MKEEN v. LESSEE. collected that the gentlemen of the bar, who supported the conveyance, spoke positively as to the DELANCY'S universal understanding of the state, on this point, and that those who controverted- the usage on other points, did not controvert it on this. But what is decisive with the court is, that the judge who presides in the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania, reports to us that this construction was universally received. On this evidence the court yields the construction which would be put on the words of the act, to that which the courts of the state have put on it, and on which many titles may probably depend. The next question is, was this deed recorded in such an office as to make the exemplification evidence? Without reviewing all the arguments which have been urged from the bar, or all the sections of the act, it may be sufficient to observe, that this court is satisfied that, where a single tract of land is conveyed, the law requires the deed to be recorded in the office of the county in which the land lies; but if several tracts be conveyed, it appears to this court that neither the letter nor the spirit of the act requires that the deed should be recorded in each county. It is material in the construction of this act, that the validity of the deed is not affected by omitting to record it. Though not recorded, it is still binding to every intent and purpose whatsoever. The only legat effect produced by recording it is its preservation, by making a copy equal to the original. The principal motive, then, for requiring that it should be proved before a justice of the particular county in which the land lies, and recorded in that county, is that which has been assigned at the bar. It is the additional security given by those provisions, that a deed, never executed, might not be imposed on the recorder. This object is as completely obtained by placing the deed on the records of that county in Vol, Y. E M'KEEN V. which one of the tracts of land lies, as it could be if DELANCY'S the deed conveyed no other tract. The verity of LESSEE. the deed is-as completely secured in the one case as in the other. It appears to the court also to be within the letter of the law. This deed was unquestionably properly admitted to record in the office of the city and county of Philadelphia. It conveyed lands lying within that city and county, and, on any construction of the act, might be there recorded. The act then proceeds to say, "that the copies of all deeds, so enrolled, shall be allowed in all courts where produced, and are hereby declared and enacted to be as good evidence, and as valid and effectual in law, as the original deeds themselves." The whole deed, then, is evidence by the letter of the act. The whole is a copy from the record. If the validity of the conveyance depended on its being recorded in the county where the land lies, then a deed might be good as to one tract, and bad as to another. But the deed is valid, though not recorded; and the question is, whether the copy is evidence as to every thing it contains. The execution of the deed is one entire thing, and is proved so as to admit the instrument to record. The copy, if true in part, is true in the whole; and if evidence in part, must, under the act, and on the general principle that it is the copy of a record, be evidence in the whole, There is no error in the judgment of the circuit court; and it is affirmed with costs. JOHN AND JAMES TUCKER v. OXLEY, AS- Under the ERROR to the circuit court of the district of Cobankrupt law lumbia, sitting at Alexandria, in an action of assumpStates a joint sit for goods sold and delivered, brought by Oxley, of the United TUCKERS V. OXLEY. assignee of Thomas Moore, a bankrupt, against the plaintiffs in error. Upon the general issue, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff below for 143 dollars and 33 cents, subject to the opinion of the debt may be court upon the following case: set off against the separate claim of the as could Thomas Moore, the bankrupt, carried on the trade signce of one of the partand business of a vendue master in copartnership ners. But such with one Henry Moore, which copartnership was on offet not have been the 31st of March, 1802, dissolved on the terms that made, at law, Thomas Moore should collect the balances due to,and independent of pay the debts due from the joint concern as the bankrupt far as the law. joint property would extend. Thomas Moore car- A joint debt ried on the trade and business of a vendue master on under a sepamay be proved his separate account from that time until the 2d of rate September following, when he became bankrupt, and sin, and a falt a commission being duly awarded and issued against ceived. him, he was duly declared a bankrupt according to equity which cau rethe laws of the United States then in force concern- strain the joint ing bankrupts; under which the plaintiff was duly appointed assignee. While Henry and Thomas Moore carried on the business of vendue master in partnership, they became jointly indebted to the defendants, John and James Tucker, in the sum of 106 dollars and 49 cents, being the balance of account due to the defendants, for their goods sold by H. and T. Moore, at vendue. After the dissolution of the partnership, and while Thomas Moore carried on business on his separate account, the defendants, the Tuckers, at different times, from the 19th of April to the 22d of July, 1802, knowing that the partnership was dissolved, and that Thomas Moore carried on business on his separate account, purchased of him at vendue, goods to the amount of 113 dollars and 12 cents, which gods were charged to the defendants, the Tuckers, in the separate books of Thomas Moore, without credit being given to the defendants for the joint debt due to them from Henry and Thomas Moore. Thomas Moore being examined as a witness, proved that he intended, at the time of selling the goods to the defendants, to give them credit for the joint debt due to them from Henry com:is dividend I'C It is alone creditor from receiving his full dividend until the joint effects are cs hausted. v. PUCKERS and Thomas Moore, but nothing was said or agreed 'OXLEY. on the subject, between him and the defendants, nor was any such credit ever given before his bankruptcy. This action is brought for the price of the goods so sold and delivered by Thomas Moore in his separate capacity. If the court should be of opinion, upon the case stated, that the defendants are entitled to have the joint debt due to them by Henry and Thomas Moore deducted from the sum claimed in this action, the verdict was to be reduced to 16 dollars and 63 cents, and judgment to be entered accordingly The opinion of the court below being, that the joint debt could not be set off against the separate claim of the bankrupt, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the larger sum; whereupon the defendants brought a writ of error. C. Simms, for the plaintiff in error. All contracts with partners are joint and several ; and every partner is liable to pay the whole. In what proportion the others are to contribute is a matter merely among themselves. The plaintiff may bring his action at law against any one of the partners, and can only be compelled by plea in abatement to join them all. 5 Burr. 2613. 1 Esp. 117. By the 42d section of the bankrupt law, (vol. 5. p. 74.) it is declared, that where there hath been mutual credit given by the bankrupt and any other person, or mutual debts between them, the assignee shall state the account between them, and one debt shall be set off against the other, and the balance of such account, after such set-off, and no more, shall be claimed or paid on either side respectively. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, in Edwards's case, 1 Atk. 100. doubted whether, under the statute relating to mutual debts, a debt due from A. to B. could be set off against a debt due from B. to A. and C. In that case C. was not in any manner liable to B. for the debt due from A. to B, V. But in the present case, Thomas Moore was liable TUCKERS to the Tuckers for the debt due to them from OXLEY. Henry and Thomas Moore, and the Tuckers might have compelled payment from Thomas alone. The clause in the act of parliament, 5 Geo. II. relating to mutual credits, and which is the same as the 42d section of our bankrupt law, has received a very liberal construction. 1 Atk. 228. Ex parte Deeze. 1 Atk. 230. Ex parte Charles Prescot. By the 34th section of the bankrupt law it appears that a partnership debt may be proved on a separate commission against one of the partners. By that section it is declared, that the "bankrupt shall be discharged from all debts by him due or owing at the time he became bankrupt, and all which were or might have been proved under the commission;" with this proviso, " that no such discharge of a bankrupt shall release or discharge any person who was a partner with such bankrupt, at the time he became bankrupt, or who was then jointly held or bound with such bankrupt, for the same debt or debts from which such bankrupt was discharged as aforesaid." And it may be laid down as a general rule, that a debtor of a bankrupt may be allowed to set off any debt due from the bankrupt which he could have proved under the commission. Coop. B. L. 247. Jones, contra. The debt for which this action was brought against the Tuckers, was contracted long after the dissolution of the partnership of Henry and Thomas Moore. It was, and yet stands, charged against them on the separate books of Thomas Moore. It is neither a mutual debt, nor a mutual credit. They are claims in different rights. It is a general principle, in cases of bankruptcy, that the joint funds are to be applied to the discharge of the joint debts, and the separate funds to the dis |