RAILROAD (continued).

connected, is only bound to carry the cattle over its own line, and
deliver them safely to the next connecting carrier. Myrick v. Mich-
igan Central Railroad Company, 102.

3. A contract whereby the liability of the company is sought to be ex-
tended beyond such carriage and delivery will not be inferred from
loose and doubtful expressions, but must be established by clear and
satisfactory evidence. Taking a through fare on the receipt of the
cattle does not establish such liability. Id.

4. The receipt of the company, ante, p. 103, does not of itself constitute
such contract. The circumstances under which it was given should
have been submitted to the jury, to determine whether in fact a
through contract was made. Id.

5. In passing upon the rights of the parties, this court will not be con-
trolled by the judicial decisions of the State where the contract of
carriage was made. Id.

6. A railroad corporation, whose railroad extends across the State of
Wisconsin from Lake Michigan to the Mississippi River, and which
is authorized, by its charter, to make "such contracts with any
other person or corporation whatsoever as the management of its
railroad and the convenience and interest of the corporation and the
conduct of its affairs may in the judgment of its directors require;"
and, by general laws, to make such contracts with any railroad
company, whose road terminates on the eastern shore of Lake
Michigan, "as will enable them to run their roads in connection
with each other in such manner as they shall deem most beneficial
to their interest," and "to build, construct, and run, as part of its
corporate property, such number of steamboats or vessels as they
may deem necessary to facilitate the business operations of such
company or companies; " and also "to accept from any other State
or Territory of the United States, and use, any powers or privileges
applicable to the carrying of persons and property by railway or
steamboat in said State or Territory; " has the power, for the pur-
pose of carrying passengers and freight in connection with its own
railroad and business, to enter into an agreement with the propri-
etors of steamboats running, by way of the Great Lakes, between
its eastern terminus and Buffalo in the State of New York, by which
it guarantees that the gross earnings of each boat for two years
shall amount to a certain sum. Green Bay and Minnesota Railroad
Company v. Union Steamboat Company, 98.

RAILROAD COMPANIES, SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE CAPITAL
STOCK OF. See Municipal Bonds.

RAILROAD MORTGAGE. See Receiver.

REBELLION. See Court of Claims, 2; Jurisdiction, 13, 14.

RECEIPT. See Railroad, 4.

RECEIVER.

See Equity Pleading and Practice; National Banks, 3–5.
1. Where the complainant prays for the appointment of a receiver of

RECEIVER (continued).

mortgaged railroad property, pending proceedings for foreclosure,
the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may, as a condition
of granting the prayer, impose such terms touching the application
of the income arising during the receivership to the payment of
outstanding debts for labor, supplies, equipment, or permanent im-
provement of the property, as under the circumstances of the case
appear reasonable. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235, and Miltenberger
v. Logansport Railway Company, 106 id. 286, cited and approved.
Union Trust Company v. Souther, 591.

2. An assignment of such claims as are mentioned in Union Trust Com-
pany v. Souther, p. 591, passes the right of the original holder to
payment out of the fund in the hands of the receiver. Union Trust
Company v. Walker, 596.

REGULATION OF COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, 1–4; Ferry,
4; Inspection Laws; Navigable Waters; Wharves and Wharfage.
REISSUED LETTERS-PATENT. See Letters-patent.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES. See Causes, Removal of.

RETIRED OFFICERS OF THE ARMY. See Officer of the Army.

REVENUE LAWS. See Causes, Removal of, 1, 2; Ferry, 2.

RIVER. See Navigable Waters.

SALE. See Contract, 3.

SHIPS AND SHIPPING. See Admiralty; Maritime Law; Wharves and
Wharfage.

SLAVES. See Constitutional Law, 4.

STARE DECISIS. See Jurisdiction, 7–11.

STATE AUTHORITY. See Constitutional Law; Ferry; Inspection Laws;
Louisiana; Navigable Waters; Swamp and Overflowed Lands;
Wharves and Wharfage.

STATE BONDS. See Louisiana; Virginia.

STATE COURTS. See Bankruptcy; Causes, Removal of; Jurisdiction, 1,
2, 5-11; Louisiana, 2; Railroad, 5.

STATE LAWS. See Jurisdiction, 7-11.

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONS, CONSTRUCTION OF. See
Corporation, 2, 3; Ferry, 1; Inspection Laws, 1, 4; Jurisdiction,
7-11; Louisiana; Missouri; Municipal Bonds, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 12;
Pension; Railroad, 6; Virginia; Will, 2, 6, 10.

STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

The following, among others, referred to, commented on, and ex-
plained:

Ordinance of July 13, 1787. See Navigable Waters.

STOCKHOLDERS.

See Corporation; Missouri; National Banks.

SUBSCRIPTIONS TO STOCK. See Municipal Bonds.
SURVEYOR OF CUSTOMS. See Customs, Surveyor of.

SWAMP AND OVERFLOWED LANDS.

1. The swamp' and overflowed lands granted by the act of Sept. 28,
1850, c. 84, are subject to the disposal of the States wherein they
respectively lie, and no party other than the United States can ques-
tion such disposal or enforce the conditions of the grant. Mills
County v. Railroad Companies, 557.

2. The proviso to the second section of the act, that the proceeds of the
lands shall be applied exclusively, as far as necessary, to the pur-
pose of reclaiming the same by levees and drains, imposed an obli-
gation which rests upon the good faith of the States. No trust was
thereby attached to the lands, and the title to them, which is
derived from either of the States, is not affected by the manner in
which she performed that obligation. Id.

8. The State of Iowa having granted its swamp and overflowed lands
to the counties respectively in which they are situate, Mills County,
insisting that certain lands were of this character, made claim
thereto. The Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company
claimed them under the act of May 15, 1856, c. 28. These conflict-

SWAMP AND OVERFLOWED LANDS (continued).

ing claims gave rise to a suit between the parties, which was decided
by the State courts in favor of the county. A writ of error was
thereupon brought; and, whilst it was pending here, a compromise
was entered into by which the county was to make certain convey-
ances to the company, and to pay it the sum of $10,000 for lands
previously disposed of. Conveyances were executed accordingly.
Afterwards, the county instituted suit to have the compromise de-
clared void, and the company sued for the $10,000. The State
courts having sustained the compromise, and decided against the
county in both suits, writs of error were brought here. Held,
1. That the county cannot set up that the lands were disposed of
contrary to the provisions of the said act of 1850. 2. That although,
after the compromise was made, the writ then pending was sub-
mitted to this court, and decided in favor of the county, yet that
this did not abrogate the compromise, as the parties continued to
act under it; and that the decision of the State court in the present
cases is not repugnant to, nor in disaffirmance of, the opinion and
judgment of this court. Id.

TAX AND TAXATION. See Appeal Bond, 1; County; Ferry; Louisi-
ana; Virginia.

The court (p. 1) denies an application for rehearing in United States
v. Erie Railway Company, decided at the present term, 106 U. S.
327.

TELEGRAPH EMPLOYÉS. See Railroad, 1.

TOBACCO. See Inspection Laws.

TONNAGE. See Ferry, 4; Wharves and Wharfage.

TOWNSHIP BONDS. See Municipal Bonds.

TOWN-SITE ACTS. See Oregon, 2.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT. See Customs, Surveyor of.

TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See Charitable Gifts and Devises; Corporation,
3; County Criminal Law, 2-4; Equity, 2; Louisiana, 2; Oregon, 2;
Swamp and Overflowed Lands, 2; Trust Deed; Will, 1, 6, 10-12.

TRUST DEED.

1. By a trust deed, duly recorded, land was conveyed to the trustees
in fee, and they were authorized to release it to the grantor upon
payment of the negotiable promissory note thereby secured. Before
that note was paid or payable, and after it had been negotiated to an
indorsee in good faith for full value, a deed of release, reciting that
it had been paid, was made to the grantor by the trustees and by
the payee of the note, and recorded; and the grantor executed and
recorded a like trust deed to secure the payment of a new note for
money lent to him by another person, who had no actual notice that
the first note had been negotiated and was unpaid, and who, before

TRUST DEED (continued).

he would make the loan, required and was furnished with a convey-
ancer's abstract of title, showing that the three deeds were recorded
and the land free from incumbrance. Held, that the legal title was
in the trustee, under the second trust deed, and that the note
thereby secured was entitled to priority of payment out of the land.
Williams v. Jackson, 478.

2. Upon a bill in equity by the holder of a debt secured by deed of trust,
to set aside a release negligently executed by the trustee to the
grantor, the complainant cannot have a decree for the payment of
his debt by the trustee personally. Id.

UNITED STATES, CLAIMS BY AND AGAINST. See Contract, 2;
Court of Claims; Pension.

Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes, ante, p. 447, which, in certain cases
therein mentioned, gives to the United States priority of payment
of debts due to it, does not apply to its demands against an insolvent
national bank. Cook County National Bank v. United States, 445.
UNITED STATES, COURTS OF THE. See Court of Claims; Dis-
trict of Columbia, 1; Equity, 3; Jurisdiction; Louisiana, 2.

UNITED STATES MARSHALS. See Causes, Removal of, 1, 2.
VERDICT. See Admiralty, 1; Jurisdiction, 3; Jury.

VIRGINIA.

1. By issuing, pursuant to her "funding act" of March 30, 1871, her
bonds with interest coupons thereto attached, the State of Vir-
ginia entered into a valid contract with every holder of the coupons,
whereby she bound herself to receive them at and after their matu-
rity for all taxes and demands due the State.
So much of any

enactment as forbids the receipt of the coupons for such taxes and
demands impairs the obligation of the contract, and is void.
v. Greenhow, 769.

Antoni

2. When the coupons were issued, the holder of them could, by the then
existing law of the State, as interpreted by her court of last resort,
enforce his right under the contract by suing out of that court a
mandamus compelling the receipt of them by the proper tax-collector,
who had refused to accept them when duly offered in payment of
State taxes; and the plaintiff, if on the return to the writ judgment
was rendered in his favor, could furthermore recover his costs with
such damages as a jury might assess, and have forthwith a peremp-
tory writ. By sect. 4 of an act passed Jan. 14, 1882, ante, p. 771,
when in such a case a mandamus is prayed for against the collector, the
law imposes upon him as a duty to answer that he is ready to receive
the offered coupon as soon as it shall be ascertained to be genuine
and legally receivable for taxes. The taxpayer is then required to
pay his taxes in lawful money, and file his coupon in the Court of
Appeals, by which it is forwarded to the county court of the county,
or to the hustings court of the city, where the taxes are payable,