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some other cause, than the dignity of a State. no difficulty in finding this cause. Those, who were inhibited from commencing a suit against a State, or from prosecuting one, which might be commenced before the adoption of the amendment, were persons, who might probably be its creditors. There was not much reason to fear, that foreign or sister States would be creditors to any considerable amount; and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the Court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace. The amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced, or prosecuted by individuals, but not to those brought by States.

§ 362. The first impression, made on the mind by this amendment, is, that it was intended for those cases, and for those only, in which some demand against a State is made by an individual in the courts of the Union. If we consider the cause, to which it is to be traced, we are conducted to the same conclusion. A general interest might well be felt, in leaving to a State the full power of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no interest could be felt in so changing the relations between the whole and its parts, as to strip the Government of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its courts, the Constitution and laws from active violation.

§ 363. This amendment, then, was designed to prevent any suit being originally commenced by any private person against a State; but it was not designed to control or interfere with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in cases to which that appellate jurisdiction extended before the amendment. A case, therefore, originally commenced by a State against a private person in any other Court, which involved any question arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties, of the United States, might still be revised by the Supreme Court, upon an appeal, or writ of error, as the case might require.

§ 364. Another inquiry, touching the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, of a still more general character, is, whether it extends only to the inferior courts of the Union, constituted by Congress, or reaches to cases

decided in the State courts. This question has been made on several occasions; and it has been most deliberately and solemnly decided by the Supreme Court, that it reaches the latter cases.

§ 365. We have already seen, that appellate jurisdiction is given by the Constitution to the Supreme Court, in all cases, where it has not original jurisdiction; subject, however, to such exceptions and regulations, as Congress may prescribe. It is, therefore, capable of embracing every case enumerated in the Constitution, which is not exclusively to be decided by way of original jurisdiction. But the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited, by the terms of the Constitution, to the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt, that Congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it may vest appellate, as well as original jurisdiction. The judicial power is delegated by the Constitution in the most general terms, and may, therefore, be exercised by Congress, under every variety of form of appellate, or of original jurisdiction. And as there is nothing in the Constitution, which restrains, or limits this power, it must, therefore, in all these cases, subsist in the utmost latitude, of which, in its own nature, it is susceptible.

§ 366. If the Constitution meant to limit the appellate jurisdiction to cases pending in the courts of the United States, it would necessarily follow, that the jurisdiction of these courts would, in all the cases enumerated in the Constitution, be exclusive of State tribunals. How, otherwise, could the jurisdiction extend to all cases, arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties, of the United States, or, to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction? If some of these cases might be entertained by State tribunals, and no appellate jurisdiction, as to them, should exist, then the appellate power would not extend to all, but to some, cases. If State tribunals might exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all, or some of the other classes of cases in the Constitution, without control, then the appellate jurisdiction of the United States might, as to such cases, have no real existence, contrary

circumstances, to give effect to the judicial power, it must be construed to be exclusive; and this, not only when the very question should arise directly; but when it should arise incidentally, in cases pending in State courts. This construction would abridge the jurisdiction of such courts far more, than has been ever contemplated in any act of Congress.

367. But it is plain, that the framers of the Constitution did contemplate, that cases within the judicial cognizance of the United States, not only might, but would arise in the State courts, in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction. With this view, the sixth article declares, that, "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges, in every State, shall be bound thereby, any thing, in the Constitution or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding." It is obvious, that this obligation is imperative upon the State judges in their official, and not merely in their private capacities. From the very nature of their judicial duties, they would be called upon to pronounce the law, applicable to the case in judgement. They were not to decide, merely according to the laws, or Constitution, of the State, but according to the Constitution, laws, and treaties, of the United States, "the supreme law of the land."

§ 368. A moment's consideration will show us the necessity and propriety of this provision, in cases, where the jurisdiction of the State courts is unquestionable. Suppose a contract, for the payment of money, is made between citizens of the same State, and performance thereof is sought in the courts of that State; no person can doubt, that the jurisdiction completely and exclusively attaches, in the first instance, to such courts. Suppose at the trial, the defendant sets up, in his defence, a tender under a State law, making paper money a good tender, or a State law, impairing the obligation of such contract, which law, if binding, would defeat the suit. The Con

shall make any thing but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, or pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. If Congress shall not have passed a law, providing for the removal of such a suit to the courts of the United States, must not the State court proceed to hear, and determine it? Can a mere plea in defence be, of itself, a bar to further proceedings, so as to prohibit an inquiry into its truth, or legal propriety, when no other tribunal exists, to which judicial cognizance of such cases is confided? Suppose an indictment for a crime in a State court, and the defendant should allege in his defence, that the crime was created by an ex post facto act of the State, must not the State court, in the exercise of a jurisdiction, which has already rightfully attached, have a right to pronounce on the validity, and sufficiency of the defence? It would be extremely difficult, upon any legal principles, to give a negative answer to these inquiries. Innumerable instances of the same sort might be stated, in illustration of the position; and unless the State courts could sustain jurisdiction in such cases, this clause of the sixth article would be without meaning or effect; and public mischiefs, of a most enormous magnitude, would inevitably ensue.

§ 369. It must, therefore, be conceded, that the Constitution not only contemplated, but meant to provide for, cases within the scope of the judicial power of the United States, which might yet be brought before State tribunals. It was foreseen, that, in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction, State courts would, incidentally, take cognizance of cases arising under the Constitution, the laws, and treaties, of the United States. Yet, to all these cases the judicial power, by the very terms of the Constitution, is to extend. It cannot extend, by original jurisdiction, if that has already rightfully and exclusively attached in the State courts, which (as has been already shown) may occur; it must, therefore, extend by appellate jurisdiction, or not at all. It would seem to follow, that the appellate power of the United States must, in such cases, extend to State tribunals; and, if in such cases, there is no reason, why it should not equally attach upon all others

§370. It is manifest, that the Constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given and withheld powers according to the judgement of the American people, by whom it was adopted. We can only construe its powers, and cannot here inquire into the policy, or principles, which induced the grant of them. The Constitution has presumed, (whether rightly or wrongly, we do not here inquire,) that State attachments, State prejudices, State jealousies, and State interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct, or control, the regular administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between States; between citizens of different States; between citizens, claiming grants under different States; between a State and its citizens, or foreigners; and between citizens and foreigners; it enables the parties, under the authority of Congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and determined, before the National tribunals. No other reason, than that, which has been stated, can be assigned, why some, at least, of these cases should not have been left to the cognizance of the State courts. In respect to the other enumerated cases,- -cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties, of the United States; cases affecting ambassadors, and other public ministers; and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, reasons of a higher and more extensive nature, touching the safety, peace, and sovereignty, of the Nation, might well justify a grant of exclusive jurisdiction.

§ 371. This is not all. A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the most sincere respect for State tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive is the importance, and even necessity, of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the Constitution. Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different States, might differently interpret a statute, or a treaty, of the United States, or even the Constitution itself. If there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgements, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the Constitution, of the United States, would be different

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