The People agt. The Mayor, &c., of New-York. severed by his putting in a separate defence, and if the other parties who do not wish to defend, desire to be relieved from costs, they should pay the demand. Suppose the summons and complaint in this case, had only been served on Norman Ford, and he had put in the same answer which he did, and the plaintiff had demurred, and judgment had been given for the plaintiff the same as it was, the plaintiff would have been obliged to take judgment against all of the defendants. (Crandall agt. Beach, 7 How. P. R. 271, 272.) It is only necessary, however, to decide in this case, that when the defendants' liability is joint and but one judg ment can be entered, the defendants are equally liable for the whole costs when one has suffered a default and the other has defended the action unsuccessfully. This motion must be denied, with $10 costs. SUPREME COURT. THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, and JAMES B. TAYLOR and OWEN W. BRENNAN agt. THE MAYOR, &c., of New-York, and others. It is not good cause of demurrer that there are too many plaintiffs or too many defendants. Nor is it good cause of demurrer that the plaintiff asks in his complaint for more than it shows he is entitled to; for relief that he is not entitled to; or for further relief than he is entitled to. Nor is the insertion in the complaint of redundant or impertinent matter, or of irrelevant or unmeaning verbiage, cause of demurrer. Under the Code, the plaintiff may present in his complaint a mass of heterogeneous facts, and a volume of unmeaning words, and any number of prayers for the most various and inconsistent relief; and none of these defects can be reached by demurrer, provided the complaint contains no matter in what state of disorganization, the elementary constituents of a good cause of action. On demurrer to such a complaint, on the ground that it contains no cause of ac The People agt. The Mayor, &c., of New-York. tion, it is the duty of the court to uncover the mass of heterogeneous facts, and to sort out and to arrange them; and if it is found that any lot or parcel of them, when arranged and placed together, will stand alone as a cause of action, it is the duty of the court to overrule the demurrer. In this case two sets of plaintiffs by different attorneys, the people of the state, by their attorney-general, and Taylor and Brennan, by their attorneys, come into court, and in the same complaint say, that the defendants unlawfully withhold the possession of certain premises in the city of New-York, either from the people or from Taylor and Brennan; and with other relief asked for, ask that the defendants "may be adjudged to render possession of the said premises to the plaintiffs, or to such of them as shall be declared entitled thereto; and to pay to them jointly or severally the sum of $100,000, for the rents, issues and profits of said premises, whilst the same have been unlawfully withheld from the said plaintiffs." In an action under the Code to recover the possession of real estate, the further claim and proceeding allowed in the action to recover the rents and profits, &c., are also allowed against the defendant as a trespasser; as a substitute for the action of trespass, and the suggestion on the record for the mesne profits, before the Code. Held, on a joint demurrer by the city corporation and many of the other defendants in this case, to the complaint, that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, that it was clear that there was no cause of action by either the people or by Taylor and Brennan, against the city corporation for withholding the premises, &c. The premises in question were actually occupied by the tenants of the city corporation; and the plaintiff's had no right to make the city corporation a defendant in such action. The rule of the Revised Statutes, that in such a case the tenants in the actual occupation should alone be made defendants, has not been altered by the Code. Had the city corporation demurred separately on the ground that there was no cause of action stated in the complaint against it, the demurrer would have been sustained; but the demurrer being joint with some of the other defendants, it must be overruled, if the complaint showed a cause of action by the people or by Taylor and Brennan, against such other defendants. Held also, that neither the common law rule, nor the statute making conveyances of land held adversely void as to the party in possession, applies to conveyances by the people of the state, or by public officers duly authorized; strictly, there can be no adverse possession as against the people; the people cannot be disscized. Therefore, the lease to Taylor and Brennan was valid, and gave them a right of entry, although the premises at the time were actually held and occupied under a title hostile to the title of the state; and having the right of entry, Taylor and Brennan could bring their action to recover the possession of the same, and the rents and profits, since the execution of the lease, as damages, &c. Held, that the complaint contained this cause of action on the part of Taylor and Brennan alone, against the defendants, the tenants in the actual occupation of The People agt. The Mayor, &c., of New-York. the premises alone; which was sufficient to save the complaint on joint demurrer by the city corporation, and the other defendants. New-York Special Term, October, 1858. DEMURRER to complaint. The facts stated in the complaint will sufficiently appear in the opinion. W. HUTCHINS and E. W. STOUGHTON, for plaintiffs. CHAS. O'CONOR, WM. C. NOYES and RICHARD BUSTEED for defendants. SUTHERLAND, Justice. Before the Code, when actions had names, this action would have been called an action of ejectment to recover the possession of certain real estate in the city of New-York. The corporation of the city of New-York and about one hundred and sixty of the other defendants, jointly demur to the complaint on the following grounds: First. That it does not contain facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Second. That three separate and distinct causes of action are improperly joined, to wit: 1. A cause of action by the people for improvident and unlawful management of property by the city corporation. 2. An ejectment by the people with a claim for damage. 3. A like claim by Taylor and Brennan. Thirdly. That said three causes of action are not separately stated. Fourthly. That there is a defect of parties plaintiffs, by the improper joinder of Taylor and Brennan as plaintiffs, with the people, who being claimants adverse to the people, should be defendants. The defendants William H. Taylor, and a few others, separately demur to the complaint on the following grounds: First. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action on behalf of the people. Secondly. That there is a defect of parties by the improper joinder of Taylor and Brennan with the people. The People agt. The Mayor, &c., of New-York. As was pertinently said on the argument, "the complaint is essentially a pleading under the Code; it is without form." Two sets of plaintiffs by different attorneys, the people of the state, by Lyman Tremain, their attorney-general, and Taylor and Brennan, by Slosson and Hutchins, their attorneys, come into court, and in the same complaint say, that the defendants unlawfully withhold the possession of certain prem ises in the city of New-York, either from the people or from Taylor and Brennan; and with other relief asked for, ask that the defendants "may be adjudged to render possession of the said premises to the plaintiffs, or to such of them as shall be declared entitled thereto; and to pay to them jointly or sev erally the sum of one hundred thousand dollars for the rents, issues and profits of said premises, whilst the same have been unlawfully withheld from the said plaintiffs." The facts stated in the complaint to show a right to the possession or a right of entry, in either the people or in Taylor and Brennan; and to a judgment that either the people of the state or Taylor and Brennan, recover the possession, with damages for the rents and profits, &c., are substantially as follows: That the people of the state are now, and have been for many years, owners in fee of the premises, and are legally entitled to the rents, issues and profits thereof since, unless a certain lease thereof to Taylor and Brennan, (afterwards particu larly described in the complaint, and a copy of which is annexed thereto,) be held valid. That the mayor, aldermen, &c., of the city of New-York, have taken possession of the premises, and through their agents rented the same, or the greater portion thereof, for market and other purposes, to the other defendants in the action; and unless said lease be held valid, withhold from the plaintiffs, the people of the state, tho possession thereof to their great damage and injury. That the commissioners of the land office, on behalf of the people of the state, by virtue of the authority vested in them by law, executed and delivered to Taylor and Brennan a lease of the premises for one year from the 24th day of April, 1858, at the The People agt. The Mayor, &c., of New-York. yearly rent of five thousand dollars, payable quarterly in advance. That under said lease, if the same be held valid, Taylor and Brennan became lawfully possessed of the premises on the first day of May preceding the commencement of the action, (May, 1858.) That Taylor and Brennan being so possessed of the premises, the mayor, &c., claiming to own said premises, have taken possession thereof as aforesaid, and through their agents have rented the same to the other defendants, who wrongfully withhold from Taylor and Brennan, the possession of the premises to their great damage and injury. That Taylor and Brennan are legally entitled to the possession of said premises under the lease, and to the rents and profits thereof, since the first day of May, 1858. That the parties now in the actual possession of the premises claim to hold as lessees or by permits of the mayor, &c., and have been directed by the agents of the city, not to deliver possession thereof to the said plaintiffs, or to pay to them the rents thereof, but to pay the same to the agents of the city. That the tenants refuse to acknowledge the right of the plaintiffs or to pay them the rent, but pay the rent to those who act or claim to act as the agents of the city to receive the same. That the occupants of the premises pay, and for several years preceding the commencement of the action, had paid in the aggregate, for the use of the premises, the sum of forty thousand dollars annually. These appear to be all the allegations in the complaint, bearing on the question of the right of possession, or to damage for the withholding the possession, or the rents, issues and profits. There are other allegations in the complaint, as to the loose and improvident manner in which the rents of the premises had been collected and paid over; the pecuniary irresponsibility and want of authority of persons professing to act for the city, in the collection of the rents; the danger that the rents will be lost by the city, and by the plaintiffs; the duty of Mr. Flagg, the city comptroller, to collect the rents if they be longed to the city; and his refraining from collecting the same, because he believed that the premises belonged to the state, and that the city had no legal right to such rent; the non-resi |