the possibility of free choice, or (c) personal ascendency. This last can hardly be admitted as a bar to responsibility in the case of adults who are compos mentis, excepting in the form of hypnotic suggestion. The "tyranny of the fixed idea," whether suggested by others or arising from within, certainly destroys the liberty of choice. But as the passive co-operation of the patient is at first necessary, the responsibility is merely transferred further back to the time when the individual originally submitted himself to the ascendency of the hypnotizer or the incendiary orator.

(4) The presence of adequate moral motive in the shape of moral feeling, which is not necessarily implied by the normal development of the intellectual faculties. The moral idiot is incapable of social sympathy or other unselfish impulses.1

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Havelock Ellis, "The Criminal," pp. 229-231.

CHAPTER IV.

HEDONISTIC THEORIES.

§ 1. The Hedonistic Calculus.

In chapter ii. we have already discussed some of the fundamental points which lie at the basis of any hedonistic theory of ethics. It has been pointed out that pleasure is an abstraction, that we do not commonly desire pleasure, and that if we did this would not prove that pleasure is itself desirable. Let us waive these considerations and consider in detail some of the assumptions made by the scientific hedonists.

Pleasures are commonly regarded as capable of rough quantitative treatment. We speak of one pleasure as being greater than another. The hedonists as a rule try to make this quantitative treatment precise. They assume that there is such a thing as a unit of pleasure, and that units of pleasure can be added, subtracted, and multiplied. Regarded by itself, and without reference to other pleasures and pains which may accompany it, the value (i.e., desirability) of a pleasure depends according to Bentham on its (1) intensity, (2) duration, (3) certainty, and (4) proximity. Proximity resolves itself into certainty, and certainty only affects

The

the estimate of a pleasure not yet present. two most important circumstances are intensity and duration.

(i.) Bentham and his followers assume that the "intensity of a pleasure can be balanced against its duration." This is indeed commonly believed by the plain man. to be possible in a rough way. But if we want to base a scientific theory of morals on it we must be more precise. It implies the notion of a unit of pleasure, which is not a really possible conception. The pleasure of eating an ounce of chocolate is not an invariable quantity, but depends on psychological factors which vary constantly. For instance, the unit of pleasure varies with the antecedent desire; the eagerness of pursuit determines the pleasure of attainment as frequently as the anticipated pleasure of attainment determines the eagerness of pursuit. Setting aside this difficulty in the conception of a unit of pleasure, we note that Bentham and other scientific hedonists assume that if we have a units of pleasure

where n is any integer. It does not seem that this is really so. Are five minutes with a certain intensity of pleasure equivalent to an hour with just one-twelfth the same intensity of pleasure; even if we suppose that no disturbing feelings of ennui, etc., enter? Suppose a man has twenty years of life, and is capable of a units of pleasure in each day. Is it a matter of in

difference, from a purely hedonistic standpoint, whether he has (disregarding leap years) 20 x 365 x a units of pleasure in one day, and no pleasure every other day for the rest of his life, that is for 20 x 365-1 days, or whether he has just a units of pleasure for 20 × 365 days?

(ii.) That pains must be regarded as negative quantities of pleasure. This again seems open to question. It does not on reflection appear clear that 2 units of pleasure + units of paina units of pleasure. A glass of ginger beer unaccompanied by the toothache seems to me out of all proportion pleasanter than a glass of champagne accompanied by ever so mild a twinge while drinking it. Pain appears to have a very real character of its own, and to entirely elude all attempts to take it as merely neutralizing pleasure. And the same thing is true of pleasure: it does not merely neutralize an equivalent amount of pain. x units of pleasure experienced along with a units of pain will be felt as a mixture of pleasure and pain, but with the pain largely preponderating. It will certainly not be felt as a state of neutral excitement.

§ 2. The Commensurability of Pleasures. (iii.) That all pleasures are commensurable. This supposes that the distinction between true and false, real and unreal pleasures, is invalid. We cannot hold with Plato that there are some pleasures which are in

1

1 Cf. "Philebus."

their own nature false because they depend on groundless anticipation of other pleasure. With Protarchus in the "Philebus " we must believe that the falsity lies in the opinion and not in the actual pleasure. Even in the case of "impure" pleasures, pleasures which are mixed with pains, the element of falsity lies in the judgment and not in the pleasure itself. Pleasures exist as they are felt; their intensity is what it appears to be. The judgment passed at the time is the only valid one; and although subsequent experience may show that the pleasure is less than we expected, or that the pleasure is inevitably attended with pain, this reflection does not invalidate the original contemporary judgment that this state is truly and really pleasant.

A more important matter is this, that the hedonistic calculus, Bentham's moral arithmetic, involves the reduction of all qualitative differences in any pleasures into quantitative. It is not open to a consistent hedonist to say with Mill1 that "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." We may,

as systematic empirical hedonists, hold that "it is quite compatible with the principle of utility [i.e., empirical hedonism] to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others." But only in so far as the difference of quality can be expressed as a difference of quantity. We may admit that a unit of pleasure of one kind Mill, "Utilitarianism," chap. ii.

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