watched the conservative tendencies of venerable institutions in this country will not be surprised to hear that in adopting these inventions we were somewhat slower than our enterprising rivals and neighbours; old traditions rather stood in the way, and a mass of material in the shape of numerous magnificent ships, types representing all our ancient glories, although not adapted for the new power, were yet too valuable, in their old associations and in their huge cost, to be easily relinquished or cast aside as no longer contributing to our naval greatness. The course adopted, one always recommended and too generally followed in cases of difficulty, was to stand still,' 'wait and see.' This being the epoch which it is proposed to consider as the startingpoint from which originated the Navy of England in its present condition, we must begin by shewing what was the relative power of the two great European navies at this juncture. The comparison must necessarily be limited in detail to the respective forces of France and England, the proximity of the two Powers to each other allowing but little time for calling out latent resources, and the number of ships available for service constituting the main strength of their respective fleets. On the other hand, the great naval power of the United States was still held largely in reserve, according to their old traditions, and claimed consideration and respect more from the excellence of its individual ships than from the numbers it had afloat or ready for sea. An investigation of a somewhat confidential character was at this date (1858)* ordered by the Government of the day, into the comparative strength of the French and English Navies. This most important paper was communicated to the public with some omissions, and we have extracted one of the most remarkable tables it contains, as calculated in a special manner to throw light on the trustworthiness of the assertion made by Mr. Goschen as to our naval greatness with reference to the past. This table, to be found at page 15, follows:

is as

See Parliamentary Paper, No. 182, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 4th April, 1859.

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The

The Report points out that England and France had at this moment precisely the same number of steam line-of-battle ships completed, that France had eight more steam frigates completed; that, when the ships now in progress are finished, England will have ten steam line-of-battle ships more than France, and France will have twelve steam frigates more than England; and that the five French ships (building) are in a much more forward state, and represent more work actually executed, than the ten English.

This result was hardly satisfactory. In the application of the new propelling agent to its larger and more powerful ships France had decidedly the start of England, and there could be little doubt that the Navy which then possessed the greater number of well-designed ships of war propelled by the screw was the master of the sea.

From this Report it is clear that in 1858 the 'wait and see' policy had brought about a state of affairs in which the Navy of England could scarcely claim even an equality of force with that of France; that whereas, at the outbreak of the revolutionary war, England possessed 145 sail of the line, France 77; in 1850, England possessed 86 line-of-battle ships, and France 45; in 1858, the number of available line-of-battle ships of each country (that is, of ships fitted with the screw) was exactly equal, viz. 29; while it was estimated that at the rate of progress making in each country in 1861, 43 English line-of-battle ships, and 40 French, would be ready for sea.

The large number of sailing ships which England still reckoned as effective portions of her maritime power had lost their value, and even that division of the steam fleet which was propelled by paddle-wheels, could not hope to contend successfully with the numerous artillery placed in ships whose motivepower was entirely below water, and practically out of reach of the projectiles of that day. Startling as must have been the sentences we have already given from the Report, there was something in it still more ominous: France is building four iron-sided ships, England none.' It is stated that two of these iron-sided ships are more than half completed; that, in the opinion of French naval officers, they are irresistible, and that no more line-of-battle ships will be laid down. So that, in 1861, in addition to the forty line-of-battle ships already referred to, France would possess four iron-sided ships ready for sea, and England none. This was a matter for serious reflection; the maritime supremacy of England was doubtless endangered: not only had France established a momentary equality with her rival in the number and quality of her screw ships of war, but had begun

begun and partially completed four vessels of a new type, evidently destined to revolutionise naval warfare and to render almost useless the larger part of the immense material possessed by Great Britain. It would be satisfactory if we could shew that even at this juncture the conduct of those who were responsible for the administration of naval affairs was marked with foresight and decision, and that, frankly appreciating the bold stroke for naval supremacy which had given our rivals a very considerable start of us, they had closed with the irresistible logic of facts, and devoted all the energies and talents of our naval architects and engineers to regaining a superiority in the engines of naval warfare which for a moment, we had undoubtedly lost. The Government, however, in consequence of this Report, thought it right to push forward the conversion of every available sailing lineof-battle ship and frigate into screw ships; and not deterred by the pregnant remark in the Report, that in ten years line-of-battle ships would be obsolete, proceeded to order the construction of new and well-designed screw line-of-battle ships as fast as workmen and materials could be provided for their advancement. While thus expending with a lavish hand large amounts in types of ships which had evidently passed away, the Admiralty, with much hesitation and doubt, took up the subject of ironclad ships of war. In the same month, April 1859, that this Report was made public, the Warrior' was ordered to be built, and six months afterwards the Black Prince.' In December 1859, two smaller and very inferior ships of the same type were ordered, the Defence' and 'Resistance.'

This hesitation offered a great contrast to the decided action of the French Government, which, in addition to the four ironclads already in course of construction, commenced six additional ships during this year, 1859.

It is hardly within the scope of the design of this article to enter into a discussion of the merits of the respective ironclads designed by France and England. It has always been a question open to doubt whether the specific advantages of iron construction, speed, size, power of proceeding under sail, and comfort of the officers and men in the Warrior,' were not more than counterbalanced by the handiness, complete protection afforded by the armour-plating (especially with reference to the rudder and steering gear), larger quantity of fuel in proportion to horsepower, less draught of water and less cost of the 'Gloire'; but no such doubt could exist when a comparison was instituted between the 'Gloire' and her three consorts, and the 'Defence' and Resistance.' Inferior in speed under steam as well as in carrying power, and totally deficient in protection for their extremities,

extremities, they had the one advantage of being built of iron instead of wood. If, however, the first four French ironclads, the 'Gloire,' 'Invincible,' 'Normandie,' Couronne' (this latter was built of iron), were, taken together, rather more than a match for the four first English ironclads, the Warrior,' the 'Black Prince,' the Defence,' and the 'Resistance'; it must further be remembered that France had completed the last ordered of her four ships in March 1862, England had not completed hers till October 1862, and the two first ordered French ironclads were both ready for sea in October 1861, at which time England had only completed the 'Warrior.' To recapitulate, in 1858 France commenced four ironclads; in 1859, six. In 1858, England commenced none. In 1859 she commenced four ironclads, and, following these ships to their completion, France had ready for sea, by May 1863, ten ironclad ships, at which date England had completed five, one of these a wooden ship; and, though four of the ten French ironclads were not sea-going cruisers, they were (against the artillery of that day) powerful armoured vessels, well adapted either for the defence of their own harbours or the attack of an enemy's. We have seen that France began her ironclads in 1858, and England hers in the following year. The decision arrived at, that these ships should be built of iron, inevitably compelled the entrusting their construction to the ironship builders in the private trade, as they alone had the requisite plant and properly skilled labour. The dockyards had neither the one nor the other. It was of much importance to the Government to get these ironclads rapidly completed; every one felt uneasy, not to say impatient, until we had recovered the start which had given our neighbours so considerable an advantage, and great efforts were made to induce eminent shipbuilders, to whom these vessels were entrusted, to complete them in the shortest possible space of time. But insuperable difficulties beset the contractors on every side: the unexampled solidity of the construction required by the Admiralty designers, the superior quality of the iron to be used, exacted by their officers, the extreme difficulty experienced in procuring armour plates, which seriously retarded the progress of our ironclad ships, are briefly adverted to, not for the purpose of blaming the ship-builders and manufacturers employed by the Government (they indeed strained every nerve, and liberally expended their capital in strenuous efforts to meet their engagements), but to teach the lesson so often overlooked or forgotten, that nothing can be extemporised in naval affairs; and to shew the danger which a country like England depending on her Navy incurs, if any Power be allowed to get a start or to take a lead in the application of science to the construction

construction of ships of war. Both countries had had the experience of the Crimean War to teach them that thick iron could be successfully applied to the sides of ships with a view of resisting the penetration of projectiles, but while in France the Emperor, under the wise counsels of M. Dupuy de Lôme, caused a careful series of experiments to be made, encouraged the manufacture of armour-plates, had their qualities severely tested, and was in consequence, in 1858, prepared to proceed with the construction of ironclad ships; we, in England, after a few desultory and unsatisfactory experiments, had allowed the whole subject to drop, and had, in 1859, to begin from the very beginning, trying experiment after experiment only to fail, and doing at last in haste, and under pressure, what our rivals had accomplished at leisure and with deliberation.

The revolution going on in the construction and rifling of heavy ordnance was also a cause of delay to our constructions, which France in some measure avoided. The system of construction and rifling which she adopted after careful trial she still maintains; but we were not so fortunate, and some of our earlier ironclads underwent no less than three changes of armament. Designed for smooth-bore 68-pounders, they passed through a phase of breech-loading Armstrong rifled guns, which, being found unsuitable, had to be removed, and service, or Woolwich rifled guns, to be supplied in their place.

It is not our purpose to enter into a history of the battle of the guns, that has yet to be written; * and it will be an instructive lesson in the art of, how not to do it; an art frequently, be it said, practised under our system of Parliamentary Government, often in consequence of the interference of that august body with executive functions. The relative positions of the two countries with respect to the ironclads which they had completed in 1863 having been shewn, namely, six French seagoing ironclads and four floating batteries of the new construction against five English sea-going ironclads and no floating batteries of new construction, we must pass in review, with but few remarks, the numbers ordered up to this date by each nation, but not yet completed; they were sixteen English and seventeen French. As regards the designs of the two navies, France was increasing her force by adding a large number of ships of somewhat similar construction and dimensions to those she already possessed, securing thus the great advantage of a homogeneous fleet. England, on the other hand, in adding to the number of her ships, was multiplying the number of her * See 'Transactions of the Institute of Naval Architects, 1872,' vol. iii. pp. 250 to 268.

classes,