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arising in Europe, and very naturally the side to which he allied himself was in every instance the victorious one. Napoleon always made the best use of his victories, which gave him great prestige, thereby increasing proportionately his moral influence. He was considered by Europe as a great political genius who was leading France in the pathway of greatness and prosperity, and who could make no mistakes; and he became in fact the arbiter of the destinies of that continent. His military defeat in Mexico in 1862, the first one he had suffered, and which showed that he did not possess the foresight with which he was credited, and his moral and political defeat in 1867, caused by the fall and execution of Maximilian, showed the thinking men of the world that he also could fall into errors of judgment, and that he was not by any means the great man he had been supposed to be, causing him at once to descend from the high pedestal upon which his former success had placed him.

Men like Prince Bismarck saw that his reputation was usurped, and that he was not greatly above the average mortal, and prepared to strike the decisive blow which was dealt to him by Prussia in 1870. To deal this blow, Prince Bismarck took advantage of the complicated situation which Napoleon had created for himself in Mexico by declaring in 1866 the war against Austria which ended with the battle of Sadowa, thus strengthening Prussia, and putting her at the head of the North German Confederation at a time when Napoleon, engaged in Mexico, and in imminent danger of becoming involved in difficulties with the United States, could not well take part in that contest without running serious risks. The talent of Prince Bismarck consisted in taking advantage of the right moment. If Napoleon had not been engaged with the Mexican intervention, he undoubtedly would have taken the side either of Austria or of Prussia, and the war would have terminated in favor of the power backed by France, with territorial advantages for the latter; and thus he would have increased his reputation as a sagacious statesman. But had Napoleon supported either power, the probabilities are that the matter would have been settled without any war, or, if a war had broken out, it would have ended in favor of the allies of France. All this was swept away by the terrible collapse of 1867, which brought about his humiliation at Sedan and the fall of the empire.

It is true that before declaring war on Austria, Bismarck obtained assurances from Napoleon that he would remain neutral; but the difficulties in which the French emperor had involved himself by his Mexican venture decided his course in this case, and Prince Bismarck knew very well that while the Mexican scheme was pending the Emperor of the French could not well afford to take part in any other undertaking of a serious character.

I believe that future historians, looking at these events without passion or prejudice, and inspired by a desire to present facts as they really are, can reason only in this way. Mexico will have, as a reparation for the injustice done her by the French intervention, the sad satisfaction of having been the prime factor in the emancipation of Europe from the Napoleonic rule. MATIAS ROMERO.

The foregoing paper caused Señor Don Luis Maneyro, Mexican Consul at Bordeaux, to write a memorandum confirming the assertions contained in the same, and considering the circumstances that Señor Maneyro has lived in France since his infancy, and that his father and himself had been prominently connected with public affairs, the former being a witness of the events connected with the French intervention in Mexico, and has had exceptional opportunities to know what took place there, his opinion has a great deal of weight. I submitted to President Diaz this memorandum with the request that he should examine it and advise me whether it was correct in so far as the reported transactions between himself and Marshal Bazaine, commander of the French army, were concerned, and General Diaz in a letter, dated at the City of Mexico, June 5, 1897, answered me that before leaving the country, Marshal Bazaine offered to sell him, not his transportation material, but his powder, arms, and army clothing that he had in excess, and did not have the means of carrying with him. I give below Señor Maneyro's memorandum.

MEMORANDUM BY SEÑOR DON LUIS MANEYRO, MEXICAN CONSUL AT BORDEAUX.

In 1866 France was not bound by any treaty or agreement that could have prevented her from taking part in the German struggle for supremacy. She could have made the balance lean on the side she would have preferred, be it in favor of Prussia, be it in favor of the independent States of the German Confederation.

The consequences of such an intervention in the war of 1866, it is plainly to be seen, would have been most important for France and the empire; in fact it is impossible to exaggerate how far the result of events and the condition of affairs would have changed.

Perhaps merely the moral weight of French intervention on one side or the other would have given the final victory to her allies, perhaps Sadowa would not have taken place. All these conjectures are allowable, and the preponderance of France would then have been. undeniable.

At that time the French army enjoyed in Europe a well earned reputation, owing to its repeated triumphs after the fall of Napoleon I.

The restoration of Louis Philippe's Government and the Second Empire had been most successful in all their undertakings.

Everybody believed in the perfect organization and the easy mobilization of that most fortunate army, and although the system of Marshal Neil, who created the "Garde mobile" in imitation of the "landwehr," was not yet in existence, public confidence in the success of the French flag was thoroughly established.

The Luxembourg question presented a most plausible pretext for the intervention of France in the conflict. A very powerful party was inducing the Emperor to declare war, and the cabals nearest the two sovereigns at the Palace-those who influenced the Empress unfortunately comprised in their midst some Mexicans whose names are known to all, much to their disadvantage-were pushing them to form an alliance with Austria, Bavaria, Hanover, and against Prussia, then increasing in influence and power.

These courtiers who had had such disastrous influence during the period of hesitancy regarding the war of Mexico were then repaid for their former mistake.

Fate decreed that their unwholesome influence in 1862 should prevent the putting into practise their happy thought in 1866. That was really another of the evil consequences of the war of Mexico on unhappy France, and as determining the fall of the empire.

The following data which have been carefully examined were collected by a Mexican who is well acquainted with Paris, and mingled with the actors and spectators of those dramas of 1862-66 and 1870.

In May, 1866, the war party was very much in the majority at the Tuileries. Every day it was expected that the Luxembourg would be invaded by French troops, or at least that a declaration of war would be issued or some step taken which would admit of no backing out.

The reports of the French military attachés residing in various countries encouraged the hopes of success, and it was not to be supposed that Austria would be utterly defeated, on account of the number of her allies, but rather it could be well imagined that Prussia was about to be annihilated.

France had it in her power to give the victory to either side. The Emperor was determined, and the chiefs of his army corps who were consulted said that all reliance could be placed on their troops.

It was then that the grain of sand was visible, that grain of sand sent by God, as Bossuet terms it, which brings about the downfall of empires when they are most occupied with their glory and their pride.

That grain of sand became the retribution that Fate reserved for the unjust aggression against Mexico, it was the betrayal of the Commissary Department which made it impossible for France to undertake an European war.

When the Commissiary Department was consulted, the scaffolding broke down, carrying with it all the combinations then made, and compelling France to remain passive, to paralyze her efforts, to reduce her to a mere spectator of a movement which changed the situation of Europe, built the powerful German nation threatening France at her very doors. Germany was already hostile to France, was cognizant of her superiority, and wished to restore the old frontiers existing before the Palatinate War.

France had 50,000 men in Mexico. Outside of Algiers, she still had 160,000 men distributed in four large military divisions. If half of these troops would cross the Rhine, they might decide the princes who were hesitating to ally themselves to France, since, until the first victories of the Prussians took place and until the affair of Langensalz, many petty sovereigns and principalities were sorely troubled and did not know with what party they should side.

The answer given by the Commissary Department when consulted was as follows:

"It is impossible to undertake a campaign under existing conditions of things. All the train material that could be used is in Mexico. We could not collect nor keep in store the necessary provisions, supplies, rations, ammunition, etc., for an army corps of six thousand men.'

And yet the Commissaires Wolf and Friant kept up their urgent demand from Mexico for more train and artillery material!

The army corps of 50,000 men had required and absorbed war material sufficient for an army of 200,000 men in active campaign in Europe.

Everything had been taken away from the various warehouses, everything was in Mexico. The lack of railways, the bad condition of the roads, the immense extent of land that the army had to cross, the army which was greatly subdivided and whose sections were at enormous distances from each other-the difficulty of providing the means of subsistence in a hostile country, where the places actually occupied were under the dominion of the invader, the necessities of an European army, which was not accustomed to the frugality and sobriety of the Mexican soldiers, all the above rendered necessary four times the amount of war material required in European countries.

The condition of the roads and the difficulties encountered in the moving of army trains had at times even brought about the destruction of war material which could not be carried away or had to remain buried in the mud. The large pieces for siege artillery, which had been brought for the investment of Oaxaca, had to be carried on men's shoulders; and portions of them had to be left dismounted and scattered on the trunks of trees. All the military trains were in Mexico, and still they were not sufficient to perform the work assigned to them.

The transport ships which carried that material would arrive one after the other, and immediately had to return to France to look for some more freight of a like nature, which could not be obtained.

The stormy passage of some of those vessels had resulted in the throwing overboard of a portion of their cargoes.

The transportation of the wounded, of provisions, and of ammunition was made under contract with the mule drivers of the country. No wagons or carts remained in France.

Upon the eve of abandoning Maximilian, Marshal Bazaine, when he knew that General Porfirio Diaz refused to buy his powder and the mules for his trains, had to drown the latter and burn the former. The French army was compelled to return to France, owing principally to the active influence brought to bear on Mr. Seward by Mr. Romero, Mexican Minister at Washington, which gave rise to the demand made by the United States on France to abandon Mexican territory gradually and at stated periods.

But that army returned to France without any war material and found none awaiting it in its native country.

The war against Germany was impossible, as was well understood by those who knew what an important part the Commissary Department plays in any war.

The Emperor and those who foresaw coming events, much against their will, had to abandon the opportunity that presented itself in the spring of 1866, and which was the only one which could possibly The results of such a step we all know well enough; they were the disasters and fall of the empire, the humiliation of France, and the loss of a portion of her territory.

occur.

Mexico had obtained her full revenge.

ADDRESSES ON THE CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN
REVOLUTIONS.

I have tried to make it clear in the minds of the people of the United States, availing myself of all the opportunities which have been presented to me, that there were sufficient causes for the revolutions that we had in Mexico, and that such causes having come to an end, there was no danger of any new outbreaks. It would be very long to insert here all the addresses that I have made with that object in view, in the many years of my official residence in this country, and I will therefore only mention such as, considering the occasion on which they were delivered, and the standing and character of the gentlemen participating in the same, I regard of more importance.

Banquet in New York City on March 29, 1864.-On March 29, 1864, after my return from Mexico as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

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