treat at last upon a footing of equal ity with that one, which, while it remained unvanquished, would always prove an effectual obftacle to that plan of univerfal influence over all the governments of Europe, which France had, fince the unexpected fuccefs of its arms, kept conftantly in view. However the French might exult in the triumphant career of their armies, it plainly appeared, by the fentiments repeatedly exprefled by the principal fpeakers of the convention, and in the councils, and upon all public occafions, to be their intimate perfuafion, however averfe to arow it, that while England ftood its ground, they would never totally accomplish thofe mighty fchemes of conqueft and influence. To execute them partially, would only involve them in perpetual quarrels with thofe powers whofe intereft required their depreflion, and whofe caufe England would never fail to fupport. Thus it was clear, that unless the ftrength of this ancient rival were effectually broken, and it were reduced to fue for peace on fuch terms as France fhould dictate, the propofed effect of fo many victories would be fruftrated, as the humiliation of all its other enemies would not fecure to the republic thofe objects at which it avowedly aimed. The prolongation of the war, in order to attain thefe, might be attended with fuch viciffitudes of fortune, as would entirely change the circumftances of affairs, and oblige the republic, in its turn, to abate of its high pretenfions, and even to compound for its exiftence, and the prefervation of the ancient limits of France, * That thefe ideas frequently occurred to the moft fagacious of the French, is inconteftible, from the various publications of the time, and no lefs from that remarkable anxiety with which their rulers canvaffed every fubject relating to England. How to compaís its depreffion was the chief object of their councils; and every fortunate event that befel them, in their numerous enterprizes, employed their confideration in what manner to convert it to the detriment of England. Among the various means of obtaining that important end, the annoyance of the English maritime commerce, had long been tried, certainly not without fome degree of fuccefs: but in no degree fufficient to weaken the naval power of England, which continued to rule the feas in every quarter of the globe, with irrefiftible fway. It was indeed from this very circumftance, that France derived a multiplicity of arguments in its manifeftos and exhortations, both to its own people, and to the other nations of Europe. Their tendency was to prove, that England was the tyrant of the fea, and that all the European powers were interested in repreffing that tyranny. To effect this, they ought to unite cordially with France, and fecond its endeavours to restore the freedom of the feas, by abridging, through every means in their power, the commercial refources of Eng land. The actual firength of its navy was fo great, that it could not at prefent be oppofed with much hope of fuccefs: but other methods might be ufed not less effectual in their ultimate ilue, and thefe were in the option of every state. the power which commanded the feas, commanded alfo the fhores, and that naval power was of more importance than dominion at land, [M3] That had had paffed into a kind of political maxim for ages. It was, in fact, a fuperiority of naval power that fubverted the Roman empire. The irruptions of the Gauls, the Cimbri, and Teutones, by land, were repelled, and might have been repelled had they been repeated. The neceffity of fubfiftence drove them quickly to the neceffity of committing their fortune to the iffue of a battle, in which the invaded derived an advantage over the invaders from the poffeffion, and from the knowledge of the country. But when the barbarians began to combine their military operations with naval expeditions; when ftores, as well as troops, were poured upon the Roman frontier, from the Baltic, the Dwina, the Elbe, the Danube, and the Euxine feas, then, and not till then, they began to be wholly irrefiftible. It was the maritime. habits, and the naval power of the Scandinavians, under the appellation of Normans, Danes, Picks, and other names, that enabled them, for the fpace of fix hundred years, to harrafs, over-run, and rule the greater part of the fea coafts of Europe. The trade of a pirate became an honourable profeffion. The fons of kings, at the head of pirates, fought and obtained at once fettlements and renown. Since the revival of letters, the modern improvements in arts and fciences, and the vaft extenfion of commerce, the fuperior importance of naval power feemed to be farther illuftrated, and more certainly established.. It was not among the leaft ftriking inftances of that fertility of imagination which fupported the French under all difficulties, that they found means, as they conceived, to oppofe power at land to power at fea: to raife the naval power of France, and to undermine that of England, by excluding her trade from the great inlets of Europe. This would give England a blow, from which it would not eafily recover. It could not fail to produce an immediate alteration in its commercial circumftances; the depreffion of which, would infallibly create a difcouragement and defpondency in the English government, that muft induce it at once, to remit of the haughtiness with which it exercifed its naval fuperiority over other nations. Such was the purport of the vas rious publications iffued by authority, or proceeding from the many individuals, who bufied themselves with compofitions of this nature. The impreffion, which they made upon the generality of European ftates, was very feeble. None, indeed, appeared to pay them much attention, but thofe on which France poffeffed the forcible means of influence. The others were convinced, that the motives of the French, in these warm addrefles to the continental powers, were dic tated by felfifh views, and that, were they to fucceed in over-throwing the maritime power of England, they would doubtlefs transfer it to themselves, and employ it to the fame ends to which they had fo notorioufly converted the fuperiority they had acquired at land. It was doubtles inconfiflent, on the ground of morality in the Englith nation, to arraign the ambition and tyranny of the French, while they themfelves, purfued fchemes of tyranny and ambition on the main ocean,, and in every quarter of the globe. If the French were plunderers at land, the Eng lith were plunderers on too many occafions, and dictators at fea. Still, however, they had done no more in the prefent war, than what had been authorized by long established cuftom; and under every reftraint, a commercial correfpondence with England, had been experimentally found extremely profitable. If their induftry enabled them to derive benefit from other nations, thefe alfo received no lefs profit from them. An exclufion of their trade would redound therefore, equally to the detriment of both parties. Foiled in their endeavours to fhut all the European ports against the English, the French determined, however, to exclude them from thofe of which they had the command. A proclamation had been iflued by the English government, permitting the exportation of merchandife to Flanders and Holland. But the Dutch convention was directed to publish a counter proclamation, prohibiting the importation of goods from England, under fevere penalties; and enjoining the people of the united provinces to renounce all commerce with a nation that had treated them fo inmically, and whofe intentions were to deprive the Dutch republic of its trade, after depriving it of its ancient freedom, by the forcible eftablishment of a ftadtholder. Having expelled a fovereign impofed upon them against their confent, they were bound in duty and honour to refufe all connections with thofe, who were endeavouring to fubject them again to his yoke. A fimilar prohibition of English manufactures had taken place in France, during the adminiftration of Roberfpierre, and had for fome time been ftrickly enforced. But the advantages refulting from a commerce with England, had gradually fuperfeded the fear of offending againit this prohibition; and it was little attended to at this time. A weighty motive for not enforcing it was, the neceffity of giving vent to the cargoes of the English velfels captured by the French privateers. But after the government in Holland had come to the determination of forbidding the entry of English goods, it thought itself the better entitled to require the adoption of the like meafure in France, as Holland, in adopting it, had complied with the requifition of the French government. This appeared fo unanfwerable a mode of reafoning, that the directory, however, difinclined to compliance, found itfelf under the neceffity of giving fatisfaction to the Dutch confede rates, who were fo determined as to admit of uo denial, that they threatened to refcind their refolutions, unless the fame were taken by the French government. The regulations proposed on this occation were very fevere; they not only prohibited the importation of English merchandize in future, but o dained the re-exportation of what had been imported. Harth methods were, at the fame time, adopted to fecure the obfervance of thefe regulations; and though they were unacceptable to multitudes, fo intent was the legiflature on diminishing the refources of England, that the prohibitory decree, together with the heavy penalties annexed to its infringement, was carried by a large majority. Great were the expectations of the enemies to England, that this exclufion of its merchandize and [M4] manufactures manufactures would, in a fhort time, reduce it to fuch diftrefs, as to difable it from carrying on the war, and oblige it to fubmit to any conditions, for the fake of recovering its trade. It cannot be denied that appearances militated ftrongly in favour of thefe confequences. Spain and Italy, two capital marts for the fale of English commodities, efpecially the firft, were now almoft entirely but to their admiffion. Genoa and Leghorn, the two principal feats of the trade between England and Italy, were under the immediate controul of France; the former was compelled, through the terror of its arms, to exclude England from its ports, by a formal treaty to that purpofe; and the latter was in the pofleffion of a French garrifon. Corfica was, at the fame time, no longer in the hands of the English: but Naples and the papal territories ftill remained open to them in Italy; and Portugal afforded an ample channel for the introduction of every article of commerce from England, not only into that kingdom, but alfo into Spain, its adjoinining neighbour, with which its immediate communication would always procure either an open or clandeftine entrance for English merchandize of all kinds. Thus, on a confiderate examination of the confequences refulting from this famous decree, they did not meet the expectations of those who framed it. It was found that as power fhut one door against commerce luxury opened another. Little was the diminution of the English trade to the fouthern parts of Europe, while in the north it remained uninterrupted. From this quarter it was that England drew the moft effential articles it wanted. Hamburgh was a port, which, while it continued open, would always prove an inlet for English goods to all parts of Germany: and the princes and states of the empire were no ways difpofed to gratify the French with an exclufion of the English from that only medi um of commercial communication between Germany and the other trading countries in Europe. The difappointment of the French government, in the fanguine hope it had entertained of deftroying the commerce, and through it the finances of England, was farther aggravated by the diforder of its own. Notwithstanding the indefatigable efforts ufed to place them on a footing of ftability, temporary expedi ents were fill the only props of government, which had no fixed prof pect of fupporting itself by other than precarious and uncertain means. But as thefe could not again be reforted to, the ftate ftill reverted to the dangerous fituation it had just efcaped, and was liable to experience ftill greater difficulties, from this fucceffive abridgement of its remaining refources. In this alarming fituation the directory refolved to call a meeting of the great bankers and merchants, to confult with them on the means of reftoring the pecuniary credit of the nation, and circular letters were dif patched to them for that purpose. On the tenth of December a meffage of a moft preffing nature was fent to the council of five hundred. It was feriously urged, by the direatory, to come without delay to the affifiance of the ftate, the wants of which were fuch that if not immediately relieved, it would be expofed to certain ruin. The only remedy that could be propofed, in this extremity, was, to authorize the di rectory rectory to receive the laft inftalment due on the fale of the national domains, amounting to eighty millions, and which, being payable in fpecie, might be appropriated with effect to the extinction of the debts that lay moft heavy on government, and the liquidation of which appeared the most indifpenfible. This meflage was communicated to a fecret committee of the council of five hundred: but contrary to the expectations of the directory, it was treated with flight, and as un deferving of attention. Equally aftonifhed and offended at this reception of a meflage, from which far different effects had been hoped, the directory publifhed this tranfaction upon the following day, as an appeal to the public on the conduct of the council. But this ftep was judged to have been too haftily laken. It feemed intended to bring the council into difgrace, as refufing to concur with the directory in a neceffary measure, and it evidently tended to occation a variance between these two branches of go. vernment, an evil that ought of all others to be the most ftudioufly avoided in the prefent circumftances of the nation. The committee, thus brought forward before the public, exculpated itself for the rejection of this meffage, by aflerting that it reprefented the ftate in a much more alarming fituation than confifted with reality. Through care and economy all difficulties might be removed, and the directory had been no lefs faulty in exaggerating the difficulties of the nation, than imprudent in making them known to the world. It was with much concern that the public beheld a rupture between the legiflature and the executive department, which, unle's it were fpeedily healed, by the difcretion of both parties, might be productive of the moft ferious evils. The neceffity of acting in concert prevented farther altercation: but the council of five hundred became extremely watchful of the motions of the directory, and refolved to confine it with the utmoft ftrictness, to the powers affigned to it by the conftitution. During the cruel adminiftration of Roberfpierre, multitudes had fled to foreign countries, or conccaled themfelves in various parts of France, in order to escape the fate that would otherwife have attended them. The revolutionary committees of the districts to which they belonged, actuated by the barbarous fpirit of the times, had entered the names of thefe unhappy perfons on the lift of emigrants, by which they were fubjected to the punishments enacted by the law, againft individuals of this defcription. After the overthrow of this fanguinary fyftem, feveral decrees had been paffed, to rescue thofe who had fuffered unjufily, through its tyranny, from the wretched condition to which they had been reduced. Thole who had expatriated themfelves fince the laft of May, 1793, when this dreadful fyftem commenced, were permitted to return to their country, and thofe who had been falfely entered on the lift of emigrants, were cleared from the penalties annexed to emigration. But, in the numbers that appealed to the laws enacted to reinftate in their rights thofe who had been unjuftly deprived of them, there were many who came ftrictly under the denomination of emigrants, but who found means, through partiality or bribery, to procure teftimonials of their not having left France be fore |