and liberal inquiry, as the series of decisions in the federal courts have been brought nnder examination, I have uniformly felt, though the vessel was at the time employed within the waters of a state in lightering vessels in the foreign or coastwise trade, Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244. When Congress has not acted, the states have more power, and, at least in matters of local interest, they may make local regulations. Thus, it appears that they may authorize the construction of bridges, &c., over navigable waters within their limits. Gilman v. Philadelphia, supra. See Comm. v. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 339; United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 W. & M. 401; Silliman v. Hudson R. Bridge Co., 4 Blatchf. 74, 395; 1 Black, 582; Albany Bridge Case, 2 Wall. 403; The Passaic Bridges, 3 Wall. 782; Illinois R. Packet Co. v. Peoria Bridge Ass., 38 Ill. 467; Woodman v. Kilbourn Man. Co., 6 Am. L. Reg. N. s. 238. They may regulate pilotage and impose penalties on vessels not taking pilots. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. See Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292; Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450. (But a law entitling port wardens to a fee, whether called on for any service or not, from every vessel arriving in that port, is void. Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31. See People v. Brooks, 4 Den. 469.) They such laws as are reasonably necessary to the regulation of its internal police, though such laws may incidentally affect inter-state or foreign commerce. Thus, it may pass inspection laws, Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38; s. c. 55 Md. 240; may make reasonable regulations as to landing-places along the borders of navigable rivers, Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Vicksburg v. Tobin, ib. 430; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; may provide that certain kinds of property shall not be allowed within its borders in such a condition as to be dangerous, may protect their oyster fisheries, even by inflicting the forfeiture of a vessel enrolled and licensed under United States laws, for a breach of proper state regulations. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71. Although, as has been said, a stream may be entirely within one state and yet be a highway for commerce with another, and subject to the regulations of Congress for that purpose, it seems to be consistent with this doctrine that a state may grant the exclusive navigation of a river lying wholly within its limits and running into the sea, above the point of navigability from the sea, the waters in question not being part of a line of commerce to points outside the state. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568. (b) Over what Commerce. Again, it is always conceded that Congress has no control over commerce which is carried on entirely within the limits of a state, and which does not extend to or affect other states (except, according to Chase, C. J., as a necessary and proper means for carrying into execution some other power expressly granted or vested. United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41, 44; ante, 254, n. 1). On these principles a police regulation of sales of inflammable oils was held to have no constitutional opera Harrigan v. Conn. River Lumber Co., 129 Mass. 580; may impose license fees even upon vessels engaged in inter-state commerce, Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 273; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 305. But such laws must not invade the exclusive domain of Congress, Foster v. Master, &c., 94 U. S. 246; Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259; Salzenstein v. Mavis, 91 Ill. 391. See infra, n. x1. See further on subject, Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 19 Wall. 584; King v. American Trans. Co., 1 Flip. 1; Sweatt v. Boston, &c. R. R. Co., 3 Cliff. 339. and it has been my invariable disposition to inculcate, a strong sentiment of deference and respect for the judicial authorities tion on sales within the several states. United States v. Dewitt, supra. So, a law requiring persons not to engage in certain kinds of business, such as selling liquor by retail, without having obtained a license from the United States, was interpreted as a mere form of imposing a tax, and it was intimated that such a license could not give authority to carry on the business within a state. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 471. It would not matter probably that commerce wholly within one state was carried on by means of the navigable waters of the United States. The waters might be subject to the control of Congress, while the particular commerce, as such, was not. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 565; The Bright Star, 1 Woolw. 266, 276. See State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204, 215. But a pretty liberal view is taken by the Supreme Court of what constitutes commerce between the several states, at least when it consists of transportation on the navigable waters of the United States. It is enough to subject a vessel to the regulations of Congress that she is engaged in carrying goods destined to a point outside the state over such waters, although she does not run in connection with any of the lines leading to such points, and the waters in question lie wholly within the state. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557. Commerce by Land, &c.— In the Daniel Ball the court expressly refrained from expressing an opinion upon the power of Congress over inter-state commerce when carried on by land transportation, but it has been asserted elsewhere that the power extends to the regulation of railroads which have voluntarily become parts of lines of communication between the states, or to the creation of such roads. The Clinton Bridge, 1 Woolw. 150, 162; s c. 8 Am. Law Reg. N. s. 149. But see 12 Op. Att.-Gen. 337. So it has been thought that it does to the case of the Atlantic telegraphs, 12 Op. Att.Gen. 337; and to telegraphs on land, Western Un. Tel. Co. v. Pacific States T. Co., 5 Nev. 102. The right to establish ferries is reserved to the states. Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black, 603; Fanning v. Gregoire, 16 How. 524; Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 27; Freeholders v. State, 4 Zabr. 718. (c) What is a regulation of commerce is a question which has arisen in determining the validity of some state laws. It has been held that a state may tax all money and exchange brokers. Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73. And legacies payable to aliens. Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490. So it may require a deposit from insurance companies incorporated in other states before they are licensed to carry on business within its limits. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (this case also decided that corporations are not citizens so far as to be entitled to the privileges of citizens of another state than that wherein they are incorporated); Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, ib. 566. The case of Crandall v. Nevada is stated ante, 429, n. 1. And Norris v. Boston, stated 439, n. (e), was reversed in the Supreme Court. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. A state may enforce a law prohibiting the sale of liquors, either domestic or imported, in less than certain large quantities, without a state license, but not affecting the sale by the importer in the original packages. License Cases, 5 How. 504. In Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 479, it did not appear that the liquor of which the sale in original packages was prohibited was not home-made (see, also, Downham v. Alexandria Council, 10 Wall. 178), or in other hands than those of the importer, and a state may tax sales of the Union. No point or question of any moment touching the construction of the powers of the government, and which of goods from abroad in the original packages, by one not the importer, for instance, one who purchased them when at sea, but whose title did not accrue until the goods were in port. Waring v. The Mayor, 8 Wall. 110. Under a uniform tax on all sales made within its limits, it may tax goods imported from other states. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123; Hinson v. Lott, ib. 148. So it has been held by state courts that taxes on the gross amount of business of express companies within the state, &c., are valid. Wolcott v. The People, 17 Mich. 68; Southern Exp. Co. v. Hood, 15 Rich. (S. C.) 66; Reading R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 284; 62 Penn. St. 286. Compare Erie R. Co. v. State, &c., infra. On the other hand, a state cannot impose a stamp duty on bills of lading for gold and silver exported from the state. Almy v. California, 24 How. 169. This case was discussed as if it had been one of exports to a foreign country, and a duty on the bill was thought to be in effect a duty on the article exported. In a subsequent case it was pointed out that the gold was only transported from one state to another, although over the high seas, and the clause prohibiting the states to tax exports and imports was thought not to apply but the case was said to be rightly decided within Crandall v. Nevada, ante, 429, n. 1; and also on the ground that the tax was in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate commerce. Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 137. On the : x1 A state cannot impose a tonnage tax to obtain means to support police regulations. Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581. The text of the note is supported by Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577; Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238. Comp. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Packet Co. v. St. latter ground a distinctive state tax on the business of carrying from state to state, in the hands of foreign corporations habitually doing business in the state, graduated by the weight of the goods and the number of passengers carried, was held void. Erie Railway Co. v. State, 2 Vroom (31 N. J.), 531; Reading R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 232. Compare Commonwealth v. Phil. & Read. R. R., 62 Penn. St. 286, &c., supra. A state cannot impose a discriminating tax on non-residents trading within its limits; but the majority of the court put this on article 4, § 2, as to privileges of citizens of each state, which, as has been seen (Paul v. Virginia, supra), does not apply to the preceding case of corporations. Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418. See 15 Wall. 300. B. The clause prohibiting the states to lay any duty on tonnage is admitted by the Supreme Court not to exonerate vessels owned by individuals and belonging to the commercial marine from being taxed by the states as property, with other property of the citizens, on a valuation of them as such. But a state tax on all steamboats and vessels plying the navigable waters of the state, levied on the basis of their registered tonnage, wholly irrespective of their value, is void, although the vessels are owned by citizens of the state, and trade only between places within the state. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall. 204. See also Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31, 35, supra. x1 Louis, 100 U. S. 423. The latter cases hold that a city may collect reasonable fees for the use of wharfage facilities which have been erected by the city, and that such fees may be proportioned to the tonnage of the vessels using such wharves. See further, Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365. * 440 has received an authoritative determination, has been intentionally omitted. There are several important constitutional questions which remain yet to be settled; but if we recur back to the judicial annals of the United States since the year 1800, we shall find that many of the most interesting discussions which had arisen, and which were of a nature to affect deeply the tranquillity of the nation, have auspiciously terminated. - The definition of direct taxes within the intendment of the Constitution; the extent of the power of Congress to regulate the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies; the power of Congress over the militia of the states; the power of exclusive legislation over districts and ceded places; the mass of implied powers incidental to the express powers of Congress, such as the power to institute and protect an incorporated bank, to lay a general and indefinite embargo, and to give to the United States, as a creditor, priority of payment, have all received elaborate discussion in the Supreme Court, and they have, to a certain extent, been ascertained and defined by judicial decisions. So, also, the extent of the constitutional prohibitions upon the states not to pass ex post facto laws; and not to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts; and not to impede or control by taxes, or grants, or any other exercise of power, the lawful authorities, or institutions, or rights and privileges depending on the Constitution and laws of the United States, has been explored and declared by a series of determinations, which have contributed, in an eminent degree, to secure and consolidate the Union, and to elevate the dignity and enlarge the influence of the national government. * The power of the President to remove all executive officers in his sound discretion has been settled, not indeed judicially, but perhaps as effectually by the declared sense of the legislature, and the uniform acquiescence and practice of the government. * 441 The absolute and uncontrollable efficacy of the treatymaking power has also been definitively established, after a struggle against it on the part of the House of Representatives, which, at one time, threatened to disturb the very foundations of the Constitution.1 1 But see 311, n. 1, as to the President's power of removal now, and as to the treaty-making power, 286, n. 1, ante. The comprehensive claims of the judicial power, as being coextensive with all cases that can arise under the Constitution and laws and treaties of the Union, have, in several instances, been powerfully and successfully vindicated. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, over the judgments aud decrees of the state courts, under certain circumstances, was defined with great accuracy and precision in the 25th section of the act of 1789, establishing the judicial courts; and the free and independent exercise of that jurisdiction, so essential to the maintenance of the authority and efficiency of the government of the United States, in criminal as well as in civil cases, has been hitherto happily sustained. The means of enforcing obedience, when not voluntarily rendered, to the decision of this appellate jurisdiction, have not been required to be practically applied; and therefore it is a question which the court has not thought it incumbent on them, as yet, to decide, whether the exercise of that jurisdiction would permit compulsory process to the state courts, with the ordinary methods of enforcing process. The act of Congress (a) provided only that, on appeal from the judgment or decree of a state court, the writ of error should have the same effect as if the judgment or decree had been rendered or passed in a circuit court, and the proceeding upon a reversal should be the same, except that the Supreme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decree, may, at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final decision of the same, and award execution. And with respect to other branches of the judicial power, it may be generally observed, that the * 442 extensive sway of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; the character of the parties necessary to give cognizance to the federal courts; the faith and credit which are to be given in each state to the records and judicial proceedings in every other state; the sovereignty of Congress over all its territories, without the bounds of any particular state; and the entire and supreme authority of all the constitutional powers of the nation, when coming in collision with any of the residuary or asserted powers of the states, - have all been declared (as we have seen in the course of these lectures) by an authority which claims our respect and obedience. In the first ten or twelve years after the institution of the national judiciary, or from 1790 to 1801, the scanty decisions of (a) September 24, 1789, sec. 25. |