same parties. As was said by this court in Durant v. Essex Company, 7 Wall. 107, 109, "A decree of that kind, unless made because of some defect in the pleadings, or for want of jurisdiction, or because the complainant has an adequate remedy at law, or upon some other ground which does not go to the merits, is a final determination. Where words of qualification, such as 'without prejudice,' or other terms indicating a right or privilege to take further legal proceedings on the subject, do not accompany the decree, it is presumed to be rendered on the merits." To the same effect see Bigelow v. Windsor, 1 Gray, 299, 301, where it is said: "Sometimes, indeed, a party plaintiff in equity, who, because he is not prepared with his proofs, or for other reasons, desires not to go into a hearing, but rather to have his bill dismissed, in the nature of a discontinuance or non-suit in an action at law, may be allowed to do so; but we believe the uniform practice in such case is to enter 'dismissed without prejudice.' Likewise Cooper Eq. Pl. 270, as follows: "A plea in bar, stating a dismissal of a former bill, is conclusive against a new bill, if the dismissal was upon hearing, and if that dismissal be not, in direct terms, without prejudice."" See also Story's Eq. Pl. § 793, and authorities there cited. The authorities to sustain this view of the case might oe multiplied, but those cited are sufficient, and demonstrate the uniformity of the rule. It is clear to this court that the decree below dismissing the bill is in harmony with the law, and it is, therefore, Affirmed INDEX. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. ACTION. See PUBLIC LAND, 1. ADMIRALTY. See COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1. AGENT. From the evidence in this case it is clear that the assignor of the defend See POWER. ANCIENT DEED. See EVIDENCE, 7, 8; APPEAL. An appeal, docketed here January 7, 1888, from a judgment of the Court ARKANSAS. See RAILRoad. ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. An assignment, as error, that the court below rejected certain patents of ATTORNEY GENERAL. See PUBLIC LAND, 2. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. A paper headed "Bill of Exceptions" not bearing the signature of the BILL OF REVIEW. On a pure bill of review nothing will avail for a reversal of the decree but BRIDGES OVER NAVIGABLE STREAMS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1, 2, 3; NAVIGABLE STREAMS. CASES AFFIRMED OR APPLIED. Passaic Bridge Cases, 3 Wall. 782, applied. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Potts v. United States, ante, 173, affirmed and applied to the case. Burchard United States v. Symonds, 120 U. S. 46, affirmed and applied. United States CASES DISTINGUISHED. State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, dis- Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333, distinguished. Clement v. Packer, 309. Jeffries v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 305, distinguished. Missouri ex CITIZEN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 9. CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. Congress enacted August 7, 1882, 22 Stat. 734, "that the Quartermaster Some time after this report of the Quartermaster General, Congress appro- VOL. CXXV-45 |