4. Navy Estimates for the Years 1871-2 and 1872-3. Presented to Parliament by command of Her Majesty, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 13th February, 1871, and 16th February, 1872.

0°

UR readers must be perfectly aware that during last autumn a controversy, which has assumed very considerable proportions, has been carried on respecting the present condition of the British Navy, its numerical strength, and the scientific construction of its ironclads. It will be admitted that no subject of greater interest could well occupy the public attention, and that it behoves us as a nation to make sure that our naval force is large enough, and powerful enough, to enable us to maintain the place to which we have attained amongst the Powers of the world. It is also evident to the least reflecting mind, that an adequate naval force must entail large, though not extravagant expenditure, calls for the exercise of forethought and vigilance; and imperatively demands the closest attention to the changes in the art of war which science applied to the powers of destruction is unceasingly bringing about.

An adequate naval force, it will be conceded, must therefore mean something more than the possession of many thousands of tons of mineral ore which can be converted in time into the raw material of which modern ships of war are constructed; and it must rest on something more tangible than the latent powers of designing such engines of war, stored abundantly no doubt, however undeveloped, in the brains of our eminent engineers and mechanics. That such a force must be in such a state of preparation as to be promptly available is a truism which has nevertheless been controverted; and it may therefore be well to show by recent instances, that it cannot be neglected without serious risk of compromising our national position. We are still far from the Millennium, and war is a contingency not so remote but that the briefest interval may suffice to bring it to our doors; it is not necessary to go very far back in order to prove how valueless are the assurances of diplomatists, or the formal statements of Ministers, that we are at peace with all the world,' that we are respected and beloved in Europe and America,' that 'the prestige of this country never stood higher,' and that our moral grandeur is the admiration of the world;' like Mr. Primrose, in the 'Vicar of Wakefield,' we seem to have heard all this before, but feel ourselves obliged to ask, did diplomacy either foresee or reveal to us that the price Italy was to pay for French assistance was Nice and Savoy? Did the moral greatness of this country, which universally condemned so unjust a

spoliation,

spoliation, including a violation of a solemn treaty, weigh in the balance against the accomplishment of this nefarious transaction? Were our despatches and objections of any avail against the evil acts perpetrated by Austria and Prussia upon helpless Denmark? In both these instances force and violence overcame right; in the one case without a contest, in the other after a brief but gallant struggle; in both instances with but little previous notice either to ourselves or to the sufferers.

The campaign that ended at Sadowa was sharp and decisive; it accomplished one of the most important changes in political geography which has been recorded in European history, yet this prodigious event was brought about in a few weeks, and it. also was preceded by scanty warning.

In June 1870, we had been told that never was the political horizon so entirely without a cloud; in July, three-quarters of a million of armed men were rushing headlong to each other's destruction, and one of the disputants, turning King's evidence, enabled us to judge of the amount of respect which armed and aggressive nations were prepared to pay to European treaties.* In a moment the French Empire crumbled into dust, and while we were still under the impression of the catastrophe of Sedan, a haughty and imperious despatch from an august ally shattered to pieces the Treaty of Paris, and rendered fruitless our sanguinary and costly struggle in the Crimea.

Across the Atlantic, High Commissioners, charged with important functions, hurried to Washington to bind two kindred nations in the bonds of esteem and affection, and to settle the terms on which a long-standing dispute should be arranged. They conceded everything; the laws which had hitherto regu lated the action of neutrals towards belligerents were, with their consent, so modified and applied to past transactions as to make it impossible for any other judgment than that of Geneva to have been delivered, while the peremptory refusal by the Government of the United States to take into consideration our counter-claims, based on the Fenian invasion of Canada, was quietly submitted to. They referred an important boundary line to arbitration, agreeing to submit the question in such terms as to ensure the Berlin award; and men high in the councils of the State assure the electors and others that it was quite worth while to pay more than three millions of money to avoid war with the United States.

A veteran diplomatist of much experience observes: 'I look upon all treaties as rules which nations lay down for their guidance, but rules which they rarely observe where there is a strong temptation of gain on one side, and no risk of danger on the other.'

Into the rights and wrongs of these transactions it is not our intention to enter; these historical facts are cited to shew how in various instances of late, the policy of this country, its remonstrances, its arguments, its interpretation of treaties, have been contemptuously set aside; how entirely without foresight diplomacy has often proved itself; how frequently the weak have succumbed to the strong; how much prestige we have lost; how securely and insultingly our disposition not to fight has been relied upon, and with what startling rapidity these events have been brought about. Let it be granted that this series of concessions, humiliating as they are to high-minded men, was in the abstract the lesser of the two evils placed before us, yet it will not be denied that our passive though discontented attitude, when Nice and Savoy were torn from Italy, must have influenced the councils of France in its clandestine negotiations about Belgium. Is it too much to say that decisive measures in favour of Denmark would certainly have modified the tone of the celebrated Gortschakoff despatch? or that the United States Commissioners at Washington refused to treat except on precisely their own terms, because care had been taken to let them understand that we in England would rather pay three or four millions sterling than go to war? In the face of demands backed by armed force, must not invariable concession lead to contempt? Have aggression and rapacity disappeared from the councils of nations? Does it not occur to the most peace-loving amongst us that as suddenly, perhaps, as we were overtaken by the last European catastrophe, a demand may be made upon us which we cannot possibly concede, and, with right on our side, we may have at last to contend against all the arrogance of successful might. Should that hour come, shall we not have been weakened by every concession we have made, by the loss of the Allies we have abandoned, and by the violation of treaties which we have permitted? May it not truly be said that, in order to come victorious out of a conflict, we require an armed force just so much the greater as our prestige has been lessened by these events, and that the very rapidity with which they come to their conclusion shews that the time has passed when we could securely trust to our latent resources.

Faulty and erroneous as we believe the action of the Government to have been in its treatment of foreign affairs, it is clear that some of its members do not refuse to recognise that a great nation like ours has a part to play in the destinies of the world, and that it must perform that duty in a manner alike dignified and honourable. Mr. Goschen, as the organ of the Government, recently said, while referring to the state of the Navy,

I acknowledge on the other hand, to the full, the imperative necessity

necessity which lies upon us to maintain that relative strength to which I have alluded. I know that this country is determined to maintain the integrity of its Empire, that it is determined to defend its colonies, and that there are imposed upon us other duties. . . . We know that all these duties rest upon us, and I for my part am not to such an extent a believer in universal good will among nations as to think that physical force is not of immense national value,' and while thus acknowledging the principle for which we are contending he shortly afterwards added the assurance

"That nothing had passed which ought to cause a blush of shame on the cheek of any one, as if our navy had ceased to be, what it always had been, the most powerful navy afloat, and capable of dealing with the navies of any two, three or four foreign Powers.'

We cannot, therefore, greatly err in supposing that it is Mr. Goschen's conviction that the power to maintain the integrity of the Empire, to defend its colonies, and to perform other duties such as the suppression of the slave-trade, rests on the possession of a Navy capable of dealing (as he says it always has been) with the Navies of any two, three, or four foreign Powers, and that he is conducting the naval administration of this country in strict accordance with this conviction. Such a policy has over and over again been advocated in the pages of this Review; many awkward incidents which we cannot but remember, and some parliamentary utterances coming from acknowledged organs of the Government, compel us, however, to withhold our belief that such a policy has received the entire concurrence of the Administration; nevertheless, we welcome with satisfaction so bold an exposition from such a quarter, of the wants of the country and of the duties of its rulers. It must, however, be our task to examine with great care the statements so emphatically made by the First Lord of the Admiralty before we can join with him in the jubilant and triumphant tone he has adopted with respect to the power of the British Navy. It will not do to be in error on this point, and Mr. Goschen must pardon us if we subject his assertions to the strictest investigations, and if we are obliged to confront them with official and parliamentary documents. We shall not be deterred from stating the conclusions at which we have arrived by the illusive imputation that we are unpatriotic in giving valuable information to rival and perhaps hostile nations, for we are in a position to know that their Governments often possess that information which the general public in this country is without;* still less can we

As an instance in point, a friend of ours happened to be in a foreign capital in 1871. A copy of Lord Dufferin's Report on the Designs of War Ships, just printed, was put into his hands by a high functionary of that Government, months before it was given to the British public as a Parliamentary document.

Vol. 134.-No. 267.

G

admit

It

admit that the epithets of habitual grumblers, alarmists, and panic-mongers, so freely cast upon those who tell or elicit unpleasant truths, should induce us to withhold from the British public incontrovertible facts, which alone will enable it to form a judgment whether its Navy is or is not in the condition claimed for it by Mr. Goschen in his Bristol speech. From that speech we have already quoted, and in the remarks we may have to make upon it, we are conscious of no political partisanship, and utterly disclaim any sympathy with those who throw into one heap every measure, legislative or executive, to condemn or applaud it according as its origin is Liberal or Conservative. is hardly possible, in reviewing with impartiality the steps which have brought our Navy to its present condition, be it good or bad, to avoid making some observations that will be agreeable to neither of the parties which have held the reins of Government, but which are essential to a right judgment of the case, and we hope that in doing so we shall in no wise transgress the limits of a just and honest criticism. It has been well said by a keen reviewer in one of our weekly periodicals that it is impossible to take up with advantage the history of any event, at a given date, without some knowledge, more or less extensive, of the periods which preceded it, and the same difficulty will certainly be experienced by any one who should endeavour to state accurately the present condition of the British Navy, without some attempt to connect that condition with its past history. We cannot judge of the comparative or relative strength of the Navy in 1870 without a reference to such a starting-point as the year 1858 affords; and a few prefatory remarks, shewing our position at that date, are necessary to make the whole subject intelligible to non-professional readers.

Briefly then, in 1858, the three great naval Powers of the world were Great Britain, France, and the United States; the second-class naval Powers were headed by Russia, and including Holland, Austria, Italy (then divided into several States), Turkey, and Spain, were following with more or less skill and perseverance the lead of the greater Powers. A revolution in naval warfare had been accepted by all maritime nations as actually accomplished, and no ship could henceforth be considered really effective for the purposes of war, that was not furnished with the new motive-power which the application of the screw had rendered available for all classes of ships. Coincident with this new motive-power, artillery had taken a great stride in advance, and pari passu with the adoption of the screw, had introduced powerful shell guns into the Navies of the world, some of whose projectiles exploded on impact, others by the ordinary action of a time fuse. Those who have

watched