reasonable, the happiness of the average individual is regarded, a restricted population, each member of which is in possession of considerable sources of pleasure, will be our aim.

§ 9. The Vagueness of Utilitarianism.

The earlier utilitarians, such as Paley and Bentham, regarded its superior clearness as one of the chief claims of their theory to the acceptance of practical people. Morality became almost a matter of demonstration. And even the chastened enthusiasm of Dr. Sidgwick regards utilitarianism as a clearer and more practical system than the intuitional morality which it was put forward to supplant.1

Indeed, one of the most effective arguments put forward by Professor Sidgwick is the cumulative proof that ordinary common sense morality is vague and uncertain, and that it naturally turns to utilitarianism to help it out.

We may ask to begin with, Why is it necessary that morality should be precise? Other arts besides the art of conduct are content to put up with a certain amount of uncertainty, e.g., politics, and the fine arts.2

It is only on the jural view of ethics, which throws all ethical principles into the form of rules,

1 There are, as we have just seen (p. 75), some Hedonists who do not regard pleasure as measurable, and reject the moral arithmetic of Bentham.

2

Cf. Aristotle, "Nic. Eth.," book i., chap. iii.

that the demand for precision arises.

And it is open

to question whether the highest kind of morality is compatible with ethical codification. Spontaneous impulse which has an important place in virtuous conduct does not easily admit of legal precision.

Then again, if we are to have rules, whatever these rules may be, we shall find much the same difficulty in bringing cases under them which common sense morality finds. Utilitarians have nearly the same difficulty in applying their maxims as other moralists have in applying their less pretentious ones. The casuistry of consequences is as difficult as any other casuistry.

Suppose I am in doubt as to some act, e.g., some deviation from veracity. I may consider the act proper to be done, because if the exact circumstances under which I am placed be taken into account, I should really desire all persons in like circumstances to act in the same way. But I may consider it not proper to be done, because my exact circumstances would never really be taken into account, men would do the act in less exceptional cases, and their love of veracity would get weakened. Which of these two considerations shall be regarded as preponderant will depend on the distance to which we trace the tendency of the act. There may be a clear gain of pleasure to myself in unveracity; and yet the second consideration may lead me to hesitate, for the real though less marked influence for evil on those who know me, and their example on others, may outweigh

the benefit to myself. Still, this influence on others, though at first disastrous, may eventuate in the rules as to veracity being altered, so that more accurate distinctions may be introduced, and the act which I actually did, and which I believe to be legitimate, viz., speaking an untruth under certain special circumstances, may be definitely permitted. This seems a clear gain; but reflection may show that such an alteration may tend to a general enfeeblement of morality, because every set of exceptions tends to weaken the influence of those main rules on which after all the fabric depends. Now each of these considerations applies to a greater number of persons than the preceding.

Myself benefited (1).

People hurt by my example (2).

People benefited by the alteration of the rule (3).

People hurt by the general enfeeblement of moral rules (4).

Each person is affected less, but it is quite possible that the increase in extension may much more than compensate for decrease in intension. We may stop at the level we have reached, practically assuming (as many conservative utilitarians do) that it can never be right to do anything which can possibly be misinterpreted by anybody, and that therefore it can never be

But we

right to try to alter rules of conduct at all. might go a step further, and urge (as many radical utilitarians do) that this weakening of positive conventional morality will eventuate in a higher and more enlightened morality avowedly based on utility; and this benefit affecting every member of society will absolutely outweigh all the disadvantages attending it.

This sort of see-saw, it may be said, is inevitable in all moral reasoning. But the chief point to be noticed is that the process is not mere see-saw; it lands us in one or other of two conclusions, one of which will justify no infringement of a rule, while the other will justify any infringement of a rule, and gives us no help to decide between them.

This it seems is the logical outcome of a method which professes to give results of a specially definite and practical kind.

§ 10. Evolutionary Hedonism.

At the end of chapter i. we saw that some thinkers regard the standard or criterion of good conduct to lie in conduciveness to the welfare of society; but that they assume that this will mean in the long run the happiness of all. For the supporters of this view pleasure is still the ultimate end; they are hedonists, but with a difference. They hold that pleasure for all must not be made the direct object of conduct. Our direct object should be the welfare of society, the increase of life of the organism in which we are, so to

speak, biological units or cells; and this will carry with it, at any rate when sufficiently advanced, increase of life for each, involving increase of happiness.

One objection to this theory lies in the assumption that the increased life of the whole involves increased life of the parts. In the development of an organic form, many cells, tissues, or organs (our biological metaphors are perhaps a little vague) must be degraded, or destroyed, in order that the development of the whole may take place. The most successful societies (quâ societies) that history tells us of are societies in which the individual consciousness has been most repressed by the forces of solidarity. The necessary economising of energy by habit and custom tends to the suppression of consciousness both in the individual and the society. The complete adaptation of society to its environment, carrying with it the complete adaptation of the individual to his, would mean, if we suppose it possible, the suppression of the higher forms of consciousness, reason, and will.

Such a complete adaptation is, however, unthinkable. Nor need the evolutionist necessarily assume it, if he posits social health as the end for each and all, irrespective of the pleasure which may or may not accompany it. But then he is left with no means of showing that such social welfare is desirable. He merely shows that it occurs. Desirable must mean desirable for some one.

Mr. Spencer and Mr. Leslie Stephen reject the moral arithmetic of Bentham and the orthodox utili