182

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on us by a command of wider area than Law. Law by means of sanctions,

or producing external acts; the next. M and aim at producing or repressinious and the most and thought, i.e., character. It das not the only

sanctions in some

and motive. saw that the Ethics deals with conduct viewed rely, or even reference to external codes. Jurisprudenc the codes enforced by the political organs The actual content of Law is often, and indeed imperfectly moral; because Law can only take of such elements of conduct as are amenable to Fonter

God

od for

God's

treatment. We cannot have definite evider motives, or other states of consciousness; and ex punishments cannot be relied on to alter them. conduct which I believe to be best may be in ad of that which Law orders, though of the same kin it may be at variance with Law.

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ans.

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Morality follows Law in so far as Morality enf obedience to laws already made. It goes further, "clothes the bare skeleton of law;" it "regul actions in conformity with the relations which act law has introduced." And as Morality largely co sists in ideally perfecting these relations it prepares the way for fresh legislation, and regulates the making of new rules. Thus the interaction of Law and Morality is twofold. To the young, and the morally backward, Law serves as a moral code; the good transcend this code; as society improves, acts which were left to the operation of the social sanction are gradually brought into the sphere of legal punishment,

In the same way it led to do to-day what a century right conduct more strid as an act of more than ordinary

and conscience, and

ideals. It has insant distinction exists between Law and Law seldom rewards; and on the imp regard to merit.

C

Positive

to particular ns are almost exclusively painful. instead of hy rewards as well as punishes. Those evil sources, is hich are punished both by the civil magistrate will to c by public opinion are crimes; those which are Fina punished by the former but only by the latter are in then called vices, though this usage of the word is not the okays strictly observed. There is thus nothing and cactly answering on the side of virtue to the term

me: that is, there are no acts which the State bitually and regularly rewards as a matter of course. Secial honours and gifts to successful soldiers or to Leave firemen and other heroes in civil life are not mentwarded with sufficient regularity and certainty to rule nstitute an exception; nor are they awarded by the tive egular State tribunals acting as such. The virtues by of temperance, justice, prudence, and benevolence are seldom if ever considered as deserving or requiring recognition by the State. The religious and social sanctions are usually sufficient to secure a fair average degree of excellence in these aspects of conduct.

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§ 3. Obedience to Law.

Is it ever right to disobey the Law? From the Utilitarian point of view the question must be solved

by a consideration of the relative advantages and disadvantages of disobedience to an unjust law. Setting aside the direct personal consequences to ourselves and those who imitate us, that is, the legal punishment we incur, we see that all disobedience involves the further evil of weakening the respect for Law and the habit of obedience in ourselves and others; it brings society, as Hobbes urged, a step nearer anarchy. On the other hand the conditions of our act may be such that this danger may be reduced to a minimum; our act may be known only to a few, or the line we purpose to follow may be quite unlikely to commend itself to persons of a lawless character. These conditions, however, seldom obtain, and the Utilitarian will feel that the balance of advantage in favour of disobedience must be very decided to justify resort to it. Nevertheless when there is a decided opposition between positive Morality and Law, and the collective. conscience is more likely to be scandalized by obedience than by disobedience, he may feel that the risk is worth running, and he may hope that his disobedience and the punishment which it brings on him may incidentally lead to a change in the Law.

The Intuitionist, especially if he regards conscience as a divinely given and inspired guide will necessarily assert that its dicta are absolutely binding even in opposition to Law and positive Morality. But he will remember that Law is on the whole the outcome of the conscience of the community, that to prefer his own. moral perceptions when in opposition to those of

others is dangerous, because self-love and other still more subtle emotions may easily bias his judgment without being recognized and discounted. If his conviction of the duty of disobedience is not of the strongest he will be influenced by the same kind of comparison of relative disadvantages as the Utilitarians. If he feels overwhelmingly certain of the duty of disobedience he will disobey, no matter at what cost. Thus the chance of conflict is greater in his case. It is this occasionally anti-legal tendency of the intuitional and theological Ethics which leads Hobbes to call the doctrine, that "whatever a man does against his conscience is sin," a "doctrine subversive of civil society."

§ 4. Casuistry.

1 وو

In the systematization of morality, casuistry has borne an important part. Growing up as a consequence of the penitential system of the Catholic Church, it has its justification in the jural view of morality. If moral truths are expressed as a system of laws, we must assume that they are continuous and consistent. The application of these laws to particular cases of difficulty which either do not appear to fall under any rule, or else appear to fall under two or more conflicting rules, is the object of the science of casuistry. Such "cases of con

2

2 "Cases of conscience are those in which conflicting duties and conflicting rules are weighed deliberately, the time and

science" had of course constantly occurred, but when private confession became frequent, regular, and compulsory, need was felt for authoritative and systematic treatment of them. Many of the great thirteenth and fourteenth-century theologians wrote books on moral theology; and different schools gradually developed, some leaning towards rigorism and others taking wider and less exacting views. The dislike of Protestants and liberal Roman Catholics to the system of casuistry is due to (1) its connection with the practice of compulsory confession and of "direction," in which the individual gives up the control of his conduct more or less entirely to the guidance of an expert; (2) its substitution of a formal obedience to rule for a living effort after the best possible conduct. If it be true that only that conduct is good for me which I believe to be right in my own conscience, mere acceptance of the rules of morality cannot be morality; mere material rightness is not rightness at all (chap. iii. § 2). On the other hand, it must be remembered that mere formal rightness will not do. We want to know our duty; and we cannot, even

1

circumstances allowing of this. Cases of necessity are those in which a man is compelled to violate common duties and common rules by the pressure of extreme danger or fear." Whewell, "Elements of Morality," bk. iii., chap. xv.

1 The revolt against theological experts was one of the central features of the Reformation. With a translation of the Bible in his hand, and the grace of God in his heart, there was nothing worth knowing which the ordinary man thought he could not know for himself.