(3) whether petitioner has filed in any court, state or federal, previous petitions, applications, or motions with respect to this conviction; if so, the name and location of each such court, the specific nature of the proceedings therein, the disposition thereof, the date of each such disposition and (if known), citations of any written opinions or orders entered therein.

(d) The following additional information shall be supplied by a petitioner in federal custody who is seeking a writ of habeas corpus :

(1) whether petitioner has filed in any court, state or federal, previous petitions for habeas corpus, motions (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255) to vacate sentence, or any other petitions, motions or applications with respect to this conviction; if so, the name and location of any and all such courts, the specific nature of the proceedings therein, the disposition thereof, the date of each such disposition, and (if known) citations of any written opinions or orders entered therein;

(2) in concise form, the grounds upon which petitioner bases his allegation that he is being held in custody unlawfully, the facts which support each of these grounds, and whether any such grounds have been previously presented to any federal court by way of petition for a writ of habeas corpus, motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, or any other petition, motion or application; if so, which grounds have been previously presented and in what proceedings; and

(3) if a previous motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 was not filed, or if such a motion was filed and denied, the reasons why petitioner's remedy by way of such motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

(e) The following additional information shall be supplied by a petitioner in federal custody who is seeking relief by motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255:

(1) the name of the judge who imposed sentence;

(2) in concise form, the grounds upon which petitioner bases his allegation that the sentence which was imposed upon him is invalid, the facts which support each of these grounds, whether any such grounds have been presented to any federal court on a previous petition for a writ of habeas corpus, motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, or any other petition, motion or application, and, if so, which grounds have been previously presented and in which proceedings; and

(3) whether petitioner has filed in any court petitions for habeas corpus, motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, or any other petitions, motions or applications with respect to this conviction; if so, the name and location of each such court, the specific nature of the proceedings therein, the disposition thereof, the date of each such disposition and (if known), citations of any written opinion or orders entered therein.

(f) Where a petition or motion is taken in forma pauperis, petitioner shall complete the forma pauperis affidavit attached to the back of the form and shall set forth information which establishes that he will be unable to pay the fees and costs of the habeas corpus or 28 U.S.C. 2255 proceedings.

(g) Petitions and motions shall be addressed to: United States District Judge, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner shall send to the Court an original and one copy of the completed petition or motion form. Done and ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 30th day of September 1963. G. HAROLD CARSWELL, U.S. District Judge.

Senator Cook. Only one question, Mr. Waits, relative to a question from the Senator from Maryland. You have no knowledge really of your own whether this is the first time the sheriff of Gadsden County has had a writ of habeas corpus?

Mr. WAITS. No, sir; I wouldn't know how many he may have had. Senator Cook. I noticed that the Senator pursued it and you said that to your knowledge it may have been the first time but you have no knowledge.

Mr. WAITS. This is the first time that I had ever had any contact with him about one, sir.

Senator Cook. All right, sir.

Senator TYDINGS. I wonder where you got a copy of that rule?
Mr. WAITS. Sir?

Senator TYDINGS. Where did you get your copy of rule 15?

Mr. WAITS. Sir, rule 15, this copy here, has been attached to the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Florida General Rules of Practice, Bankruptcy Rules of Practice, effective July 1, 1959. This amendment has been attached to this copy of those rules, sir,

Senator TYDINGS. Where did you get your copy of the rule?
Mr. WAITS. Where did I get them, sir?

Senator TYDINGS. Yes.

Mr. WAITS. I got them in the clerk's office, Tallahassee, Fla., U.S. district court.

Senator TYDINGS. I have nothing further.

(The Chairman subsequently made the following affidavit a part of the record:)

STATE OF FLORIDA, COUNTY OF GADSDEN, SS:

Before me, the undersigned authority, this day personally appeared Otho W. Edwards of Quincy, Gadsden County, Florida, who being by me first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he was Sheriff of Gadsden County, Florida from February 5, 1944 until January 7, 1969; that during the year 1964, he recalls that warrants were sworn out by the Justice of the Peace in Gadsden County, Florida, for the arrest of Stuart Wechsler and several other defendants on charges of criminal trespass, and in the performance of his duty he served said warrants upon the said Wechsler and the others and arrested them according to the commands of said warrants; that at some point these cases were removed to the Federal District Court of the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division, presided over by Federal District Judge Harrold Carswell; that after these cases were removed to Federal Court, Judge Carswell issued an order directing him as Sheriff of Gadsden County to release said defendants, and on the same day Judge Carswell issued an order remanding the Wechsler proceedings to the Justice of Peace Court in Quincy, Gadsden County, Florida, and ordering the defendants to be released on bond. The order granting petition for writ of habeas corpus and the order of remand were delivered to him by the attorney for the defendants.

Affiant further says that to his best recollection he has never talked with Judge Carswell, either by telephone or in person, about these cases, or, as a matter of fact, about any other court proceedings until he was called on the telephone by Judge Carswell on January 30, 1970, and was asked what his recollection was about receiving notice of the Judge's action in the Wechsler case, and affiant told him he had never had a telephone conversation with him about that or anything else. Affiant further says that his only other contacts with Judge Carswell have been that he testified once in Judge Carswell's court as a witness in a criminal case and he saw him once at a doctor's office in Tallahassee and they exchanged greetings for no more than a minute or two.

Affiant further says that at the time these cases were pending in Federal Court, Marvin Waits of Tallahassee, Florida, was Deputy Marshal in charge of the Tallahassee office and he recalls asking Mr. Waits if he would let him know when the court ruled in the matter so that he might judge his actions accordingly, and pursuant to this request, Mr. Waits did call him and advised him of the orders entered by Judge Carswell on August 17, 1964; that this call by Mr. Waits was in accordance with the routine procedure which existed between enforcement agencies in our area at that time and so far as he can recall this was a courtesy extended to any enforcement agency or officer who made a similar request.

OTHо W. EDWARDS.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 31st day of January, 1970.

BARBARA R. BROWN,
Notary Public, State of Florida at Large.

My Commission expires: January 15, 1972.
Senator BURDICK. The next witness is Mr. Conyers.

40-399-70--14

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I am Congressman Conyers from Michigan. I have been over here all this morning. I have been waiting patiently to testify and will continue to do so. But would you be kind enough to indicate to me approximately when I will be permitted to offer testimony in this matter?

Senator Cook. Mr. Chairman, I would like to move that the Congressman be given the privilege of testifying at this time.

Senator TYDINGS. I think he should be given that privilege right

now.

Senator BURDICK. You will be given the privilege without a motion. I did not know the Congressman was here.

Senator HRUSKA. I might say that there had been a request of the chairman by another Senator that Mr. Schlossberg be heard briefly before Congressman Conyers. I do not know if the chairman was. aware that the Congressman was here or not. That request did not come from this side of the chairman. It came from the other side of the chairman. I make that by way of explanation, Congressman, because that request was made by another member of the committee. Senator BURDICK. Proceed, Congressman.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. In coming before this committee to speak against the appointment of Judge Carswell to the Supreme Court I reflect the considered judgment of my eight other black colleagues who serve in the House of Representatives. This presentation, however, is specifically endorsed by the following: Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm of New York. Congressman William Dawson of Illinois.

Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of New York.
Congressman William Clay of Missouri.

Congressman Louis Stokes of Ohio.

The other black members are in business and other activity and had not been able to read this final document, but they are united in the opposition again of this nominee to the Supreme Court.

If our argumentation against this nominee and the one before him could be heard and understood by the President of the United States, then perhaps you could be spared these continued appearances on my part. I am here again to prevail upon you to establish the basic principle that any person of a racist or segregationist persuasion is per se unqualified to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court. I grant you that this is to some in the Congress a new and strange point of view. There are those who may even consider it un-American, especially when a racist persuasion does not exclude one from either of the other two branches of the Federal Government but we must begin somewhere, must we not?

As is the case so frequently in American politics, this daring suggestion is really not as revolutionary as it first sounds; it is more a matter of practicing what we preach. It is a matter of putting into effect the lofty platitudes that everyone agrees upon. On August 8, 1968, when he was accepting the Republican nomination to be President, Richard Nixon said:

Let those who have the responsibility to enforce our laws and our judges have the responsibility to interpret them be dedicated to the great principles of civil rights.

I urge that the Senate insist that the President keep his pledge. This is why I urge you to reject the nomination of Judge Carswell to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court.

To black Americans and their leaders and to millions of whites who are dedicated participants in the struggle for freedom, this nomination is the second in a series of attempts to subvert the cause of equal justice. What is more, this strategy is becoming clearer to more citizens each day. No amount of obfuscation that may take place during these hearings is going to change that.

How can we come here today and seriously argue that Judge Carswell's unquestionably racist philosophy has changed, now that he has been nominated to the Supreme Court? It is hardly sufficient to suggest that this appointment will do him a world of good. In the meantime it will do the Nation a world of harm.

We should not have to take that risk. There are 320,000 attorneys, 439 Federal judges, and thousands of State court judges in the United States. Why does the President have to nominate one with a racist background?

You have before this body for consideration a nominee whose record as a judge leaves in my mind no doubt of his inability to sit on the highest court of the land and fairly decide issues that bear upon the question of equality between the races.

Second, we have a man who as a mature leader of his community committed himself to that perverse, sick theory, white supremacy. This theory of racism has created more dissension, ill will, and hatred than any other notion in the 194 years of our Nation's history, and some would still attempt to rationalize Mr. Carswell's attachment to this contemptible doctrine. How can we put a man on the highest bench who has said, and I quote only in brief part:

"I am a southerner by ancestry, birth, training, and inclination, belief and practice. I believe that segregation of the races is proper, and the only practical and correct way of life in our States. I have always so believed and I shall always so act. I shall be the last to submit to any attempt on the part of anyone to break down and to weaken this firmly established policy of our people. If my own brother were to advocate such a program, I would be compelled to take issue with him and to oppose him to the limits of my ability. I yield to no man, as a fellow candidate or as a fellow citizen, in the firm, vigorous belief in the principles of white supremacy, and I shall always be so governed."

Third, while a member of the Justice Department he participated as a director in changing a public golf course to a private facility for the express purpose of excluding blacks, in opposition to the court decision, and then denied his activity until it was exposed.

Through 1967, of the four civil rights cases that were decided by Judge Carswell and subsequently appealed to the circuit court, four were reversed, and I hope somebody asks me to cite them. And in addition, as Senator William Proxmire has pointed out: "Perhaps an even more disturbing phenomenon, however, because it goes beyond interpreting the law, has been Judge Carswell's habit of delaying civil rights litigation as long as possible. For example, in the Steele against Leon County Board of Education, a school desegregation case, plaintiff made a motion for further relief on May 7, 1964. On May 26, Judge

Carswell sustained defendant's objections to the raising of questions looking into teacher segregation. No further hearings were ordered before school opened. On January 20, 1965, the school was found to be in compliance with certain 1963 orders. In February of 1965, plaintiffs filed a further motion for hearings. After a series of legal maneuverings the court reaffirmed a denial of plaintiff's motion for further relief. Finally, on January 18, 1967, the circuit court remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in United States against Jefferson County Board of Education-tantamount to a reversal. Finally, after almost 3 years, the Carswell court granted the relief sought. This dilatory behavior in civil rights cases, where justice delayed is certainly justice denied-in this instance for 3 school years casts serious doubt upon Judge Carswell's judicial temperament."

In a study done as a Yale Ph. D. dissertation in 1966 by Mary Hannah Curzan, Judge Carswell was found to be one of a group of 10 Southern judges whose civil rights decisions merited them the segregationist label. This label was applied, by the way, to only onethird of the Southern judges whose civil rights decisions were analyzed. In a recent interview Professor Leroy D. Clark of New York University, who formerly headed the operation of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in Northern Florida, claimed Carswell had repeatedly delayed school cases by failing to rule until pressed to do so, and then often by issuing decisions that were palpably wrong and quickly reversed. "We would have a hearing and it would take several months for him to rule," Mr. Clark said. "I would have to file a motion to ask him 'would you please rule?' which is outrageous."

Mr. Clark, is also quoted by Time Magazine as saying that "he was probably the most hostile judge I have ever appeared before; he would rarely let me finish a sentence."

Professor John Lowenthal of Rutgers University, a law professor, has, I presume, already testified before your committee as to the procedural tactics of Judge Carswell in 1964 in a case against civil rights workers trying to help enroll black voters in Florida. Professor Lowenthal said he found Judge Carswell's behavior consistent with his commitment to white supremacy.

Mr. William Kunstler, a prominent civil rights and civil liberties lawyer has also expressed to me his intentions to testify before this committee concerning his own shocking experiences as a trial lawyer in Judge Carswell's court.

To any serious member of the bar, an appointment to the Supreme Court is the highest recognition that can be achieved. In the instant case of the present nominee, there can be found little or no trace of judicial or scholarship.

Mr. Chairman, from his own admission he has never written any legal articles or other papers. Such considerations were apparently irrelevant in President Nixon's search for the right political man. James A. Wechsler has raised the question quite appropriately in my mind when he said:

"Was this the worthiest prospect available even granting the premise that the seat was being reserved for a Southern conservative? The conclusion is an insult to the very breed of man Carswell is supposed to represent, and which has on occasion produced judges widely esteemed for their learning in the law. Such an appointment invites