others. The practical danger, to most reflective men, rather lies in that refined sort of egoism which refuses to suffer sympathetic pain caused by depriving others of pleasures which are dangerous, or by inflicting pain which is salutary. There is, however, a special theoretical difficulty with regard to egoism as a speculative theory of Ethics.

Suppose I hold that the only right and reasonable end of conduct is my own happiness, and agree that normally my own happiness will be best secured by paying considerable attention to the happiness of others, may I assume that this will always be so and that the two will never be in final and irreconcilable rivalry? Self-sacrifice will not be reasonable, and therefore not right, for me if I find that it is ultimately antagonistic to my own happiness.

Religion steps in here with the rewards of a future life. And if we may go beyond the sphere of mere Ethics and take in theological considerations, these considerations will be of course overwhelming, at least in most cases. But the arguments for the existence of a God who punishes the guilty and rewards the innocent are not regarded as convincing by everyone, especially by those who are most likely to act in a selfish fashion. And theologians have so often taught that the allotment of heaven and hell will be decided by the acceptance or non-acceptance of certain metaphysical or theological beliefs, that even among Christians the ethical effectiveness of the appeal to a future life has been a good deal weakened.

Professor Sidgwick leaves the question unsettled in the last chapter of his "Methods of Ethics." The practical reason, that is, reason exercised on moral matters, seems to give us two conflicting intuitive judgments one of which asserts that it is reasonable and right to aim at our own happiness and not to ultimately and absolutely give that up for the benefit of anyone else; while the other asserts that we ought to sacrifice our own happiness when we can thereby secure a greater happiness for anyone else. Professor Sidgwick cannot see how these can be reconciled in a way which is entirely convincing to reason.

Most men doubtless make a venture of faith here. And in actual practice the importance of the question is slight. In scarcely any cases are the highest interests of self, even when estimated in terms of pleasure and pain, in irreconcilable conflict with those of others.

It is obvious that absolute altruism defeats itself. Self-sacrifice when carried to excess means the enfeeblement or even the destruction of those who practice it, and thus, theoretically speaking, can only lead in the long run to the increased predominance of egoism. This is urged very strongly by Mr. Spencer.2 But we must not forget that excess of altruism in the few may be in the highest degree useful to society, because the inducements to self-sacrifice are so much

1 This is the Dualism of the Practical Reason. See p. note, below.

98,

2 Data of Ethics ("Principles of Ethics," Part I.), pp. 196 seq.

feebler than the inducements to self-preservation, and, therefore, beautiful and fascinating examples of selfsacrifice are required to overcome the natural antipathy to suffering, and to produce even a quite moderate amount of altruism in ordinary men.

"The noblest gift a hero leaves his race
Is to have been a hero."

Mr. Spencer's other contention, that excessive altruism will only lead to the greater selfishness of those who are already selfish, and on whom benefits are heaped, may be dismissed as quite chimerical. higher altruism understands how to say No.

§ 6. Utilitarianism.

The

Utilitarianism is defined by Professor Sidgwick as "the ethical theory, that the conduct which, under any given circumstances, is objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole; that is, taking into account all whose interests are affected by the conduct." In short it is the theory which accepts as the end of conduct "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

This universalistic hedonism must be distinguished from egoistic hedonism, which regards my own happiness as the only rational end for me. The name, utilitarianism, popularized by J. S. Mill,1 has been some

1 Mill lays claim to being the first to adopt it. See "Utilitarianism,” ch. ii., p. 9, note. But Bentham was the real author; see Bowring's note in the "Deontology" (1834), vol. i., p. 287.

times applied to the latter as well as the former. And Bentham himself, as well as Paley and other writers, has used language which shows that he does not always clearly discriminate between them, e.g., " By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question."

We must, therefore, dissociate pure utilitarianism from the crypto-egoism of Hobbes and other writers. The obligation to do what promotes the general happiness according to them rests on the consequences which society attaches to our acts. In a state of nature, i.e., in the imaginary pre-social condition, "the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice." view comes to much the same thing as that of Thrasymachus in the "Republic"-that justice is the interest of the stronger, for that in all states justice is constituted by the interest of the government.1

This

Utilitarianism makes both the virtuousness and the obligation of a felicific act consequences of its felicific character.

By Bentham, Paley, Mill, and others of what we may call the more orthodox utilitarians, the happiness which is to be sought for each and all as far as Hobbes, "Leviathan," Part I., chap. xiii.; cf. Plato, "Republic," bk. i.

1

possible, is simply the sum of pleasures.

Happiness

means pleasure and nothing else. If we reckon pains as negative quantities of pleasures, we may call happiness the algebraical sum of pleasure.

Suppose that we substitute for this meaning of happiness the idea of welfare, goodness, or some other term into which non-hedonistic elements enter, we shall have a hybrid system which is no longer what Bentham propounded, and Mill (though inconsistently) professed.

It will make considerable difference in our results, whether or not we accept the view put forward by Bentham, and accepted by Professor Sidgwick, that all pleasures are homogeneous and commensurable and equally desirable. From this it will follow that "given equal amounts of pleasure pushpin is as good as poetry" (see above § 2). If, on the other hand, we do not analyse the idea of happiness into mere pleasure, or if while doing this we interpret pleasure in an ideal way, we are led to results which coincide with some forms of intuitionism. Thus the late T. H. Green identifies to a large extent the theory of utilitarianism as understood by Mill and George Eliot with his own ethical view. "We can only have the highest happiness . . . . by having wide thoughts, and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we would choose before everything else, because our souls see it is good."

1

Epilogue to "Romola."

G