"1. There are some things in human conduct that merit approbation and praise, others that merit blame and punishment; and different degrees either of approbation or of blame, are due to different actions.

"2. What is in no degree voluntary can neither deserve moral approbation nor blame.

"3. What is done from unavoidable necessity may be agreeable or disagreeable, useful or hurtful, but cannot be the object either of blame or of moral approbation.

"4. Men may be highly culpable in omitting what they ought to have done, as well as in doing what they ought not.

"5. We ought to use the best means we can to be well informed of our duty.

"6. It ought to be our most serious concern to do our duty as far as we know it, and to fortify our minds against every temptation to deviate from it."

B. Relating to "particular branches of virtue:""1. We ought to prefer a greater good, though more distant, to a less; and a less evil to a greater. 2. As far as the intention of nature appears in the constitution of man, we ought to comply with that intention, and to act agreeably to it.

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"3. No man is born for himself only.

"4. In every case we ought to act that part towards another which we would judge to be right in him to act toward us, if we were in his circumstances and he in ours.

"5. To every man who believes the existence, the perfection, and the providence of God, the veneration and submission we owe to him is self-evident." (Works, ed. Hamilton, pp. 637-640.)

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C. There is a third class which expresses the relations existing between different kinds of good conduct or to use Reid's own words: "There is another class of axioms in morals by which, when there seems to be an opposition between the actions that different virtues lead to, we determine to which the preference is due." Such are the following: (a) "Unmerited generosity should yield to gratitude, and both to justice."

(b) “Unmerited beneficence to those who are at ease should yield to compassion to the miserable, and external acts of piety to works of mercy" (pp. 635-640).

It is characteristic of Reid's want of consistency that this last axiom, or first principle, which he expressly tells us is self-evident, should be (in the very same sentence) deduced from another still more ultimate principle:-" Because God loves mercy better than sacrifice."

This dogmatic intuitionism is essentially unphilosophical. The thinker naturally attempts to systematize and analyze; to reduce his number of principles to the fewest possible, and to exhibit the whole in a connected form. Accordingly, we can scarcely point to any philosopher who has rested content with the system which seems natural enough to the unreflective

morality of common sense.1 The preacher and the teacher, whose aim is practical, are the natural upholders of dogmatic intuitionism.

We may state in the words of Locke the essential point of what is called

§ 5. Philosophic Intuitionism.

"The idea of a supreme being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea of ourselves as understanding, rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place morality among the sciences capable of demonstration: wherein, I doubt not, that from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out, to anyone that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences." (Essay, bk. iv., chap. iii., $ 18.)

This statement clearly places ethics on the foundation of theology; and Dr. Clarke lays down the main positions of his system in close connection with certain theological propositions :

"The same necessary and eternal different relations that different things bear to one another; and the same

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Even Reid's discussion shows the beginning of such an attempt.

consequent fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another; with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself, to choose to act only what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe; ought likewise constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings to govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public in their respective stations. That is, these eternal and necessary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures so to act; they cause it to be their duty or lay an obligation upon them so to do, even separate from the consideration of these rules being the positive will or command of God; and also antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehension of any particular private and personal advantage or disadvantage, reward or punishment, either present or future; annexed either by natural consequence, or by positive appointment, to the practising or neglecting of those rules." (Boyle Lectures, 1705, p. 176, 9th edition.) In other words, there are between things certain ultimate relations existing; amongst them are certain relations we call moral, and these moral relations subsist apart from the direct command of God, in consequence of the existence of the objects of thought themselves. As examples of such ultimate and unalterable relations Clarke cites several theological propositions; e.g., "that God is infinitely superior to men," and "that men should honour, worship, obey,

and imitate God;" and several ethical ones, e.g., "that all men should endeavour to promote the universal good and welfare of all." From the apprehension of these truths follow corresponding obligations. (1.) "That we must honour and worship God."

(2. "That we so deal with every man as in like circumstances we could reasonably expect he should deal with us" (Rule of equity); and "that we endeavour by a universal benevolence to promote the welfare and happiness of all men " (Rule of love).

(3.) "That every man preserve his own being as long as he is able, and take care to keep himself at all times in such temper and disposition both of body and mind as may best fit him to perform his duty." From this rule of sobriety flow the duties of temperance, selfrestraint, contentment, and (apparently) courage and prudence, though Clarke does not explicitly mention them (p. 209).

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Putting aside his rule of piety, as belonging to the sphere of religion rather than that of morality, we note that the third rule-that of sobriety-involves a reference to duty as determined independently of it; the third rule is dependent on the second. fessor Sidgwick regards the first branch of the second rule, viz., that of equity, as equivalent to the statement (so far as altruistic action goes) that "if we assert any action to be right, we imply that it would be right for all persons in precisely similar circumstances; " that is, to an assertion of the objectivity of morality.

This axiom, says Dr. Sidgwick, is implied in all