Opinion of the Court. because it was unnecessary and could have no practical influence upon the result, this court dismissed a writ of error, for want of jurisdiction, saying: "It thus appears that the provision of the State constitution upon the subject of slave contracts was in no wise drawn in question. The decision was governed by the settled principles of the jurisprudence of the State. In such cases this court has no power of review." "Substantially the same question arose in Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, heretofore decided. The writ of error was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The same disposition must be made in this case." These cases are quite in harmony with the line of cases, beginning before these were decided, in which, on a writ of error upon a judgment of the highest court of a State, giving effect to a statute of the State, drawn in question as affecting the obligation of a previous contract, this court, exercising its paramount authority of determining whether the statute upheld by the State court did impair the obligation of the previous contract, is not concluded by the opinion of the State court as to the validity or the construction of that contract, even if contained in a statute of the State, but determines for itself what that contract was. Leading cases of that class are Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116, in which the State court affirmed the validity of a statute authorizing a railway viaduct to be built across a river, which was drawn in question as impairing the obligation of a contract, previously made by the State with the proprietors of a bridge, that no other bridge should be built across the river; and cases in which the State court affirmed the validity of a statute, imposing taxes upon a corporation, and drawn in question as impairing the obligation of a contract in a previous statute exempting it from such taxation. State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416; Mechanics & Traders' Bank v. Debolt, 18 How. 380; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; Memphis & Charleston Railroad v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, 709; University v. People, 99 U. S. 309; Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Palmes, Opinion of the Court. 109 U. S. 244; Memphis Gas Co. v. Shelby County, 109 U. S. 398; Vicksburg &c. Railroad v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665. In each of those cases, the State court upheld a right claimed under the later statute, and could not have made the decision that it did without upholding that right; and thus gave effect to the law of the State drawn in question as impairing the obligation of a contract. those in The distinction between the two classes of cases which the State court has, and those in which it has not, given effect to the statute drawn in question as impairing the obligation of a contract as affecting the consideration by this court, on writ of error, of the true construction and effect of the previous contract, is clearly brought out in Kennebec Railroad v. Portland Railroad, 14 Wall. 23. That was a writ of error to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in which a foreclosure, under a statute of 1857, of a railroad mortgage made in 1852, was contested upon the ground that it impaired the obligation of the contract, and the parties agreed that the opinion of that court should be considered as part of the record. Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering judgment, after stating that it did appear that the question whether the statute of 1857 impaired the obligation of the mortgage contract "was discussed in the opinion of the court, and that the court was of the opinion that the statute did not impair the obligation of the contract," said: "If this were all of the case, we should undoubtedly be bound in this court to inquire whether the act of 1857 did, as construed by that court, impair the obligation of the contract. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116. But a full examination of the opinion of the court shows that its judgment was based upon the ground that the foreclosure was valid, without reference to the statute of 1857, because the method pursued was in strict conformity to the mode of foreclosure authorized, when the contract was made, by the laws then in existence. Now, if the State court was right in their view of the law as it stood when the contract was made, it is obvious that the mere fact that a new law was made does not impair the obligation of the contract. And it is also clear that we cannot inquire whether the Supreme Court of Maine Opinion of the Court. was right in that opinion. Here is, therefore, a clear case of a sufficient ground on which the validity of the decree of the State court could rest, even if it had been in error as to the effect of the act of 1857 in impairing the obligation of the conAnd when there is such distinct and sufficient ground for the support of the judgment of the State court, we cannot take jurisdiction, because we could not reverse the case, though the federal question was decided erroneously in the court below against the plaintiff in error. Rector v. Ashley, 6 Wall. 142; Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257; Steines v. Franklin County, 14 Wall. 15. The writ of error must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction." 14 Wall. 25, 26. The result of the authorities, applying to cases of contracts the settled rules, that in order to give this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a State court, a federal question must have been, expressly or in effect, decided by that court, and, therefore, that when the record shows that a federal question and another question were presented to that court and its decision turned on the other question only, this court has no jurisdiction, may be summed up as follows: When the State court decides against a right claimed under a contract, and there was no law subsequent to the contract, this court clearly has no jurisdiction. When the existence and the construction of a contract are undisputed, and the State court upholds a subsequent law, on the ground that it did not impair the obligation of the admitted contract, it is equally clear that this court has jurisdiction. When the State court holds that there was a contract conferring certain rights, and that a subsequent law did not impair those rights, this court has jurisdiction to consider the true construction of the supposed contract, and, if it is of opinion that it did not confer the rights affirmed by the State court, and therefore its obligation was not impaired by the subsequent law, may on that ground affirm the judgment. So, when the State court upholds the subsequent law, on the ground that the contract did not confer the right claimed, this court may inquire whether the supposed contract did give the right, because, if it did, the subsequent law cannot be upheld. But when the State court gives no Syllabus. effect to the subsequent law, but decides, on grounds independent of that law, that the right claimed was not conferred by the contract, the case stands just as if the subsequent law had not been passed, and this court has no jurisdiction. In the present case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana did not, and the plaintiff in error does not pretend that it did, give any effect to the provision of the Constitution of 1879 abolishing monopolies. Its judgment was based wholly upon the general law of the State, and upon the construction and effect of the charter from the legislature to the plaintiff company, and of the license from the city council to the defendant company, and in no degree upon the Constitution or any law of the State subsequent to the plaintiff's charter. The case cannot be distinguished in principle from the cases above cited, in which writs of error to State courts have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As was said in Bank of West Tennessee v. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, above cited, "The result in this case would have been necessarily the same if the Constitution had not contained the provision in question.' Writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction. KREIGER v. SHELBY RAILROAD COMPANY and Others. SAME and Others v. SAME and Others. SAME and Another v. SAME and Others. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY. Nos. 948, 949, 950. Submitted December 12, 1887. Decided March 19, 1888. Upon a writ of error to the highest court of a State, under Rev. Stat. § 709, the opinion of that court, recorded as required by the statutes of the State, may be examined by this court to ascertain the ground of the judgment. Statutes of a State authorized a district in a county, defined by exact boundaries, to determine by the vote of its inhabitants to subscribe for stock Statement of the Case. in a railroad company, and required bonds to be executed in its name by the county judge to the railroad company for the amount of stock so subscribed for. By later statutes, it was enacted that this district should be entitled to vote on the amount of its stock, and in so doing be represented by certain magistrates of the county; and that it should have a certain corporate name, and by that name might sue and be sued. The highest court of the State held that by the earlier statutes the district was made a corporation, and entitled to vote and to receive dividends on its stock in the railroad company, and that the later statutes made no change in the contract created by the earlier statutes. Held, that this court had no jurisdiction on writ of error. THESE were three suits in equity, one brought by the Shelby Railroad Company, another by the Shelby Railroad District of Shelby County in the State of Kentucky, and the third by Kreiger and other individual stockholders in the railroad company. The plaintiffs in each suit were made defendants in each of the other suits. All the cases were argued together in the courts of the State of Kentucky and in this court, and presented the question whether the Shelby Railroad District had the right of voting at stockholders' meetings upon stock held by it in the Shelby Railroad Company, under the following circumstances: By an act of the legislature of Kentucky of March 15, 1851, the Shelby Railroad Company was incorporated; its capital stock was fixed at $600,000, in shares of $50 each, to be subscribed for by any individual or corporation; at any meeting of the stockholders, each stockholder was to be "allowed one vote for every share owned by him, her, or it;" on every share subscribed, one dollar was to be paid at the time of the subscription, and the residue in instalments and at times to be fixed by the president and directors; all payments made on the stock were to bear interest until a dividend made, certificates of stock were to be issued to the persons entitled, in addition to the shares subscribed or held by them, and no certificates of stock were to be issued until they were paid for; the county court of Shelby County was empowered to subscribe for stock for all such interest in behalf of the county, its subscription was to be made payable at such times and places and upon such terms as might be agreed on between it and the |