The preceding Table of the British and foreign shipping cleared outwards from 1663 to 1811, both inclusive, is taken from the last edition of Mr. Chalmers's Comparative Estimate. It gives a very complete view of the progress of the navigation of the country; and from the attention paid by the author to such subjects, and the facilities which his situation in the Board of Trade gave him for acquiring authentic information, its accuracy may be depended on. II. Account of the Total Number of Vessels engaged in the Foreign and Colonial Trade of the United Kingdom, with the Amount of their Tonnage, and the Number of Men and Boys employed in navigating the same, that entered Inwards from all Parts of the World, in the several Years from 1814 to 1835, both inclusive; distinguishing British from Foreign. III. Account of the Shipping employed in the Foreign and Colonial Trade of the United Kingdom, in the Year 1835, exhibiting the Number and Tonnage of Vessels entered Inwards and cleared Outwards (including their repeated Voyages), with the Number of their Crews; separating British from Foreign Ships, and distinguishing the Trade with each Country.-(Board of Trade Papers, vol. v. p. 45.) 101 33,626 4,328 5,005 269 2,156 130,479 9,979 14,295 2,442,734 133,688 6,005 866,990 47,132 13,948 2,419,941 136,637 6,047 905,270 47,927|| IV. Account of the Vessels employed in the Coasting Trade of Great Britain and Ireland in 1830, 1831, and 1832. V. Account of the Number of Vessels and of their Tonnage, built and registered in, and of those belonging to, the different Ports of the British Empire, from 1820 to 1835, both inclusive; specifying the Number of their Crews, and distinguishing between those of the British Islands and Possessions in Europe and those of the Colonies. 90,060 140,913 77,635 416 116 872 Tons. Ships. Tons. Ships. 19,110 32,719 1,147 2,199.959 4,343 317,041 23,453 2,517,000 154,808 23,721 2,531,819 154,812 24,242 2,581,964 158,422 24.435 2,618,061 161,734 24,385 2,634,577 164,000 25,055 2.716.100 168,061 25,511 2,783,761 171,020 N. B.-The falling off in the number of ships in 1827 is apparent only. The numbers returned in the previous years were those that appeared on the registers. But a ship, when once placed on them, remained till evidence was produced of her having been sold to foreigners, fost, or otherwise destroyed; so that a good many ships were at all times on the register, which, in fact, did not exist. The Registry Act passed in 1826 obliged all owners of ships to register them of new: when, of course, the names of those that had ceased to exist disappeared from the books. VI. An Account of the Number of Ships or Vessels belonging to the different Ports of the British Empire on the 31st of December, 1835, stated in succession, agreeably to the Amount of Tonnage belonging to each; and specifying also the Number of the Crews. (Obtained from the Custom House.) Ships. Tons. Men. Ports. London - 12,829 Newcastle 1,054 996 Sunderland - 712 32,392 566,152 503 63,524 3,783 Scarborough 172 27,052 1,389 Dartmouth. 373 27,140 1,760 Beaumaris Exeter 120 15,283 736 Arundel 35 3,034 171 Newry and 153 15,113 Strangford 275 14,436 1,030 Chichester 59 2,620 164 Londonderry Stockton 104 13,308 619 Wexford Gloucester 246 13,237 1,113 69 4,883 311 2,170 162 Drogheda Rochester 274 12,364 744 Barnstaple 119 Baltimore Scilly 236 Sligo Portsmouth 201 11,968 730 Bridport 99 Galway Newhaven 33 Port of Bridgewater. 117 9,019 608 Gweek 688 132 British Islands. Total England 14,823 1,853,112 105,945 Jersey 243 23,221 2,023 Guernsey Maldon Fowey Dundee & Perth 387 44,869 3,002 411 Aberystwith 129 6,737 41,743 3,095 Total British Falmouth 86 6,732 1,786 Bridgewater 77 Kingdom & 111 5,702 1,301 Brit. islands 20,300 2,360,303 143,109 Weymouth 73 5,698 306 Irvine & Ayr 400 Grand Total 25,511 12,783,761 i 171,020 VII. Account of the Number of Ships, with the Amount of their Tonnage, distinguishing between British and Foreign, which entered the under-mentioned Ports, from Foreign Parts, in each of the Three Years ending with 1835.-(Papers published by Board of Trade, vol. v. p. 46.) Dublin VIII. An Account of the Number and Tonnage of the Vessels entering into and sailing from the Ports of Ireland in 1801, and the subsequent Years mentioned below, distinguishing between the Trade with Great Britain and that with Foreign Parts.-(Papers published by the Board of Trade, vol. i. p. 174.) IX. Account specifying the Number and Tonnage of the Ships built and registered in each Division of the British Empire in 1832; with their Classification according to the Amount of their Tonnage.— (Papers published by Board of Trade, vol. ii. p. 49.) Ship-building.-The cost, including the outfit, of the ships built in 1832, may, we believe, be taken, at a rough average, at from 101. to 121. per ton, or 117. at a medium, making their total value 1,302,2351. London, Sunderland, Newcastle, Liverpool, Hull, Yarmouth, &c. are the principal building ports. The business has increased with extraordinary rapidity at Sunderland; so much so, that while only 60 ships, of the burden of 7,560 tons, were built in that port in 1820, no fewer than 109 ships, of the burden of 25,519 tons, were built in it in 1832. Ships built at London, Liverpool, Bristol, and other western ports, are, however, in higher estimation than those built on the Tyne and the Wear, at least for those branches of trade where the best ships are required. Within the last few years, a great many steam boats have been built on the Clyde.-(As to building in the Isle of Man, see next paragraph.) State of the Shipping Interest.-A great deal of evidence was taken by the Committee of the House of Commons on trade, Manufactures, &c., in 1833, on the state of the shipping interest. The statements made by some of the witnesses differ very materially from those of others; but, on the whole, they go to show that it was then, and had been for some years, very much depressed. It is difficult, however, seeing the number of new ships that are every year built, not to suspect that the complaints of the ship owners are very much exaggerated. No doubt their profits are a good deal lower than they were during the war; but this, if it be really an evil, is one that is not peculiar to them, but equally affects agriculturists, manufacturers, and merchants; and is not even confined to this country, but extends to others. We have already shown the groundlessness of the clamour raised against the reciprocity treaties (vol. ii. p. 211.); which, far from being injurious, have been signally beneficial to our commercial and shipping interests. It is believed that, owing to the peculiar facilities afforded by means of docks and other devices for the loading and unloading of ships, the employment of steam tugs to bring them quickly to their moorings and to take them to sea, and the greater economy and despatch that now pervade every department of the business, 3 ships are able to perform, and do, in fact perform, as much work as was done by 4 at the end of the war! There has, in this way, been a virtual addition of 400,000 to 500,000 tons to our mercantile navy. And this surely is enough, without looking at any thing else, to account for the decline in the rate of freight since 1815. The fall in the value of ships has been a consequence of the still greater fall in the value of the timber, iron, hemp, &c. of which they are constructed; and, however injurious to those who happened to have bought or built ships during the high prices, it is in no ordinary degree advantageous to the public, and to the ship owners that are now engaging in the trade. The heavy discriminating duties on Baltic timber are, in fact, the only real grievance under which our shipping interest labours. Were it not for them, ships might be built cheaper in England than in any other country. Such, however, is the vast importance to a maritime nation like this of being able to build ships at the lowest possible rate, that we think they ought to be allowed to be built in bond, or, if that would be inconvenient, that a draw. I ack should be allowed of the duty on every article used in their construction. A measure of this sort would give to the shipping of England the same superiority, in point of cheapness, that is now enjoyed by our cottons; and would do more than any thing else to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of our maritime ascendency. It is entirely owing to the operation of the duties that so many ships are now built in the colonies. They are very inferior to those built in England; and were the latter built in bond, or were the duties on the articles used in their construction drawn back, they would also be the cheapest of the two. It may be worin mentioning, as illustrative of the singular anomalies that have been allowed to insinuate themselves into our commercial system, that timber may be imported into the Isle of Man, or into any other British possession, without regard to its origin, on payment of an ad valorem duty of 10 per cent. It is remarkable that advantage was not earlier taken of this anomaly, to build ships in the Isle of Man. Latterly, however, several vessels have been built in it; and it is clear that, unless it be placed on the same footing as the other parts of the empire, it will become the grand seat of the ship building business. We hope, however, that the equalisation will be made, not by extending our timber laws to the Isle of Man, but by giving to Britain and Ireland the same advantages as it enjoys. There cannot be a doubt that the equalisation of the timber duties would be one of the greatest improvements which it is possible to make in our commercial system. Mercantile Navy of France.-We have elsewhere given (see vol. i. pp. 752, 753.) very full details with respect to the navigation and shipping of France; but the subjoined classified account of the shipping belonging to that kingdom on the 1st of January, 1830, 1831, and 1832, may not be unacceptable to ou readers. Account of the Mercantile Marine of France on the 1st of January of each of the Three Years ending with 1832. (SHIPS (CLASSIFICATION, QUALIFICATIONS OF Masters of, &c.).—There is in the Art. WRECK, an account of the annual average number of shipwrecks from 1793 to 1829, with a classified account of those in the last year. Since then, the number of these calamities has in no degree diminished. The following account, compiled from Lloyd's books, shows the amount of shipwreck, in so far as it can be ascertained, from the 1st of January, 1832, to the 30th of June, 1836. Statement of the Number of the Vessels lost, abandoned, broken up, &c. 345 unknown 139 unknown 464 unknown ditto 432 113,184 158 594 121,770 158 In 1832, actual losses, &c. from Lloyd's books 32,390 752 154,160 20,355 399 70,623 This account must not, however, be taken as fairly representing the total loss from shipwreck. The return as to foreign losses is too defective to be of the least value; and even as respects British shipping, such losses only are taken into account as are entered upon Lloyd's books, whereas it is well known that very many vessels are annually lost that are not entered in these books, and of which, consequently, no account is kept. But, such as it is, the above account shows, estimating the value of the wrecked ships and cargoes at the moderate rate of 187. a ton, that the pecuniary loss arising from the shipwreck of British vessels, in 1835, amounted to the immense sum of 2,191,8607. (121,770 × 18.) But the loss of property is less afflicting than the loss of life. In 1833, the crews of 38 ships were entirely drowned, while those of very many more partially shared the same fate. But, owing to the extent to which emigration has of late years been carried, and especially to the numbers of poor emigrants ready to embark in any ship, provided they get a cheap passage, the loss of crews is no criterion of the loss of life occasioned by shipwreck. Thus, in 1834, no fewer than 731 emigrants, bound for Canada, lost their lives by shipwreck, principally in the gulph and river of St. Lawrence (see vol. i., art. EMIGRANTS); and within the last few years there has been a still more lamentable waste of life, in consequence of the loss of convict ships bound for Australia. The frequency and amount of shipwreck is, indeed, quite appalling; and has at length begun forcibly to attract the public attention. It may be thought, perhaps, that these disasters are wholly ascribable to the perils incident to navigation, and that they are not really greater than might be expected to occur to a mercantile navy so extensive as that of England, whose flag is displayed on every sea, however remote or dangerous, but such is not really the case. If we suppose that a third part of the wrecks that have taken place of late years have been occasioned by the dangers of the sea, we believe we shall not be within, but beyond the mark. The other two thirds, or more, have originated in artificial causes, of which the principal have been the erroneous system adopted by the underwriters in the classification of ships, and the incompetency of the masters. 1. Old System for classifying Ships.-To insure a ship on right principles, or in such a way that the premium shall be the fair equivalent of the risk, is no easy matter. The risk depends partly on the condition of the ship and the capacity of the master and crew; partly on the nature of the cargo she is to take on board; and partly on the voyage she has to perform. The last two circumstances disclose themselves, and their influence may be appreciated at least with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes, without any difficulty; but it is far otherwise with the condition of the ship, and the capacity of the master and crew. It is essential to the adjusting of an insurance on fair terms, that these should be known; and it is, at the same time, exceedingly difficult to acquire any accurate information with respect to them. It is plain that there is but one mode in which any thing satisfactory can be learnt with respect to the condition of ships, and that is, by the inspection and examination of persons of competent information as to such matters. To acquire a just character at first, a ship should be repeatedly surveyed while she is being built; and to learn her condition at any subsequent period, some of the planks should be taken off, and her hull and rigging subjected to a thorough examination. This is the only method to be followed if we wish to arrive at results that may be safely depended on. The age of a ship should not be altogether overlooked in estimating her condition; but it is not a criterion that, taken by itself, is worth almost any thing. There is the greatest possible difference in the materials of which different ships are built, in the way in which they are built, and in the wear and tear to which they are exposed. Some have been so very bad, that they have actually gone to pieces on their first voyage; others, with difficulty, last for 3, 4, or 7 years; and others, again, run for 10, 15, and even 20 years, and upwards, with but little repair. It may be presumed that the condition of ships built of similar materials, on the same plan, and employed in the same departments of trade, will depend materially on their ages: but a thousand circumstances conspire to defeat this presumption; and it would be ludicrous to suppose that it should apply at all in the case of ships constructed of different materials, and engaged in different lines. But notwithstanding the criterion of age is thus really worth less than nothing as a rule by which to judge of a ship's condition, it is almost the only one that has been referred to in this country. From about the year 1760, or perhaps earlier, down to 1834, ships were arranged, by the underwriters at Lloyd's, in classes marked by the letters A, E, I, and O, and the figures 1, 2, and 3; the former referring to the hull of the ship, and the latter to the rigging. A ship marked A 1. was in the highest class; that is, her hull and rigging were both declared to be in the best condition; ships marked E 1. were in the next class; those marked I 1. were in the lowest available class, or that formed of such as were fit only for carrying coals, or other goods not liable to sea damage along the coast; ships marked O were unseaworthy. But to get into the highest class, no examination of the ship, or none worthy of the name, was required. Unless some very flagrant defect were obvious in their construction, all ships were entitled, when new, to be marked in the highest class; and they were entitled, whatever might be their real condition, to stand in it for a certain number of years, varying from 6 to 12, according to the port in which they happened to be built! It is not easy to imagine that any thing can be more absurd than such a classification; but the whole extent of the injury arising from it is not immediately obvious. The great majority of merchants and underwriters have not, and could not be expected to have, any personal knowledge of different ships, and have nothing to trust to but the classified accounts. Suppose, now, that two ships were built at the same time in London or any other port; that one was constructed of the best materials, and in the best way, while the other was constructed of the worst materials, and in the most defective manner: these two ships were placed side by side in the class A 1.; the underwriters, seeing them there, were ready, without further inquiry, to insure them at the same premium, and the merchants were, for the same reason, quite as willing to employ the one as the other! A bounty was thus given on the construction of what have been called slop-built ships, or ships of an inferior class. For a half, or, at most, two thirds, of what would be required to construct a good and really sufficient ship, a shipowner got an inferior vessel of an equal burthen sent to sea; and, owing to the matchless absurdity of the system of classification, the inferior was placed in the same rank with the superior ship; enjoyed all the advantages such distinction could give; and was, in the public estimation, deemed quite as good and as deserving of employment as the other. This has been a more copious source of shipwreck than all the currents, rocks, and fogs that infest our seas; but it was not the only one. At the end of a certain number of years, depending (as already stated) on the port where the ship was built, both the vessels referred to above were degraded to the class E; and yet it might happen, that the superior ship was, when so degraded, better entitled to continue in the class A than the inferior ship was ever to be in it. But even this does not exhaust the whole absurdity of this preposterous scheme, for VOL. II.-2 R |