April 17. President Lincoln's proclamation of blockade. Norfolk navy yard taken by the Confederates. Proclamation of Governor Letcher, recognizing war between Virginia and United States. April 24. Virginia forms an alliance offensive and defensive with the Confederacy, and surren ders the control of its military operations to the Confederacy. April 27. President Lincoln's proclamation, extending the blockade to Virginia and North Carolina. April 30. Commodore Pendergast's notice of blockade of ports of Virginia. May 3. May 3. May 3. Virginia calls out volunteers. Proclamation for 40,000 men. Proclamation of Governor Letcher, of Virginia, calling on "every citizen" to take arms and give aid. May 6. The Confederate congress acknowledge the existence of a war between them and the United States. May 13. Queen's proclamation of neutrality between the two belligerents. May 20. May 21. North Carolina joins the Confederacy. The Confederate congress at Montgomery adjourned to meet at Richmond, July 20th. May 23. Virginia adopts the secession ordinance by pop ular vote. June 17. Before this, the battles of Acquia Creek, Fairfax Court House, Philippa, Vienna, and Big Bethel had taken place, and the rebel army was within a few miles of Washington. III. Third. The claimants being residents in enemy's territory, the onus is on them to show why their property should not be condemned. The Primus, Spink's Prize Cas. 48; The Magnus, 1 Rob. 31; The Countess of Lauderdale, 4 Rob. 283; The Walsingham, 2 Rob. 77, I Wheat. 506, Appendix. I am now brought to what I suppose to be the only difficult question, perhaps the only disputed question in the cause,whether the principles above established are applicable to wars called civil, domestic, or internal. I propose to consider this question in two parts,-first, whether, in such war, the sovereign power of the state can exert these powers; and, secondly, if so, whether there is anything in the distribution of functions under our constitution which renders the exercise of these powers as they were exercised illegal. IV. Fourth. In civil or domestic war, it is competent for the sovereign to exercise belligerent powers. War is simply the exercise of force by bodies politic, or bodies assuming to be bodies politic, against each other, for the purpose of coercion. The means and modes of doing this are called "belligerent powers." The present case does not require an extreme definition of what may constitute war. Suppose the following state of facts in a sovereignty: (1) Millions of the sovereign's subjects unite in the establishment of a new government over a portion of the territory. They are sufficient in numbers, intelligence, and wealth to be recognized as one of the family of nations. (2) They inhabit territory large enough to constitute an independent sovereignty capable of self-support, with ports, rivers, agriculture, manufactures, and commerce. (3) They organize a sovereign state over all this territory, not as a temporary expedient, but for a permanency, and claim jurisdiction of right over all the inhabitants of the territory. Their government has all the functions of a state, judicial, executive, and legislative, and they claim recognition as a sovereign by other powers. (4) They establish this government de facto, over the territory, and claim it de jure. They treat all resistance to it by inhabitants as treason. (5) They treat all attempts by force of arms to put down this government, and re-establish the old sovereignty, as acts of war. They declare that war exists between them as one sovereignty and the parent state as another. They raise armies and navies, establish a conscription over all inhabitants, issue letters of marque, and establish prize courts. Their courts condemn, as enemy's property, property of persons residing in the parent state, on the established principles of war. (6) They attack the forts, troops, and ships of the sovereign, by sea and land, and fighting on the scale of a large war is going on. (7) Foreign nations recognize this state of things as war, and concede to each power engaged in it the rights of belligerents. In this state of things, the question is not what the sovereignty may choose to do, or ought to do, but what is competent for him. to do. Is he prevented from meeting war by war; belligerent power by belligerent power? That it is competent for him to exercise belligerent powers: Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 272; Cheriot v. Foussat, 3 Binn. 253; Dobree v. Napier, 3 Scott, 225; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 306; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 635; Wheaton, Int. Law, pp. 363, 365; Grotius de Jure Belli, Prol. 8 25; Burlamaqui (N. & P. L.) 263; 2 Rutherford Inst. 503; Hay & Marriot, 23, 47, 78, 83, 94, 197, 216; Bynk. Law Nat., 3 Hall Law J. p. 11; The Admiral (Grier, J.) Law Int. Sept. 19, 1862; The Marathon, Grier, J.; The Maero, Grier, J.; The Amelia, Grier, J.; The Amy Warwick, 24 Law Rep. 335, 494; The Gen. Parkhill, Cadwallader, J.; The Tropic Wind, Dunlop, J.; The Hiawatha, Hallis Jackson, Crenshaw, North Carolina, etc., Betts, J. The capture of what is technically called "enemy's property" forms no exception. None of the above authorities make any distinction among belligerent powers as competent or not competent in civil war. No case has ever been decided to the contrary under our own or any other government. To determine whether this power is inconsistent with the notion of this kind of war, we must recur to the nature of war, and the reasons for the exercise of this power. The reasoning heretofore employed will elucidate this point. (1) The object of war is coercion of the power you are engaged with. (2) If that power has title in any property, or has an interest, for the purposes of the war, in its transit, arrival, or existence, you may capture it, as a mode of coercion, unless the rights of neutrals or the rules of humanity and policy sanctioned by nations exempt it from capture. (3) As to merchandise found on the sea, the fact that the person to whose ownership and control it is subjected resides. within the dominion and under the control of the enemy brings it within the reason of the rule founded on coercion of the enemy, as we have seen, and it is not exempt by any law of nations. (4) The right to capture it is not derived from or affected by any actual or implied or constructive hostility of the owner. is immaterial whether he be a citizen or an alien or a friend; whether he has aided in the war or not, or on which side; whether he is considered as faithful to the power under which he resides, or is suspected or even imprisoned by it as a traitor. The test is the predicament of the property. The fact that he is under It the jurisdiction and control of the enemy gives the enemy an interest in the preservation and transfer of the merchandise, whether as a source of wealth, taxation and revenue, or of contribution or confiscation. These considerations show that the doctrine of "enemy property" is applicable to domestic or civil wars. The reasons are the same. (1) The object of the sovereign is to coerce the power which is organized against him, and making war upon him. (2) This power exercises jurisdiction and control de facto, and claims it de jure over the territory. It compels obedience and exacts allegiance from all inhabitants of the territory, without respect to their wishes. It compels each inhabitant to pay taxes and imposts upon his property, to aid in the war, and makes the property liable to contribution or confiscation. This power, therefore, has the same interest in the merchandise of an inhabitant of the territory at sea, for the purposes of the war, as if it were an acknowledged sovereign; and the parent state has the same interest in the capture of the property, for the purpose of coercing the rebel power. (3) The right of the sovereign to capture it jure belli is not derived from any actual or presumed disloyalty or criminality of the owner. It is equally immaterial as in a foreign war whether the owner is an alien or a friend; whether, in other respects, he has taken part in the war, or on which side; whether the rebel power considers him faithful to them, or suspects him, or has him in prison as a traitor. The test and the reason is the predicament of the property. (4) If the owner was hostile to the de facto government under which he lives, and they had actually declared the property in question to be confiscated before its capture, it would not be doubted that it was subject to capture. But their laws and rules respecting allegiance, obedience, contribution, confiscation, and taxation govern and affect this property in fact (although the sovereign will not admit de jure), so long as it is out of the actual custody and control of the parent sovereign. (5) It does not follow that the owner of the property in civil wars owes allegiance to the sovereign. He may be an alien, or even a mercenary soldier, or a political agent of some power that has recognized the rebels as a nation. (6) Suppose a part of the sovereign's dominions are wrested from him in public war, and his enemy establishes a civil as well as military government over it, and claims it as his own, and the local authorities and a majority of the inhabitants acquiesce in the new dynasty, and it is established de facto. Can it be doubted that it is competent for the sovereign to capture property of its inhabitants, at sea, as a means of coercion of the power possessing it? It is still a political question with the sovereign whether he will capture such property, and, if condemned, whether, after a peace, he will compensate the owner, on proof of merit. I will now consider certain objections made to the application to internal wars of the doctrine of enemy's property. I. It is objected that the exercise of this power is inconsistent with the claim to civil jurisdiction over the owner. Not more so than in foreign war. There the property of a subject is liable to capture if it is in a certain predicament, e. g., if it is the peculiar product of enemy territory, and exported thence, or if the owner resides, however unwillingly, in the enemy's territory, and under his jurisdiction. II. It is objected that so the property of a loyal citizen may be condemned. Not more so than in foreign war. The property in the given predicament may belong to a loyal friend and subject, or an indifferent neutral. It is a political question whether the right shall be exerted over all such property, on reasons of general policy, or whether exceptions shall be made in case the owner so resident is loyal to us, or sympathizes with us. It is worthy of remark that the sovereign can exercise these belligerent powers at first, if ever. The lapse of time gives him no new rights of war. The recognition of the rebel state as belligerent by foreign powers confers no right on the sovereign. It only recognizes an existing right. The recognition of rebel states as sovereign by foreign powers confers on the sovereign no new war power. The moment he ceases to claim jurisdiction over the rebel territory the war ceases to be a civil war, and becomes an international war. The objections really amount to this: that war powers can never be exercised in civil wars, at any stage, except by the rebels. According to this theory, if the civil war is one in which each party claims to be the state, neither can exercise belligerent powers. If neither makes that claim, both may exercise them. If one claims to be the state, and the other does not (as in this case), the latter only can exercise them. III. It is contended that, if the owner is a traitor, his property is exempt from confiscation by the constitution (article 3, 3) and the act of 1790 (chapter 9, § 24). But there is no allegation or evidence that the claimants of this property are trai |