worse fustian than the "Henriade"? In the matter of style the resemblance is yet closer. Cicero and Voltaire wrote each his own language with singular accuracy. They were both such fine masters that they reduced the science of writing to a formula, and each of them lacked that peculiar distinction which gives a personal touch to prose. So that what they had achieved was not beyond the reach of their disciples. And as Cicero brought the Latin language to an admirable level of logical commonplace, SO Voltaire, Cicero's most eminent pupil, created a French prose which was not beyond the reach of diligence, and which made variety a sin. If it be true, as Matthew Arnold said, that the journey-work of literaBlackwood's Magazine.

ture is better done in France than in England, this is due to the example of Voltaire. But we may always pay too high a price for accuracy, and had Voltaire never lived the journals of France might have been far worse written than they are, but the French language would have preserved more of its ancient character and distinction. So that even in style we can hardly applaud the influence of Voltaire. But whatever evil he did to literature, let us remember that he was the author of "Candide," that masterpiece of irony, which will never lose its gaiety and freshness, and of certain "Letters" which we cannot praise more highly than by saying that they are as good as Cicero's own.

Although it is extremely doubtful if "stout Cortez," with or without all his men, ever did stand "silent, upon a peak in Darien," one can be tolerably certain that Simon Boliver would not have been "silent" had he been there on November 3rd, 1903. For on that day a limb was torn from the constitutional tree which the great Liberator planted on the soil of the old Spanish kingdom of New Granada. That king

dom had lasted for over a hundred years, under Spanish rule, before Boliver emancipated the country and founded the Republic of Colombia, which was a confederation of the States of New Granada and of the Provinces of Venezuela. This confederation was in 1819, and Simon Bolivar, as President, established himself at Bogotá, a city which has the disadvantage of being hundreds of miles from all the ports and commercial centres of the country whose capital it is. Between Bogotá and Panama there is no method of communication by land, but from Bogotá to the coast by land, and thence to Panama by sea, the journey may now be made in about a fortnight. In Bolivar's time the communication must have been much slower, but Boli

No. 4

var regarded Panama as the jewel of the new organization, and in 1828 he issued a commission for the formation of a roadway across the Isthmus between the two oceans. He believed that in that narrow strip of land Colombia held that which would make her a great and wealthy nation. And on November 3rd last she lost it, not by conquest, but by secession, and by a secession approved and confirmed, if not aided and abetted, by the greatest Republic in the world, which waged one of the greatest and bloodiest wars on record in order to disprove the right of confederated States to separate from the majority.

It may be freely admitted that by the establishment of the independence of Panama, the world may be benefited more than by its retention in the Republic whose government is mismanaged at Bogotá, but not the less is the occurrence one that jars on the moral sense of the political world.

There is an enduring historical interest in Colombia because of its association with the struggle of Latin-America to free itself from the domination of Spain. The revolt began before the end of the eighteenth century, although

States were made Departments in a reconstituted Republic of Colombia. One of these States, or Departments, is (or was) Panama, with an area of only 30,000 of the 500,000 square miles comprised in the area formerly known as New Granada. In the days of the Conquistadores, the city of Panama was the centre of Spanish influence in the South Pacific, and the Isthmus itself has always been regarded by Colombians as "the navel of the world."

The history of the Panama Canal project may be briefly noted. In 1879 M. de Lesseps began to organize the Panama Canal Company, which was floated in December, 1880. Some 600,000 shares of £20 each were sold, yielding £12,000,000, but the actual cost of the enterprise was estimated by its originator at £26,320,000, and the time required at eight years. The original intention was to build the Canal at sea level, without locks, like the Suez Canal. The depth was to be 291⁄2 feet, and the width at bottom 72 feet. On the Atlantic side, Colon was fixed as the terminal port, and Panama was selected on the Pacific side, the total length of the route between the two points to be followed by the Canal being 47 miles. To carry out the sea-level plan it was necessary to make a cutting 328 feet deep at Culebra. The original scheme was adhered to until 1887, when it was abandoned, and one with a system of locks was adopted. But two years later followed the collapse of the company, and all work on the

Canal was stopped. A Commission of Inquiry, in May, 1890, reported that the Canal could be completed in eight years, at a cost of £23,200,000, which should be increased to £36,000,000 for the purposes of administration and financing. Eventually the concern was revived in 1894 under the title of the New Panama Canal Company. The new company's share capital consists of 650,000 £4 shares, of which the Republic of Colombia owns one-seventh. Since 1895 a good deal of work has been added to that accomplished by the old company, and the Canal is now about half completed. The locks will number five, each nearly 800 feet long. Then after America took up the Nicaragua project, and from it was diverted to Panama, negotiations were opened between the United States and Colombia. These have been slow. The United States offered Colombia, originally, an annual rental for the Canal strip of $100,000, while Colombia asked for $650,000. Ultimately the United States agreed to pay $10,000,000 down, and an annuity of $250,000. This would have put Colombia in possession of an ample fund, for, in addition to the £2,000,000, which Colombia was to obtain from the United States, she would have received a share of the amount payable to the New Panama Canal Company, a seventh part of the share capital of the latter being owned in the name of the Republic.

The manner in which the Panama route was originally chosen for the Canal has recently been told by Señor Cristano Medina, the Guatemala Minister at Paris. He was a member of the Commission which sailed by the Lafayette for Colon in 1876 to inspect the several routes for the International Congress. The intention then was to visit Nicaragua as well as Panama, and Señor Medina was the prime advocate of the advantages of the Nicaragua line. But Lieutenant Bonaparte

Wyse came to terms with the Colombian Government, and returned to Europe with a contract for the construction of the Canal at Panama. De Lesseps was, or said he was, quite indifferent as to which route the International Congress would select, but no representative from Nicaragua attended that Congress, and eighty of its members were the nominees of "Le Grand Français." All the foreign delegates were in favor of Nicaragua, as Señor Medina says De Lesseps ac

knowledged to him, but De Lesseps backed the Wyse scheme because he professed to be afraid that Nicaragua would put on the screw if the Congress voted in favor of that route without any previous understanding as to terms. And as all the French engineers backed De Lesseps, and the foreign delegates, seeing how the wind was blowing, abstained from voting, the Panama design was carried by 78 votes to eight. It is probable that the route was selected as rashly as the scheme was prosecuted recklessly by the French company, but the consensus of engineering opinion is to-day decidedly in favor of Panama over Nicaragua.

It is worth while now to consider the Colombian view of the concession to the present French company and the legal standing of that company.

After the collapse of the Lesseps company, its liquidators asked the Colombian Government to prolong the period for the reorganization of a new company and the continuation of the works at the Canal. The Congress enacted the Law of December 6th, 1892, under which a contract was signed on April 4th, 1893, between the Colombian Government and the new company, by which the period for the reorganization of the new company was extended to October 31st, 1894, and the term for the completion of the Canal to October 31st, 1904. In 1899 the new company, finding that it

could not finish the work within the period granted, asked for a new prorogation of six years. The Colombian Congress of that year did not agree, but the Government decided to send to Europe a Commissioner to study the question. They appointed Señor Nicolas Esguerra, who, after visiting Panama and New York, went to Paris, and there opened negotiations. His diplomatic efforts were in vain, as the Colombian Government was at the same time negotiating with the company's agent at Bogotá, and on April 23rd, 1900, granted the prorogation for a sum of £200,000, which was paid at Paris. The question recently raised was

whether or not this decree was constitutional. According to the Constitution the Government is empowered to make contracts, but they have to be submitted to the approval of Congress. It is affirmed that there was no existing law authorizing the President of Colombia to grant the extension. And it was contended that the Congress was not bound to sanction the blunders and transgressions of the Government. Congress might, of course, have approved the prorogation as granted by the Government decree: and the company was indeed informed by the Colombian Commissioner at Paris that any contract for the prorogation must be submitted to Congress to have any legal value. But surely to the plain man it is evident that if Colombia, through its representative Government, accepted the honorarium for renewing the concession, the Congress and the country were alike bound by the transaction.

For half a century, as Mr. Frederick Penfield (formerly U.S. Consul-General in Egypt) has observed, the Nicaraguan was the only Isthmian Canal believed to be available to the United States. As Frenchmen controlled the Panama route, generations of Americans were reared under the influence of the Nicaragua preference, prior to General

Grant and onwards. It is scarcely necessary to recall that the Walker Commission reported in favor of this route to Congress, and only sent a supplementary report recommending Panama when the French company climbed down in its terms. Soon after that supplementary report was presented Consul Penfield publicly advocated the acquisition of the Panama Isthmus by the United States. His argument was that the State of Panama was of comparatively little value to the Republic of Colombia, though of inestimable value to a powerful nation constructing the Canal; that the people of Panama have no affection for Colombia, and have even shunned the name of Colombians; that it is at least twelve days' journey from Panama to Bogotá, the seat of Colombian Government; that three-fourths of the capital invested in the State of Panama for mining and other purposes is American; and that the United States is pledged by treaty to preserve order on the Isthmus, and has repeatedly had to send armed forces there. What Mr. Penfield advocated was an out-and-out purchase on equitable terms of the State of Panama from the Republic of Colombia, so that the Stars and Stripes may float over the Isthmus, as he predicts it is destined to do over half the West Indian islands. But Panama prefers to be an independent State.

In the United States the opinion seemed to prevail that the Colombians could have no sane motive for hesitating to ratify the Canal Treaty. Señor Raúl Pérez set forth in The North American Review for July, 1903, these reasons:-"First, neither the Colombian Executive, nor an ordinary Congress can constitutionally ratify a treaty that Involves the cession of territory to a foreign Power; second, the Canal will not be of as much benefit to Colombia as those who are unfamiliar with the situation assume; third, Colombians

firmly believe that there are other solutions to the problem, which, besides being fair and legal, would permanently satisfy both the United States and Colombia." It is true that in the Salgar-Wyse contract of 1878, on which the operations of De Lesseps Company were founded, a clause runs to the effect that "the concessionnaires, or those who in the future may succeed them in their rights, may transfer those rights to any other capitalists or financial corporations; but they are expressly forbidden to transfer them or mortgage them, under any consideration, to any foreign nation or Government." But it was surely as competent for Colombia to modify as to grant this concession. And as to the transfer of the territory, there is nothing more sacrosanct in territorial than in other national possessions. A nation does not lose its honor by alienating a strip of its territory for good and sufficient cause. Did not Russia sell Alaska and France sell Louisiana to the United States? Great Britain has not felt any compunctions about alienating and transferring territory over which she had full sovereign rights when the occasion demanded it, and Britons are not less tenacious of their national honor than Colombians have any right to be. The construction of a waterway across Central America is a matter not only of international commercial importance, but also one which promised to be of permanent advantage to Colombia. Of course, if the inhabitants of the Isthmus of Panama objected to any foreign Power having even a leasehold tenure in their territory, the rejection of the contract would have been justifiable. But the people of Panama did not object. On the contrary, they desired the arrangement most ardently.

What, then, was the real cause of the rejection of the Hay-Herran Canal Treaty by the Congress of Colombia? Patriotism was only the blind, for im