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CHAPTER XVI.

POWER OVER NATURALIZATION AND BANKRUPTCY.

§ 1102. THE next clause is, that Congress "shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States."

§ 1103. The propriety of confiding the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization to the national government seems not to have occasioned any doubt or controversy in the convention. For aught that appears on the journals, it was conceded without objection.1 Under the confederation, the States possessed the sole authority to exercise the power; and the dissimilarity of the system in different States was generally admitted as a prominent defect, and laid the foundation of many delicate and intricate questions. As the free inhabitants of each State were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in all the other States, it followed that a single State possessed the power of forcing into every other State, with the enjoyment of every immunity and privilege, any alien whom it might choose to incorporate into its own society, however repugnant such admission might be to their polity, conveniences, and even prejudices. In effect, every State possessed the power of naturalizing aliens in every other State; a power as mischievous in its nature as it was indiscreet in its actual exercise. In one State, residence for a short time might, and did confer the rights of citizenship. In others, qualifications of greater importance were required. An alien, therefore, incapacitated for the possession of certain rights by the laws of the latter, might, by a previous residence and naturalization in the former, elude at pleasure all their salutary regulations for self-protection. Thus the laws of a single State were preposterously rendered paramount to the

1 Journ. of Convention, 220, 257. One of the grievances stated in the Declaration of Independence was that the king had endeavored to prevent the population of the States by obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners.

2 The Contederation, art. 4.

laws of all others, even within their own jurisdiction.1 And it has been remarked, with equal truth and justice, that it was owing to mere casualty that the exercise of this power under the confederation did not involve the Union in the most serious embarrassments.2 There is great wisdom, therefore, in confiding to the national government the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States. It is of the deepest interest to the whole Union to know who are entitled to enjoy the rights of citizens in each State, since they thereby, in effect, become entitled to the rights of citizens in all the States. If aliens might be admitted indiscriminately to enjoy all the rights of citizens at the will of a single State, the Union might itself be endangered by an influx of foreigners, hostile to its institutions, ignorant of its powers, and incapable of a due estimate of its privileges.

§ 1104. It follows, from the very nature of the power, that, to be useful, it must be exclusive; for a concurrent power in the States would bring back all the evils and embarrassments which the uniform rule of the Constitution was designed to remedy. And, accordingly, though there was a momentary hesitation, when the Constitution first went into operation, whether the power might not still be exercised by the States, subject only to the control of Congress, so far as the legislation of the latter extended, as the supreme law,3 yet the power is now firmly established to be exclusive. (a) The Federalist, indeed, introduced

1 The Federalist, No. 42.

2 Ibid.

8 Collet v. Collet, 2 Dall. R. 294; United States v. Villato, on Const. Law, ch. 28 (chap. 30, 2d edit).

Dall. 270; Sergeant

4 See The Federalist, Nos. 32, 42; Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. R. 259, 269; Rawle on the Const. ch. 9, pp. 84, 85 to 88; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. R. 48, 49; Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. Cir. Ct. R. 313, 322; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 19, p. 397; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 255 to 259; 12 Wheat. R. 277, per Johnson, J.; but see Id. 307, per Thompson, J. A question is often discussed under this head, how far a person

(a) That the power over naturalization is exclusive, see further, Thurlow v Massachusetts, 5 How. 585; Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283. And as to the right of expatriation, see Dana's Wheaton, p. 122 note; Lawrence's Wheaton, Appendix, p. 891. A man may, however, be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State. "He must reside

within the State to make him a citizen of it; but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union." Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 72; 14th Amend. to U. S. Const. See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542. Further as to citizenship, see SS 1693-1695, 1932, et seq.

this very case, as entirely clear, to illustrate the doctrine of an exclusive power by implication, arising from the repugnancy of a similar power in the States. "This power must necessarily be exclusive," say the authors; "because, if each State had power to prescribe a distinct rule, there could be no uniform rule." 1 (a)

§ 1105. The power to pass laws on the subject of bankruptcies was not in the original draft of the Constitution. The original article was committed to a committee, together with the following proposition: "To establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies, and respecting the damages arising on the protest of foreign bills of exchange. The committee subsequently made a report in favor of incorporating the clause on the subject of bankruptcies into the Constitution; and it was adopted by a vote of nine States against one. The brevity with which this subject is treated by the Federalist is quite remarkable. The only passage in that elaborate commentary, in which the subject is treated, is as follows: "The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds, where the parties or their property may lie, or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn in question." 3

§ 1106. The subject, however, deserves a more exact consideration. Before the adoption of the Constitution, the States severally possessed the exclusive right, as matter belonging to their general sovereignty, to pass laws upon the subject of bankruptcy

has a right to throw off his national allegiance, and to become the subject of another country, without the consent of his native country. This is usually denominated the right of expatriation. It is beside the purpose of these commentaries to enter into any consideration of this subject, as it does not properly belong to any constitutional inquiry. It may be stated, however, that there is no authority which has affirmatively maintained the right (unless provided for by the laws of the particular country), and there is a very strong current of reasoning on the other side, independent of the known practice and claims of the nations of modern Europe. See Rawle on the Const. ch. 9, pp. 85 to 101; Sergeant on Const. Law. ch. 28 (ch. 30); 2 Kent's Comm. Lect. 25, pp. 35 to 42.

1 The Federalist, No. 32.

2 Journ. of Convention, 220, 305, 320, 321, 357.

3 The Federalist, No. 42.

(a) A bankrupt law is not invalid on the ground of want of uniformity, because of its adoption of the differing

State exemption laws. In re Beckerford, 1 Dillon, 45.

and insolvency.1 Without stopping at present to consider what is the precise meaning of each of these terms, as contradistinguished from the other, it may be stated, that the general objects of all bankrupt and insolvent laws is, on the one hand, to secure to creditors an appropriation of the property of their debtors pro tanto to the discharge of their debts, whenever the latter are unable to discharge the whole amount; and, on the other hand, to relieve unfortunate and honest debtors from perpetual bondage. to their creditors, either in the shape of unlimited imprisonment to coerce payment of their debts, or of an absolute right to appropriate and monopolize all their future earnings. The latter course obviously destroys all encouragement to industry and enterprise on the part of the unfortunate debtor, by taking from him all the just rewards of his labor, and leaving him a miserable pittance, dependent upon the bounty or forbearance of his creditors. The former is, if possible, more harsh, severe, and indefensible. It makes poverty and misfortune, in themselves sufficiently heavy burdens, the subject or the occasion of penalties and punishments. Imprisonment, as a civil remedy, admits of no defence, except as it is used to coerce fraudulent debtors to yield up their present property to their creditors, in discharge of their engagements. But when the debtors have no property, or have yielded up the whole to their creditors, to allow the latter at their mere pleasure to imprison them, is a refinement in cruelty, and an indulgence of private passions, which could hardly find apology in an enlightened despotism; and are utterly at war with all the rights and duties of free governments. Such a system of legislation is as unjust as it is unfeeling. It is incompatible with the first precepts of Christianity; and is a living reproach to the nations of Christendom, carrying them back to the worst ages of paganism.3 One of the first duties of legislation, while it provides amply for the sacred obligation of contracts, and the remedies to enforce them, certainly is, pari passu, to relieve the unfortunate and meritorious debtor from a slavery of mind and body, which cuts him off from a fair enjoyment of the common benefits of society, and robs his family of the fruits of his labor and the benefits of his paternal superintendence. 1 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. R. 122, 203, 204; Rawle on the Constitution, ch. 9, pp. 101, 102,

2 See 1 Tucker's Black. Comm. App. 259.

3 See 2 Black. Comm. 471, 472, 473. See also 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 259.

this power

of legis

A national government which did not possess lation would be little worthy of the exalted functions of guarding the happiness and supporting the rights of a free people. It might guard against political oppressions, only to render private oppressions more intolerable and more glaring.

§ 1107. But there are peculiar reasons, independent of these general considerations, why the government of the United States should be entrusted with this power. They result from the importance of preserving harmony, promoting justice, and securing equality of rights and remedies among the citizens of all the States. It is obvious, that if the power is exclusively vested in the States, each one will be at liberty to frame such a system of legislation upon the subject of bankruptcy and insolvency as best suits it own local interests and pursuits. Under such circumstances no uniformity of system or operations can be expected. One State may adopt a system of general insolvency; another, a limited or temporary system; one may relieve from the obligation of contracts; another only from imprisonment; another may adopt a still more restrictive course of occasional relief; and another may refuse to act in any manner upon the subject. The laws of one State may give undue preferences to one class of creditors, as, for instance, to creditors by bond, or judgment; another may provide for an equality of debts, and a distribution pro rata without distinction among all. One may prefer creditors living within the State to all living without; securing to the former an entire priority of payment out of the assets. Another may, with a more liberal justice, provide for the equal payment of all, at home and abroad, without favor or preference. In short, diversities of almost infinite variety and object may be introduced into the local system, which may work gross injustice and inequality, and nourish feuds and discontents in neighboring States. What is here stated is not purely speculative. It has occurred among the American States in the most offensive forms, without any ap-. parent reluctance or compunction on the part of the offending State. (a) There will always be found in every State a large mass of politicians, who will deem it more safe to consult their own temporary interests and popularity, by a narrow system of preferences, than to enlarge the boundaries, so as to give to dis(a) It occurred also among the colonies before the revolution. 2 Graham's Hist. App. 498, 499.

VOL. II.

4

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