an imprudent and hafty ftep, and that chance is utterly loft. He could not at prefent enter into a detail of particulars. He had no hefitation, however, in declaring, that the difpofition of his majefty's minifters went beyond the purpofe of the motion before them; and, that in confequence of difpatches received from his Imperial majetty, who had refufed to negociate for peace, but in conjunction with Great Britain, a confidential perfon was to be fent, from this country to Vienna, with inftructions to enable the emperor to conduct farther negociations, in concert with his allies. He, therefore, hoped that Mr. Pollen would withdraw his motion, rather than perfevere in a meafure which would tend to defeat the end which it propofed.

Colonel Porter difavowed all confidence in minifters. The chancellor of the exchequer had come to the houfe with a flourishing defcription of the ftate of the finances; and in a few weeks thereafter, we were found to be in a fituation little short of bankruptcy. At all events, the present motion could do no harm; it fhould, therefore, have his fupport.

Mr. Addington had flattered himfelf that, after what had paffed, Mr. Pollen would have withdrawn his motion. This motion, he observed, was founded on two grounds, ftated in a French paper: firft, the origin of the war, which was attributed to the British miniftry; fecondly, the infincerity of the British government in its overtures for peace. He made a variety of obfervations, tending to fhew, that minifters were dragged into the war against their wills; and, alfo, that they had not neglected any feasible opportunities

or means of pacification. If we were to make any application for peace, he faid, in our. prefent circumftances, the enemy might fuppofe, that we were driven to it by the recent occurrences at the bank. It had been afked, what had been gained by the war? This was an improper queftion, as it was a war of defence: but, we had retained our character, atchieved great conquefts, and made a difcovery of eafy means of preferving internal tranquillity. We had nearly deftroyed the marine of France, and given a fevere blow to that of Spain. We had, in a great degree, quafhed thofe dangerous principles that were abroad, and fecured our honour, our liberty, and, he trufted, our conftitution. Thefe were fome of the advantages we had gained by the war: and, on thefe grounds, he would vote against the motion, and move the order of the day.

Mr. Fox thought, as he knew the country alfo thought, that peace was the only means of averting our impending ruin. But what does the minifter, who has had fo large a fhare in producing your prefent calamities, propofe to you to night? That you thould still repofe your confidence in him: ftill confide in thofe councils which have been fo fatal. It feemed, Mr. Hammond, of whofe abilities he had no doubt, was going to Vienna, and, on this the minifter expected them to ftop at once, in the performance of their duty. We are now to negociate, fays the minifter, in conjunction with the emperor, and Buonaparte is to be negociaior for peace with us both. Do not put me under difficulties, by your untimely interference. Το that, as a general principle, Mr. Fox

had

had no difficulty in affenting, though perhaps he would not agree with the minifter as to the extent to which that principle might be carried. The prefent queftion was not, whether any minifter, under any circumstances, fhould have the confidence of the house, during a negociation, but whether the prefent minifter, under the prefent circumftances, fhould poflets that confidence? A motion was made for peace, by an honourable gentleman (Mr. Wilberforce) two years ago. What was the language then? "Do not vote for this propofition, but truft in me." He prevailed

with this houte to do then what he afks you to do now; to confide in his fincerity. After a confiderable Afier a confiderable lapfe of time, a negociation was at laft attempted. through the medium of Mr. Wickham, and after wards carried on by the embally of lord Malmesbury. This negociation became a fubject of difcuffion in this houfe, which was told, after every means had been made ufe of to evade all measures that could lead to any serious negociation, that there was not a heart in England fo "profligate as to wifh, nor a haud fo daftardly as to fign, nor a man to be found fo degenerate, as to be the courier of a commiflion to be fent to France, to ftipulate for peace." We have tried our executive government enough, faid Mr. Fox, to be confident we can do no good to our country, by trying fuch means any longer. Let us now try means that we have not tried. My opinion is, that, let who will be the negocia tors for peace, certainly, ftill more if the prefent minifters are to be the negociators, the chance of obtaining it will be infinitely increased, if parliament bould give that nego.

13

ciation the fanction of its vote But it feems the French will be encouraged if this horfe fhould interfere and dictate to the executive government. Will they really think worle of your energy, if they find that you are determined to take your own affairs into your own hands, inftead of confiding to the prefent minifters. Will they really expect to make better terms of peace with the people of England, fpeaking to them through the medium of reprefentatives, than with the prefent executive government? Do they expect more real care of the interest of the people of England from a reigning faction, than from the people themfelves, fpeaking through the medium of their reprefentatives? I apprehend the contrary; and that, as we fhould expect more juftice from the French people themselves, than we do of any faction among them, fo would they from the people of Great Britain; and, in that view, I should hope, that neither the republic of France would be hoftile to Great Britain, nor the limited monarchy of this country be hoftile to the juft claims and true interefts of the republic of France. I wish to know what better pledge you could give of finceri ty to France, in your defire for peace, than to tell them, by a vote of the houfe of commons, that you are willing to negociate: and what is more likely to lead to a restoration of tranquillity, upon a solid and per. manent foundation?

Colonel Fullarton obferved, that the prefent queftion, ftripped of all diplomatic ambiguity, flood exactly thus: is this country prepared to admit, that Belgium fhall not be reftored to the emperor, and that the Rhine fhall be the boundary of France? If not, the French will

anfwer,

anfwer, come and take Belgium. Thefe are not times for entrufting the most important interefts of the country to plenipotentiaries who entrench themfelves behind the ramparts of etiquette, and italk on the ftilts of ambafadorial mightinefs. Undoubtedly, every returning fentiment of mutual forbearance and amity ought, by every practicable mode, to be encouraged. Perhaps, with this view, no better beacon or directory can be found, in the annals of negociation, than the conduct of our Indian government, in the year 1781, when French, Dutch, Myforeans, and all, were in arms against the English; and our intereft in the eaft were, if poffible, more unprofperous than they are at prefent on the continent of Enrope. An honourable baronet, now a member of this house, then second in council, and afterwards governor-general in India, in conjuction with lord Macartney and fir Eyre Coote, intimated to the Mahrattas, that, unlefs in fo far as might be neceflary to fupport exifting engagements with allies, the English government was determined, that their operations against the Mahrattas fhould be naval, and defenfive merely. This they intimated to the Poonah government, and, from that moment, not a fhot was fired between the Mahrattas and the English. There is one point, which must not be omitted. It is well known, that the French, from the commencement of the war, have refifted all ideas of treating collectively with the confederated powers: in fo doing, they have proved their wifdom; for, by treating individually, they have detached every power from the confederacy excepting

Auftria and England. If the French lofe all hope of detaching thefe powers from each other, they can no longer have the fame object left for perfifting in that policy; at leaft, it may no longer be impracticable to devife means for bringing them to treat on general principles, and collective arrangements. This can hardly be effected without a congrefs, in fome form or other. Under this impreffion, he would take the liberty of reading fuch a form of refolutions as he conceived would meet the object in view, not meaning, however, at all, to prefs them on the houfe at prefent:

Refolved, "That it is the opinion of this houfe, that, whenever a proper opportunity occurs, the moft eligible mode of eftablishing the tranquillity of Europe, on a fecure foundation, will be, by affembling a general congrefs, fuch as took place laft century, previous to the peace of Munfier. That the object of this congrefs ought to be, to fpecify and declare to all mankind the principles of right and wrong, which ought to govern the relations between independent ftates; to fpecify and declare to all mankind the principles of fecurity, property, and public credit, which it is neceffary to recognize, and render effectual, before any pacification can be negociated with stability or honour.

"In the event of the Belligerent powers not acceding to this opinion, it will become this house to make known the grounds on which the war is continued, to afcertain the form on which it is to be conducted, and to declare the principles on which a ceffion of hoftilities ought to be concluded, on the part of his Britannic majefty.”

Sir William Pultney faid, that what the parliament and the nation fhould require was not fo much an immediate peace, as a fecure one: and this object would be accomplifhed by patience under our fufferings, and perfeverance in the conteft. As long as the enemy retained Belgium and Holland there could be no fecurity for England. Now was the moment to ftrain every nerve in the firuggle; and he was more fearful that minifters would be too forward than too tardy in bringing matters to a termination. His complaint against them was that, on hearing the difafters that had befallen the Imperial arms, they had not immediately come down to the houfe, and called for a loan to invigorate the brave exertions of our illuftrious ally.

Sir John Macpherfon fpoke to the following effect. He thought that it would not be a greater proof of moderation and juftice, than of found political wifdom, to declare that we tood up only in defence of our own rights and liberties, and not for the purpose of encroaching on thofe of other nations. He was anxious that fuch a declaration fhould be made, not only because it would contribute to give peace to this country, but to all Europe, and among other nations, even to our enemies. The interefts of Britain would be beft promoted by confulting not only our own advantage, but that of all the civilized world: by endeavouring not only to obtain from, but to extend to France, a juft, honourable, and folid peace. The French go vernment has ceased to be an incendiary aflembly, fanguinary dictators, and a club of plunderers. It has affumed the form and the tone of regular governments. It has offici

ally declared its refpect for perfonal fafety, property, and morals, and has denounced vengeance against the anarchists. It has likewife manifested an appearance of a wifh for peace. It is for the French nation to realize the peace, of which their new government fpeaks to them with cautious referve. And this object, a frank declaration on the part of the people of England, through their reprefentatives, of a fincere difpofition to peace, on a fair moral bafis, equally conducive to the fecurity and welfare of both nations, by awakening the fenfibility, and gaining the confidence of the French na tion, would materially tend to forward. The bafis to which he alluded was a due regard to juftice, private property, public credit, and the rights of nations. It was time for the English nation to open their eyes on the true object of the war: an object which ought to be as remote from the fpirit of vengeance, as that of conqueft. It points, on the contrary, to a reasonable agreement between the belligerent ftates; an agreement dictated by the force of their wants, and founded on the indifpenfable protection of the right of property, without which no ftate can be certain of providing for the fubfiftence of its fubjects, nor of maintaining the fecurity of its civil order. Commerce and modern finance having intermingled all property, even that of nations, it follows that public credit has become the univerfal depofitary of civilized fociety. There is only one property, and one real finance in Europe, the circulation of which is as effential to the political body, as that of the blood to the human body; it was a violation of the right of property that produced the

affignats,

affignats, and the affignats that produced the revolution, with all the miferies fuffered by France, and inflicted on her neighbours. To fhew a difpofition, even a zeal for the fettlement of a government in France, that fhould refpect the rights of men and nations, would not be a greater bleffing to that country, than to all Europe. The motion before the houfe had a happy tendency to harmonize the great body of the French and English people (who could not be faid properly to be at war with each other, though their governments were) into peace and good neighbourhood, by difcountenancing and difapproving the infinuations of infincerity, on the part of this country, in the late negociation. It would affift minifters, in proving that the prolongation of

the calamities of war did not reft with Great Britain. To a motion of this tendency, he did not fee why any objection fhould be made by either fide of the house: as it was calculated to procure an effential advantage to the country, while it contributed to ftrengthen the. hands of government. On thefe grounds, he thought himfelf juftified in fupporting the prefent motion.

Mr. Johnes could never forget the ignominiousmanner in which our ambaffador had been difmiffed, nor forgive the infult offered to the nation. The objects for which we contended were, our liberties, our fortunes, our religion, our God, and our king! On a divifion of the house, there appeared for Mr. Pollen's motion, 85: against it, 291.

VOL. XXXIX.

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CHAP.