Reciprocity Treaties.-Reciprocity treaties have a great role to perform in the development of commercial relations between the SpanishAmerican nations and the United States, but, unfortunately, public opinion is not yet prepared in this country to accept them. The subject of reciprocity is far more complicated than it appears to be, since it has become connected with the protection and free-trade questions which are now so earnestly agitated in this country. The United States, as an eminently Anglo-Saxon nation, has always followed, although sometimes with slowness, the footsteps of the mother-country, in many cases even going beyond her; and, although thus far they do not seem disposed to accept free trade, which has done so much to secure the commercial preponderance of England, I have no doubt that before long they will not remain behind Great Britain in this regard; but as the ultra-protective policy prevails here at present, it is not possible to establish and maintain reciprocity successfully. The United States, from an agricultural country which it was a few years ago, has reached the condition of a manufacturing one, and in this stage is making very rapid strides. Now when the production of manufactured articles is exceeding the needs of the home market, the foundation of the protective system is receiving a great blow; production is now cheapened; new foreign markets are now sought for the surplus products; and when all this is attained, this country will be a great commercial nation. Reciprocity treaties will represent the transition between these two stages, and until the second is fully attained there will be many difficulties in the way.

The fate of the reciprocity treaty signed with Mexico in 1883 demonstrates the correctness of this view. That treaty, which was initiated by this Government, was made with a country contiguous to it for nearly two thousand miles, inhabited by twelve millions of people, who produce, in proportion to their population, very few manufactured articles, but who have all the elements of soil, climate, and labor necessary to produce the raw materials needed by the manufacturing industries of the United States. That nation, too, is connected with the United States by four trunk railways built by United States companies, which are really extensions and feeders of the trunk lines of this country. It is clear that, if reciprocity could not be established with Mexico, much less can it be adopted with the other American nations, which have not as favorable conditions, excepting perhaps Brazil, which has developed a very large trade with the United States. It has been found impossible to carry out the reciprocity treaty with Mexico, which was intended, by the exemption of duty on Mexican sugar, to open new sources of production and trade. Moreover, the tariff Act of October 1, 1890, intended to close this market to the chief article of Mexican export-silver in lead-ore,-an

industry which was developed by the construction of railroads in Mexico, this ore being the principal article that they transport, and which was encouraged and increased by the capital and skill of this country.

The main reason why the reciprocity treaty with Mexico was not put in operation was the opposition to receiving, free of duty, Mexican sugar, notwithstanding the fact that, as compensation for such advantage, Mexico made valuable concessions to this country; and yet in the Tariff Bill enacted October 1, 1890, foreign sugar was exempted from all import duties, without any compensation or advantage in favor of the national production of other articles.

Reciprocity was, undoubtedly, the subject most fully considered in the Conference, and the one which commanded the most earnest attenThe committee agreed as to the difficulty of establishing a customs union, in the sense of a Zollverein, and as to the desirability of making reciprocity treaties to promote trade between the respective countries. On the latter point, however, the committee was divided, as the Brazilian, Colombian, Venezuelan, Nicaraguan, and Mexican members of it recommended the negotiation of such treaties, not upon a uniform basis, but in accordance with the circumstances and needs of each country, while the Argentine and Chilian delegates thought it officiousness on the part of the Conference to make any such recommendation. The Argentine Government had favored reciprocity treaties, as in 1875 it proposed to the United States the negotiation of one, and the same suggestion was renewed by the Argentine delegation to the chairman of the United States delegation in the Conference, as stated in the discussion by Señor Saenz Peña, an Argentine delegate who was a member of that committee, who also favored reciprocity personally, but he did not think that the Conference had authority, under the law convening it, to consider the subject of reciprocity, as it was not mentioned in the program of its labors. He therefore did not sign the report of the majority, and made with Señor Alfonso a minority report. The essential difference between the views of the majority and the minority of the committee was that the majority thought that they ought not to discourage the negotiation of reciprocity treaties, even if this was only for the purpose of leaving on the United States the responsibility of their failure, while the minority preferred not to commit itself to any given policy, leaving the whole matter to the respective governments, although in reality they seemed convinced of the advantage of such treaties and wished to negotiate them.

The discussion on this subject in the Conference was carried on mainly between the delegates of the Argentine Republic and of the United States, who were members of the committee; but the economic policy of both countries rather than that of negotiating reciprocity

treaties was the subject really discussed. The Conference finally approved the recommendation of the majority in favor of such treaties, and refused to give a vote against customs union, because they regarded this as a step which might be misunderstood, in the sense of acting against one of the objects of the law convening the Conference, and because the United States delegates were among the first to acknowledge the impracticability of such a union. The minority had to reconsider the abrupt manner in which they rejected the customs union.

Mr. Blaine attached a great deal of importance to this matter, and the deep interest he finally took in it was only revealed several months after the adjournment of the Conference. Conscious of the many advantages which would accrue to his country by the negotiation of such treaties, he did all that was in his power before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, which was at the time preparing the tariff bill approved by the President, October 1, 1890, to induce it to leave the duties on sugar as a good basis to negotiate such treaties. The official and private utterances of Mr. Blaine, which soon afterwards were made public, show very plainly the great importance he attached to the subject, and the interest he felt in it was so great that he even went so far as to antagonize his own political party. For the failure of reciprocity treaties he, therefore, cannot be responsible. The Argentine delegates, who were not aware of all his efforts, very likely thought that he was indifferent to this matter, but subsequent events have shown that this was not the case, although I understand that he did not favor free wool, which was what they desired.

Mr. Blaine's suggestions in favor of reciprocity made to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, with a view to favor reciprocity with the Latin-American countries, were not accepted, and instead of that, sugar, which was the principal inducement that the United States could offer to those nations, was placed in the free list.

Instead of the commercial reciprocity, as understood in the treaties with Canada, concluded June 5, 1854, with the Hawaiian Islands on January 30, 1875, and the unexecuted treaty with Mexico of January 20, 1883, namely, the admission into the United States free of duty of commodities produced in the Latin-American countries paying high duties under the tariff bill, and vice versa, which was equivalent to a partial free trade applicable only to a few commodities, and which was what Mr. Blaine recommended to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, Congress approved a measure which was really retaliation instead of reciprocity, namely, that whenever the President should be satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting sugars, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, raw

and uncured, or any of such articles, imposed duties or other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of the United States, which in view of the introduction of such articles into the United States he might deem to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he should have the power to suspend the free importation of such articles into the United States, for such time as he should deem just, and to levy a duty upon the same, which was specified in Section 3 of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890.

I can say with perfect certainty that none of the Latin-American countries ever established import duties with a view to discriminate against the United States, and that if sometimes they levy high duties. on commodities from this country, which are paid also by similar commodities from other countries, it is because they need such duties as revenue to defray their public expenses, and in no manner are they intended to discriminate against the United States or to act as an obstacle to the trade with this country.

The United States succeeded through their able diplomacy in making reciprocity agreements with Brazil on January 31, 1891, and Spain in behalf of Cuba and Porto Rico on June 16, 1891. As the largest portion of the sugar and coffee imported into the United States came respectively from Cuba and Brazil, the other American countries which exported those products had either to enter into similar reciprocity agreements or be subject to a differential duty, and many of them had to accept the very slight advantage offered by that tariff. The European nations which had colonies in America producing sugar and coffee had also, for the same reasons, to enter into similar arrangements.

Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, the Argentine Republic, Hayti, and other nations did not enter into any diplomatic agreement,—some, like Mexico, because they thought there was not sufficient compensation in the reciprocity provisions of the tariff, and others, like Colombia and Venezuela, because they depended almost exclusively on their import duties and could not possibly reduce them. President Harrison issued a proclamation on the 15th of March, 1892, levying differential duties of three cents per pound on the coffee imported from Colombia, Venezuela, and Hayti.

I have reason to know that neither of the countries which entered into such agreements were at all satisfied with them, and in fact the Brazilian agreement was the source of great dissatisfaction to the people of that country and of severe censure to Señor Mendonça, the Brazilian Minister in Washington, who negotiated it. Señor Mendonça stated that Mr. Blaine had promised him that he would not make reciprocity agreements in so far as sugar was concerned with any other country, which would have given to Brazil the monopoly of the sugar trade with

the United States, this being the principal inducement which the Brazilian Government had to accept the agreement; but when this fact was brought unofficially to the notice of Mr. Blaine, he denied having ever made any such promise.

President Cleveland was understood not to be in favor of the reciprocity agreement, but he could not take upon himself the responsibility of nullifying them by a mere executive act. This object was attained however, by the tariff bill of August 28, 1894, which terminated said agreements by ignoring them.

Sections 3d and 4th of the tariff Act approved on July 24, 1897, now in force, gives a larger scope for reciprocity agreements, but even that does not have enough inducement for the American countries to enter into such agreements, and I am not aware that so far any has been made.

There is an impression in this country that the Latin-American nations were very well satisfied with the reciprocity agreements and that they were very anxious to renew them, but I know that impression. is ungrounded. Some of the American republics have the impression that through reciprocity they may obtain a very large reduction of duties, as compared with other nations, on the sugar imported to the United States, and that is the reason why some of them are favorably disposed to make such agreements.

The result proves very clearly how little the real condition of things was appreciated by some of the manufacturing nations of Europe, when they feared that the outcome of the Conference might be the negotiation by the United States of reciprocity treaties with American republics that might interfere with their own existing commercial relations.

Lasting Results of the Conference.—I consider as the lasting results of the Pan-American Conference; the railway project, out of which came a Railway Commission which has done very important work; the Monetary Commission, which led to the meeting of the Brussels Conference, although its result so far has been nugatory; and the organization of the Bureau of American Republics.

I will speak especially of each of these three subjects, and before ending this paper I will mention others which the Conference took up but which were not quite as important, namely, the Montevideo Treaties and Commercial Nomenclature.

Intercontinental Railway Project.-The Committee on this subject appointed by the International American Conference recommended that a special International American Commission of engineers should meet in Washington to ascertain the routes, determine their true length, estimate the cost of each, and compare their respective advantages for the purpose of deciding upon the construction of an international railway connecting all the nations. That recommendation, which was approved by the Conference on February 26, 1890, appears