Opinion of the Court. it would under any circumstances have the power, of determining that the rate of three cents a mile fixed by the legislature is unreasonable. Still less does it appear that there has been any such confiscation as amounts to a taking of property without due process of law. It is equally clear that the plaintiffs in error have not been denied the equal protection of the laws. The legislature, in the exercise of its power of regulating fares and freights, may classify the railroads according to the amount of the business which they have done or appear likely to do. Whether the classification shall be according to the amount of passengers and freight carried, or of gross or net earnings, during a previous year, or according to the simpler and more constant test of the length of the line of the railroad, is a matter within the discretion of the legislature. If the same rule is applied to all railroads of the same class, there is no violation of the constitutional provision securing to all the equal protection of the laws. A similar question was presented and decided in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Iowa, above cited. It was there objected that a statute regulating the rate for the carriage of passengers, by different classes of railroads, according to their gross earnings per mile, was in conflict with art. 1, sec. 4, of the Constitution of Iowa, which provides that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation," and "the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens." In answering that objection, the Chief Justice said: "The statute divides the railroads of the State into classes, according to business, and establishes a maximum of rates for each of the classes. It operates uniformly on each class, and this is all the Constitution requires." "It is very clear that a uniform rate of charges for all railroad companies in the State might operate unjustly upon some. It was proper, therefore, to provide in some way for an adaptation of the rates to the circumstances of the different roads; and the general assembly, in the exercise of its legislative discretion, has seen fit to do this by a system Opinion of the Court. of classification. Whether this was the best that could have been done is not for us to decide. Our province is only to determine whether it could be done at all, and under any circumstances. If it could, the legislature must decide for itself, subject to no control from us, whether the common good requires that it should be done." 94 U. S. 163, 164. Judgment affirmed. BONAHAN v. NEBRASKA. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA. No. 501. Submitted October 11, 1887.- Decided October 17, 1887. A person convicted of crime in the court below having sued out a writ of error which was docketed here, and having escaped from the jurisdiction of the court below, this court declines to hear the case, and orders it removed from the docket unless the plaintiff in error comes within the jurisdiction of the court below or or before the last day of this term. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles O. Wheedon and Mr. C. E. Magoon for plaintiff in error. Mr. William Leese for defendant in error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. It appearing that during the pendency of this writ the plaintiff in error has escaped, and is not now within the control of the court below, either actually, by being in custody, or constructively, by being out on bail, it is ordered that the submission of the cause be set aside and that unless the plaintiff in error is brought or comes within the jurisdiction and under the control of the court below on or before the last day of this term the cause be thereafter left off the docket until directions to the contrary. Smith v. United States, 94 U. S. 97. Opinion of the Court. ADDINGTON v. BURKE. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS. No. 3. Submitted October 13, 1887.- Decided October 17, 1887. The parties having compromised the suit and stipulated that the plaintiff in error shall dismiss it, the court makes an order to enforce the stipulation, unless cause to the contrary be shown. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. S. Robertson for plaintiffs in error. Mr. M. L. Crawford for defendants in error. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. It having been suggested that this cause has been compromised and the debt paid, and that a stipulation has been entered into by the parties to the effect that the plaintiffs in error shall dismiss the suit, It is ordered that unless the plaintiffs in error show cause to the contrary, on or before the fourth Monday in November, the writ be dismissed. The Clerk will serve a copy of this order at once on the counsel for the plaintiffs in error of record, through the mail. This order having been duly served, and return thereof made, on the 5th of December, 1887, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE announced the following order. This cause is dismissed under the order made October 17, 1887, no cause having been shown to the contrary as then required. The Clerk will preserve as part of the record the evidence of service of the order of October 17. Opinion of the Court. SHREVEPORT v. HOLMES. SHREVEPORT v. CROOKS. SHREVEPORT v. CARTER. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA. Nos. 1121, 1122, 1123. Submitted October 17, 1887. - Decided November 14, 1887. - Rehearing refused January 9, 1888. A petition for a rehearing of a case decided by a divided court is denied on the ground that no important constitutional question is involved. THESE cases, which were all submitted together, were all affirmed by a divided court on the 14th day of November, 1887. The plaintiff in error petitioned for a rehearing, citing Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 119 U. S. 129. Mr. N. C. Blanchard and Mr. T. Alexander for plaintiff in error and for petitioner. Mr. A. H. Leonard for defendant in error on the submission of the cases. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the court. These petitions are denied. The rehearing was granted in Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 119 U. S. 129, after a decision by a divided court, because an important constitutional question was involved. The questions in these cases are not of that character. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA. No. 107. Submitted December 13, 1887.- Argued March 20, 1888. Decided April 9, 1888. It being made to appear that one party to this suit had sold out to the other, and that the suit was prosecuted by the purchasing party for his own benefit, the court of its own motion, after notice and hearing, dismissed the case. Mr. Gaylord B. Clark for plaintiff in error submitted on his brief. No appearance by counsel for defendant in error. Mr.. W. A. Gunter was attorney of record for it. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE on the 9th of January, 1888, announced the following order: It having been suggested to us that there is no longer any real controversy between the parties to this suit about the matters therein originally involved, and that The Western Union Telegraph Company is at this time practically both plaintiff and defendant, it is ordered that this writ of error be dismissed unless the plaintiff in error show cause to the contrary on or before the 17th day of February. The Clerk will serve a copy of this order at once on the counsel of record for the plaintiff in error through the mail. Due service of this order was made, and on the 20th of February, 1888 THE CHIEF JUSTICE made the following announcement: The showing in this case against the order to dismiss does not satisfy us that there exists any longer a real controversy in the suit. It is conceded that the Western Union Telegraph |