as pleasure giving. These two concessions in point of fact give up the very point at issue. If in these two cases it is possible to desire something else than pleasure, clearly the allegation that all conduct is directed towards self-gratification falls to the ground. Dr. Bain now indeed allows the existence of a rhythm in consciousness between extra-regarding and selfregarding impulses. But it is a somewhat bizarre view of human nature which suggests that all altruistic conduct and a great deal which is neither altruistic nor egoistic is irrational, and is due to a morbid volitional condition akin to that which leads a weak man to throw himself over a cliff, or a hypnotic patient to try to swim for his life when he is sprawling on my turkey carpet. There is no need for such a violent hypothesis. The existence of altruistic feel ings is as obvious, and lutionary principles, as feelings. 1 as easily explained on evothe existence of egoistic Of course in a sense all my desires are selfish because they are mine, because they aim at securing objects of the need of which I am conscious and not you. But in this sense all my thoughts are selfish because they are mine. It seems more satisfactory to restrict the term to desires which directly aim at what will give us pleasure because it will give us pleasure, to acts in which "the ego is not only the source of the volition but also its object." The attempt to represent the martyr as enduring the 1 Spencer, "Principles of Ethics," vol. i., pp. 203 seq. agonies of martyrdom for the sake of the intense spiritual pleasure which accompanies them, is a very poor psychological joke. § 8. Motive and Intention. There is considerable uncertainty in the use of these two words. Austin, whose analysis is of course made from the point of view of the lawyer, defines motive as "a wish causing or preceding a volition," in other words, as equivalent to definite desire. And by intention he means the expected effect of an action, whether wished or merely expected. Thus intention includes those consequences which we would rather did not happen, as well as those which we wish to produce. If nausea is an inevitable consequence of my taking a dose of medicine, and I know it, I intend the nausea, though I do not wish it. This refinement in the meaning is not quite in keeping with ordinary usage. When we speak of intention we ordinarily mean the intended and desired effects of an action. Motive is thus reserved for the mainly emotional condition, "the conscious impulse to action, whether desire or aversion," as Professor Sidgwick defines it, while intention is reserved for the objective effects aimed at. Motive is, however, often used for the end aimed at, the idea of the object desired, instead of the impulse itself. It is so employed, for instance, by Mr. Muirhead, who defines motive as "the idea of the object which, through congruity with the character of the self, moves the will."1 It seems unsatisfactory to give up a meaning which, on the whole, was a convenient one, and which was accepted by lawyers as well as moralists. But the transition from one meaning to the other is not uncommon in ordinary usage, and can be easily accounted for. In the words of Professor Sully, "A motive is a desire viewed in its relation to a particular represented action, to the carrying out of which it urges or prompts. The desire in this case ceases to be a vague, fluctuating state of longing, and becomes fixed and defined as an impulse to realize a definite concrete experience, viz., the known and anticipated result of a particular action; or, since the object of desire is now fore-grasped as the certain result of a particular active exertion, it assumes the form of the end of this action." 2 It should be noticed that we seldom, if ever, act from a single motive. Dr. Sidgwick's emancipated Jew, who eats bacon from a "desire to vindicate true religious liberty combined with a liking for pork,” is a type of most good men. It is not so much the martyr as the madman whose motive is absolutely single. Even when we overrule an impulse it usually helps to colour the imperious and predominant feeling which led to its suppression. These considerations are important in 1 "Elements of Ethics," p. 58. 2 "Human Mind," vol. ii., p. 208. connection with Dr. Martineau's special form of intuitionism already alluded to." § 9. Freedom of the Will. The chief question which ethics raises with regard to the will is not so much a psychological as a metaphysical one. Psychology cannot settle the freedom of the will, because like all other sciences psychology must assume the validity of the categories of thought. It must take notice of the "consciousness of freedom" which we undoubtedly have, and it may explain how this consciousness arises, but it cannot settle the validity of the apparent intuition, although, as Dr. Sully rightly says, such a genetic explanation "would manifestly cut away the psychological ground of the common form of the doctrine of liberty." The question must be left over to the domain of metaphysic, which deals with the final concepts of different departments of knowledge, and examines the assumptions made not only in ordinary thought but in the systematic thinking of the sciences. 2 What is meant by calling the will free? (1) That we are free to act as we please, that we can will to act as we see fit to act, that we can will to act as we see it is reasonable to act. This asserts the dependence of volition on thought, but not that 1 See above, chap. v., § 3. 2 "Human Mind," vol. ii., p. 365. volition is caused by thought. When the volition is in agreement with our judgment the volition is free. (2) There is a reference to an I-myself. This, however, is the empirical self, the group of psychological actualities and possibilities which we have come to know as we have come to know other objects of experience. Whether we imply a further and more intimate reference to the pure self, the metaphysical assumption which we seem driven to make as a necessary basis for all psychological explanation, is another matter. Without attempting a full examination of the question1 we may note the following points. (1)" The assumption of free-will is in a certain sense inevitable to anyone exercising rational choice." 2 This is admitted by the Determinists but explained away. It merely means that I can act as I please; the action is my action, determined by my nature as a whole and not by any external force or by any one part of my nature to the exclusion of the rest. "The sense of freedom is the realization of the function of consciousness in its most complex and impressive manifestation." "3 (2) The purely phenomenalist psychology of Mill and his school has completely broken down. We are obliged to allow that there is something in mind besides ideas and motives, viz. the attending mind 1 See Appendix A, p. 199, for a full list of authorities. 2 3 Sully, "Human Mind," vol. ii., p. 293. |