YEATON V. FRY. until he met with the blockading force. Which instruction the court refused to give. 3. The third bill of exceptions stated, that the plaintiff below offered to read in evidence certain depositions taken in Tobago, under a commission issued at the instance of the defendant, and the court, being satisfied that the plaintiff's attorney had agreed to receive, and did receive and transmit to the plaintiff, notice of the time and place of taking such depositions, suffered the plaintiff to read them in evidence to the jury. 4. The fourth bill of exceptions was to the opinion of the court given to the jury at the request of the plaintiff, that if at the time the brig sailed from Tobago for Curraçoa the latter island was not a blockaded port by notification of the British government to the American nation, but was blockaded in fact, and if the master was ignorant of such blockade until he was warned off by the blockading force, and being so warned he did not again attempt to enter the blockaded port, but changed his course intending to come directly to Norfolk, and in the prosecution of such voyage to Norfolk was captured by a French cruiser, and recaptured by in English vessel, carried into Jamaica, libelled, condemned and sold under a decree of the vice-admiralty court of that island, then such sailing from Tobago for Curraçoa, and from thence to Norfolk, was a lawful voyage within the meaning of the contract of insurance, and not within the exception in the policy, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover against the underwriters an indemnity for the loss sustained by such capture, recapture and sale. Youngs, for the plaintiff in error, contended, 1. That blockaded ports were absolutely excepted from the policy, and, consequently, there was no insurance if the vessel sailed for a blockaded port. The exception amounts to a warranty that the ves sel shall not sail for a blockaded port; and the insu red takes upon himself the chance of the port being YEATON blockaded. Park, 322. 367. Kenyon v. Berthow. 2. That the copy of the proceedings of the court of vice-admiralty, at Jamaica, was not sufficiently authenticated to be admitted in evidence. The act of congress does not designate any mode of authentication of foreign papers, but has left that subject entirely to the state legislatures. As the court below was sitting at Alexandria, it ought to have been governed by the act of assembly of Virginia of December 8, 1792, (Revised Code, 168. fol. ed.) which requires, besides the attestation of a notary public, "a testimonial from the proper officer of the city, county, corporation, or borough where such notary public shall reside, or the great seal of such state, kingdom, province, island, colony, or place beyond sea." In the case of Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch, 238. this court said, that foreign judgments were to be authenticated, either by an exemplification under the great seal, or by a proved copy, or by the certificate of an officer authorized by law, which certificate itself must be properly authenticated. The proper authentication, under the laws of Virginia, is the testimonial mentioned in the act of assembly, or the great seal of the colony or island. 3. With regard to the depositions taken on behalf of the defendant, and which the plaintiff wished to use on the trial, they ought not to have been read for the plaintiff, because they had not been taken in such a manner as to authorize the defendant to use them against the plaintiff. This court has determined that notice to an attorney at law is not such notice as is required by the act of assembly of Virginia, for taking depositions, and the attorney could not admit, or waive notice but upon record. V. FRY.. ΥΠΑΤΟΝ FRY. E. J. Lee and C. Lee, contra, were stopped by the court as to the first point. 2. As to the copy of the proceedings in the courtof vice-admiralty, they took a distinction between the proceedings of municipal courts, and courts of the law of nations. The seals of courts of admi- · ralty, in cases under the law of nations, are admitted in evidence without further authentication, because they are courts of the whole civilized world, and every person interested is a party. 1 Rob. 296. The Maria. Gilb. Law of Ev. 22, 23. This was admitted by the counsel on both sides in the case of Church v. Hubbart, referred to by the opposite counsel. Besides, these proceedings are authenticated in the manner provided by the 19th article of the British treaty of 1794. Jones, in reply. The The exception in the policy was not intended merely to exclude the risk of attempting to enter a blockaded port, but excluded all risks if the vessel should sail for a port actually blockaded. trade with a blockaded port is an illegal trade, and there is an express warranty at the foot of the policy against all losses arising from seizure for or on account of illicit or prohibited trade. The exception, therefore, must have been intended to provide for something else. Can it be contended that if the vessel had sailed for Hispaniola, the underwriters would have been liable for a loss, happening in any manner whatsoever? Yet blockaded ports and Hispaniola are equally excepted, and in the very same. words. A voyage to such a port is as much excluded from the policy as a voyage to Hispaniola. The exclusion of particular ports amounts to a warranty that the vessel shall not sail to such ports; and if a warranty be not complied with, the underwriters are not bound, whatever may be the cause of the It is non-compliance, and whether the loss happened in March 13. MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court as follows, viz. The material question in this case grows out of an exception in a policy of insurance. The plaintiff insured a specified sum on the brig Richard, belonging to the defendant, "at and from Tobago to one or more ports in the West Indies, and at and from thence to Norfolk ;" and the insurance is declared to be made against "all risks. blockaded ports and Hispaniola excepted." The Richard sailed from Tobago for Curraçoa, which was then blockaded in fact, but the blockade was not known at Tobago when the vessel sailed, nor was it known to the captain until he was warned off by a British ship of war. He then sailed for Norfolk; but on his voyage was captured by a French privateer, by whom the vessel was plundered to a considerable extent, and ordered to St. Domingo for trial. The question is, whether this risk comes within the exception contained in the policv. The counsel has considered the exception as a warranty; but the court cannot so consider it. The words are the words of the insurer, not of the insured; and they take a particular risk out of the policy which, but for the exception, would be comprehended in the contract. YEATON V. FRY YEATON v. FRY. What is that risk? Policies of insurance are generally the most informal instruments which are brought into courts of justice; and there are no instruments which are more liberally construed, in order to effect the real intention of the parties, if that intention can be clearly ascertained. In that part of the policy on which the present controversy depends, a few words are given, to which others must be subjoined in order to complete the sense, and give a full description of the risk against which the underwriters were unwilling to insure: These words are, "blockaded ports and Hispaniola excepted." It is reasonable to suppose that a voyage to Hispaniola was not insured. The assured has notice of this, and if he sails for Hispaniola, the voyage is entirely at his own risk. Against the risks of such at voyage, whatever they may be, the underwriters will not insure. It is a specified place, excluded, by consent, from the policy. The perils attending the voyage are understood, whether they arise from the sea, or otherwise, and are all excepted. The motives for making the exception do not appear, nor ́ can they be inferred from the instrument. The plaintiff in error contends that the same reasoning applies, in its full extent, to the exception of blockaded ports; but the court does not think so. י{ Hispaniola is excepted absolutely from the policy; but other ports are within the terms, of the voyage insured, if they be not blockaded. It is their character, as blockaded ports, which excludes them from the insurance. Their being excepted by this character is thought to justify the opinion, that it is the risk attending this character which produces the exception, and which is the risk excepted. The risk of a blockaded port, as a blockaded port, is the risk incurred by breaking the blockade. This is defined |