Concurring Opinion: Field, J. decision in the Kansas case may perhaps be reconciled with the one in this case by distinguishing the power of the State over property created within it, and its power over property imported its power in one case extending, for the protection of the health, morals, and safety of its people, to the absolute prohibition of the sale or use of the article, and in the other extending only to such regulations as may be necessary for the safety of the community until it has been incorporated into and become a part of the general property of the State. However much this distinction may be open to criticism, it furnishes, as it seems to me, the only way in which the two decisions can be reconciled. There is great difficulty in drawing the line precisely where the commercial power of Congress ends and the power of the State begins. The same difficulty was experienced in Brown v. Maryland, in drawing a line between the restriction on the States to lay a duty on imports and their acknowledged power to tax persons and property. In that case the court said that the two, the power and the restriction, though distinguishable when they did not approach each other, might, like the intervening colors between white and black, approach so nearly as to perplex the understanding as colors perplex the vision, in marking the distinction between them: but as the distinction existed, it must be marked as the cases arise. And after observing that it might be premature to state any rule as being universal in its application, the court held as sufficient for that case that when the importer had so acted upon the thing imported, that it had become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it had lost its distinctive character as an import, and had become subject to the taxing power of the state; but that while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it was plainly a duty on imports. So in the present case it is perhaps impossible to state any rule which would determine in all cases where the right to sell an imported article under the commercial power of the Federal government ends and the power of the state to restrict Concurring Opinion: Field, J. further sale has commenced. Perhaps no safer rule can be adopted than the one laid down in Brown v. Maryland, that the commercial power continues until the articles imported have become mingled with and incorporated into the general property of the State, and not afterwards. And yet it is evident that the value of the importation will be materially affected, if the article imported ceases to be under the protection of the commercial power upon its sale by the importer. There will be little inducement for one to purchase from the importer, if immediately afterwards he can himself be restrained from selling the article imported; and yet the power of the State must attach when the imported article has become mingled with the general property within its limits, or its entire independence in the regulation of its internal affairs must be abandoned. The difficulty and embarrassment which may follow must be met as each case arises. In The License Cases, reported in 5 Howard, this court held that the States could not only regulate the sales of imported liquors, but could prohibit their sale. The judges differed in their views in some particulars, but the majority were of opinion that the States had authority to legislate upon subjects of interstate commerce until Congress had acted upon them; and as Congress had not acted, the regulation of the States was valid. The doctrine thus declared has been modified since by repeated decisions. The doctrine now firmly established is, that where the subject upon which Congress can act under its commercial power is local in its nature or sphere of operation, such as harbor pilotage, the improvement of harbors, the establishment of beacons and buoys to guide vessels in and out of port, the construction of bridges over navigable rivers, the erection of wharves, piers, and docks, and the like, which can be properly regulated only by special provisions adapted to their localities, the State can act until Congress interferes and supersedes its authority; but where the subject is national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the States, such as transportation between the States, including the importation of goods from one State into another, Congress can alone act upon it and provide the Concurring Opinion: Field, J. needed regulations. The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be free. Thus the absence of regulations as to interstate commerce with reference to any particular subject is taken as a declaration that the importation of that article into the States shall be unrestricted. It is only after the importation is completed, and the property imported has mingled with and become a part of the general property of the State, that its regulations can act upon it, except so far as may be necessary to insure safety in the disposition of the import until thus mingled. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 319; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 271; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 282; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 469; Mobile v Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 697; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 203; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 631; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, 455; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; Wabash &c. Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489. It is a matter of history that one of the great objects of the formation of the Constitution was to secure uniformity of commercial regulations, and thus put an end to restrictive and hostile discriminations by one State against the products of other States, and against their importation and sale. "It may be doubted," says Chief Justice Marshall, "whether any of the evils proceeding from the feebleness of the Federal government contributed more to that great revolution which introduced the present system than the deep and general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress. It is not, therefore, matter of surprise that the grant should be as extensive as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce and all commerce among the States. To construe the power so as to impair its efficacy would tend to defeat an object, in the attainment of which the American government took, and justly took, that strong interest which arose from a full conviction of its necessity." Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 446. To these views I may add, that if the States Dissenting Opinion: Waite, C.J., Harlan, Gray, JJ. have the power asserted, to exclude from importation within their limits any articles of commerce because in their judgment the articles may be injurious to their interests or policy, they may prescribe conditions upon which such importation will be admitted, and thus establish a system of duties as hostile to free commerce among the states as any that existed previous to the adoption of the Constitution. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom concurred THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and MR. JUSTICE GRAY, dissenting. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Gray, and myself are unable to assent to the opinion and judgment of the court. The effect of the statutes of Iowa is to forbid the introduction of intoxicating liquors from other States for sale, except for medicinal, mechanical, culinary, or sacramental purposes. They may be brought in for such purposes, by any person, or carrier, for another person or corporation, if consigned to some one authorized by the laws of Iowa to buy and sell intoxicating liquors. And these statutes permit the sale of foreign intoxicating liquors, imported under the laws of the United States, provided such sale is by the importer, in the original casks or packages, and in quantities not less than those in which they are required to be imported. It appears upon the face of the declaration that the plaintiffs one of whom is a citizen of Iowa - made application to the board of supervisors of Marshall County, in that State, for permission, under the statute, to buy and sell in that county intoxicating liquors for medicinal, culinary, mechanical, and sacramental purposes, and that their application was rejected. They then resorted to the expedient of buying five thousand barrels of beer in Chicago, and tendering them to the railroad company for transportation to the same county, without furnishing the certificate required by the laws of Iowa. The refusal of the company to transport this beer into Iowa, in violation of her laws, is the basis of the present suit. The plaintiffs claim damages upon the ground that they could have sold this beer in that State at a price in advance of what Dissenting Opinion: Waite, C.J., Harlan, Gray, JJ. it cost them. As they do not allege that the beer was to be delivered in Iowa to a person authorized by her laws to sell it there, no wrong was done, of which the plaintiffs can complain, unless it be their right, not only to have their beer carried into the State, but to sell it there, in defiance of her laws. The fundamental question, therefore, is, whether Iowa may lawfully restrict the bringing of intoxicating liquors from other States into her limits, by any person or carrier, for another person or corporation, except such as are consigned to persons authorized by her laws to buy and sell them for the special purposes indicated. In considering this question, we are not left to conjecture as to the motives prompting the enactment of these statutes; for, it is conceded, that the prohibition upon common carriers bringing intoxicating liquors from other States, except under the foregoing conditions, was adopted as subservient to the general design of protecting the health and morals and the peace and good order of the people of Iowa against the physical and moral evils resulting from the unrestricted manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, it was adjudged that state legislation prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, to be sold or bartered for general use as a beverage, did not necessarily infringe any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States; and that the former decisions to that effect License Cases, 5 How. 504; Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 33; and Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201, 206"rest upon the acknowledged right of the States of the Union to control their purely internal affairs, and, in so doing, to protect the health, morals, and safety of their people by regulations that do not interfere with the execution of the powers of the general government, or violate rights secured by the Constitution. The power to establish such regulations, as was said in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, reaches everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the national government." 123 U. S. 659. Referring to the suggestion that no government could lawfully prohibit a citizen from |