Decisions announced without Opinions.

No. 523. MoMASTER, ADMINISTRATOR, V. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. Eighth Circuit. Granted March 12, 1900. Mr. Henry J. Taylor for petitioner. Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, Mr. G. W. Hubbell and Mr. W. E. Odell opposing.

No. 548. BETHLEHEM IRON COMPANY v. WEISS. Third Circuit. Denied March 12, 1900. Mr. Frank P. Prichard and Mr. John G. Johnson for petitioner. Mr. George Demming opposing pro hac vice.

No. 486. OREGON RAILROAD & NAVIGATION COMPANY v. BALFOUR. Ninth Circuit. Denied March 19, 1900. Mr. A. B. Browne and Mr. W. W. Cotton for petitioner. Mr. William A. Maury, Mr. Geo. H. Williams and Mr. C. E. S. Wood opposing.

No. 539. WESTINGHOUSE AIR BRAKE COMPANY v. NEW YORK AIR BRAKE COMPANY ET AL. Second Circuit. Denied March 19, 1900. Mr. Thomas B. Reed, Mr. F. H. Betts and Mr. George H. Christy for petitioner. Mr. Frederick P. Fish, Mr. John C. Spooner and Mr. Charles Neane opposing.

No. 538. HAMILTON v. FOWLER. Sixth Circuit. Denied March 19, 1900. Mr. William M. Randolph and Mr. Thomas B. Turley for petitioner.

Denied

No. 526. LANDON v. BULKLEY. Second Circuit. March 19, 1900. Mr. Edward Winslow Paige for petitioner. Mr. John E. Parsons, Mr. C. N. Bovee, Jr., and Mr. James L. Bishop opposing.

INDEX.

ADMIRALTY.

1. The question in this case is as to the adequacy of the proof offered on
behalf of the Government and the captors to show that the Newfound-
land was trying to violate the blockade of Havana, and the court is of
opinion that it does not attain to that degree which affords a reason-
able assurance of the justice of the sentence of forfeiture in the court
below that it raises doubts and suspicions and makes probable
cause for the capture of the ship and justification of her captors, but
not forfeiture. The Newfoundland, 97.

-

2. It appearing in this case that both the charterer and the vessel had
been previously engaged in bringing away refugees from Cuba, and
were chargeable with notice of the military and naval operations
against that island, that such facts were of common knowledge at the
port from which she sailed, and that intercourse with Cuban ports
was dangerous; and it appearing from a preponderance of evidence
that both the charterer and master of the vessel had knowledge of the
blockade: held, that the vessel was properly condemned. The Adula,
361.

3. If an examination of the ship's papers and the testimony of the crew,
taken in preparatorio, make a case for condemnation, an order for fur-
ther proof is only made where the interests of justice clearly require
it: held, in this case that there was no error in denying the motion of
the claimant for further proof. Ib.

4. No general rule of international law exempts mail ships from capture
as prize of war. The Panama, 535.

5. A Spanish mail steamship, carrying mail of the United States from
New York to Havana at the time of the breaking out of the recent war
with Spain, was not exempt from capture by the sixth clause of the
President's proclamation of April 26, 1898. Ib.

6. At the time of the breaking out of the recent war with Spain, a Span-
ish mail steamship was on a voyage from New York to Havana, carry-
ing a general cargo, passengers and mails, and having mounted on
board two breech-loading Hontoria guns of nine centimetre bore, and
one Maxim rapid-firing gun, and having also on board twenty Rem-
ington rifles and ten Mauser rifles, with ammunition for all the guns

687

and rifles, and thirty or forty cutlasses. Her armament had been put
on board more than a year before, for her own defence, as required by
her owner's mail contract with the Spanish Government, which also
provided that, in case of war, that government might take possession
of the vessel with her equipment, increase her armament, and use her
as a war vessel, and, in these and other provisions, contemplated her
use for hostile purposes in time of war. Held, that she was not
exempt from capture as prize of war by the fourth clause of the Presi-
dent's proclamation of April 26, 1898. Ib.

7. The general rule is that in time of war the citizens or subjects of the
belligerents are enemies to each other without regard to individual
sentiments or dispositions, and that political status determines the
question of enemy ownership. The Benito Estenger, 568.

8. By the law of prize, property engaged in any illegal intercourse with
the enemy is deemed enemy property, whether belonging to an ally or
a citizen, as the illegal traffic stamps it with the hostile character and
attaches to it all the penal consequences. 1b.

9. Provisions are not, in general, deemed contraband; but they may
become so if destined for the army or navy of the enemy, or his ports
of naval or military equipment. Ib.

10. In dealing with a vessel asserted to be an enemy vessel, the fact of
trade with the enemy in supplies necessary for the enemy's forces is of
decisive importance. Ib.

11. Individual acts of friendship cannot change political status where
there is no open adherence to the opposite cause and former allegiance
remains apparently unchanged. Ib.

12. A consul has no authority by reason of his official station to grant
exemption from capture to an enemy vessel; and this vessel was not
entitled to protection by reason of any engagement with the United
States. Ib.

13. In cases of peculiar hardship, or calling for liberal treatment, it is not
for the courts, but for another department of the Government, to
extend such amelioration as the particular instance may demand. Ib.
14. Transfers of vessels flagrante bello cannot be sustained if subjected to
any condition by which the vendor retains an interest in the vessel or
its profits, a control over it, or a right to its restoration at the close of
the war. Ib.

15. The burden of proof in respect of the validity of such transfers is on
the claimant, and the court holds as to the transfer in this case that
requirements of the law of prize were not satisfied by the proofs. Ib.
See BLOCKADE.

BLOCKADE.

1. A legal blockade may be established by a naval officer acting upon his
own discretion, or under direction of superiors, without governmental
notification. The Adula, 361.

2. In view of the operations being carried on for the purpose of destroy-
ing or capturing the Spanish fleet at Santiago de Cuba, and the reduc-
tion of that place, it was competent for the Admiral commanding the
squadron to establish a blockade there, and at Guantanamo, as an
adjunct to such operations, and such blockade was valid as against all
vessels having notice thereof. Ib.

3. It appearing that Guantanamo was eighteen miles from the mouth of
Guantanamo Bay and was still occupied by the enemy, held, that
although the American troops occupied the mouth of the bay, the
blockade was still operative as to vessels bound to the city of Guan-
tanamo. Ib.

4. The legal effect of a lawful and sufficient blockade is a closing of the
port, and an interdiction of the entrance of all vessels of whatever
nationality or business. 1b.

5. The sailing of a vessel with a premeditated intent to violate a blockade,
is ipso facto a violation of the blockade, and renders her subject to
capture from the moment she leaves the port of departure. Ib.
6. If a master has actual notice of a blockade, he is not at liberty even to
approach the blockaded port for the purpose of making inquiries. Ib.
7. If a neutral vessel be chartered to an enemy, she becomes to a certain
extent and pro hac vice an enemy's vessel, and a notice to her char-
terer of the existence of a blockade is a notice to the vessel.

CANALS.

See PUBLIC LAND, 11-14.

CASES AFFIRMED OR FOLLOWED.

Ib.

1. The judgment in this case affirmed upon the authority of United States
v. Oregon and California Railroad Company, 176 U. S. 28; Wilcox v.
Eastern Oregon Land Company, 51.

2. The judgment in this case affirmed upon the authority of United States
v. Oregon and California Railroad Company, 172 U. S. 28, and Wilcox
v. Eastern Oregon Land Co., Same, 51; Messinger v. Eastern Oregon
Land Company, 58.

3. The reasons for refusing, at October Term, 1898, to dismiss this case
on the ground that the appeal to this court was not taken in time, are
the same as those set forth in Allen v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 173
U. S. 479; Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 68.

4. Walsh v. Columbus, Hocking Valley & Athens Railroad Co., 176 U. S.
469, followed. Vought v. Columbus, Hocking Valley &c. Railroad Co.,
481; Wright v. Same, 481.

5. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, affirmed and followed. Maxwell v.
Dow, 581.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, B, 18;

JURISDICTION, C, 3;

RAILROAD, 11.

VOL. CLXXVI-44