controversy is very limited; and further, that whether satisfactory or not, such consensus of experts is all that the average man (or, indeed, any man) has to go on in medicine, law, politics, theology, or science. There is no absolute in knowledge nor in action. "Probability," as Bishop Butler says, "is the guide of life." Be it observed that every thoughtful man is to some extent an expert in matters of conduct, and is entitled to weigh his opinion with that of others. But he will give chief consideration to the maxims drawn by induction from the almost infinite moral observation of the whole human race, checking these by the criticism of poets, and saints, and philosophers. There is, however, no absolute authority in art or in morals as there is in law. The question is always liable to be re-opened, for there is no fixed. court of appeal whose decision is necessarily right because it is final.

This ethical method differs from the jural method because it does not pre-suppose the existence of absolute rules. There is no doubt in every doubtful case a way which is, on the whole, the best, if we can only arrive at it; but there is seldom some general formula which is applicable to this case to the exclusion of all other formulas. Our actual solution of the difficulty is almost bound to be to some extent unsatisfactory.

§ 11. Objections to the Esthetic View. (1.) To this view the first obvious objection is that the analogy between art and morality is misleading. The artist must produce something; he must have something to show for his labour. But, in reply, it may be said that all arts do not terminate in the production of a visible or tangible object. The executive musician and the actor are acknowledged to be artists; and it must be allowed that a good deed is as much an object as a beautiful tune improvised by a musician and incapable of exact repetition, or an admirable performance on the stage.

(2.) The mention of the actor suggests another objection. It will be said that this view makes the appearance the chief thing. Morality becomes on this system a mere performance. The moral artist will aim at the production of external effects, and will be no more bound to really be what he appears to be than is the dramatic artist.

In reply, it must be at once conceded that the danger of make-believe and hypocrisy will exist. The inferior artist is always liable to put forward work which looks right, but will not bear the inspection of experts. But that danger exists on any system of morality, nor would the aesthetic attitude materially increase the temptation. The truly beautiful conduct, the only conduct which the artist will aim at producing, is conduct which is beautiful in motive, intention, and execution. An act externally beautiful,

yet not done from a high motive, is not morally admirable in a marked degree. If a merchant gives one of his clerks £5 at Christmas through some mistake which he cannot easily put right without appearing mean, his generosity is obviously only in appearance ; if he gives the £5 because he thinks he will get more work out of the clerk, although the act is not disgraceful, it is not a brilliant example of moral beauty; if, however, the employer gives his Christmas-box with the hope that the young man will misuse itget drunk, and justify his dismissal-the act is morally ugly. In other words, certain internal conditions, such as the motive and intention, are part of the beautiful object which the artist in conduct seeks to produce. And so Aristotle lays down.1

(3.) Another objection has already been suggested. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the æsthetic aspects of character which are not moral and those that are. There is a certain splendour and fascination about great criminals; the life of a Borgia has been called "beautiful as a tempest.' The career of a Napoleon seems more beautiful than that of the industrious citizen who fulfils all his everyday duties with cheerfulness and patience.

2

The reply to this lies partly in the contrast between the real ethical beauty as recognized by the expert, and the imperfect ethical beauty which appeals to the

1 "Nic. Eth.," II. iv.

2 See Sidgwick's address to Ethical Society at Cambridge ("Spectator," Aug. 11th, 1888).

K

insensitive and the thoughtless. There are some excellencies which appeal to all-such as dashing courage, constant activity, brilliant resourcefulness, good-natured though momentary liberality. That these are virtues the expert does not deny; but he recognizes their partial character, and their frequent incompatibility with more important virtues.

If cruel vindictiveness or selfish lust is said to be an artistically beautiful motive, this is probably because we do not put ourselves into close enough relation with the case. We do not adequately realize what must be the interior of a mind in which this emotion is supreme. We do not picture clearly the daily conduct of a person actuated by such an impulse.

Then there is the glamour of successful achievement which is not a reason for moral approval; but which produces a feeling easily confounded with it. Besides, there is the fact that our approved moral ideals sometimes are unduly lacking in the more active and spontaneous elements which once formed part of them, and which the common sense of mankind still admires. Our moral taste, by a natural reaction from the romantic and military and saintly ideals, has become a little bourgeois. The well-behaved classes are just now apt to canonize successful merchants, and to look askance at successful soldiers. It seems as though this onesidedness, against which the instincts of the crowd have in their crude fashion been a natural protest, were likely to be corrected.

It is clear that on the aesthetic system which

regards moral excellence as akin to beauty, and regards good conduct as an art, the term right undergoes some change in meaning. There is no conduct

which here and now can be known as the absolutely and materially right. But we may be able to say with sufficient definiteness that "this conduct is the

best open to us, it will avoid more evil and secure more good than any other possible conduct, so far as can be foreseen."

In this way we comply with Professor Sidgwick's dictum: "That there is in any given circumstances some one thing which ought to be done and that this can be known, is a fundamental assumption made not by philosophers only, but by all men who perform any processes of moral reasoning.'

This is what we find in the case of other arts; we can never say a particular picture is absolutely right; but we can as a rule decide which picture of several is on the whole the best, considering the conditions under which it is produced. This is best in colour, that in drawing; this in beauty of style, that in earnestness of treatment. So of acts, we cannot say that any act is absolutely right; but this is best in purity of motive, that in prudence of conception; this in cheerfulness of sacrifice, that in equity of purpose.

Thus, too, there remains no categorical imperative. All imperatives are hypothetical. The idea of the

1

"Methods," bk. i., p. 6 (1st edition). The passage is now omitted; but Dr. Sidgwick apparently does not consider the alteration of material importance.