enforcement by the federal court, in controversies as to contracts, or commercial obligations, or title to real property [depending upon general principles of law], of a law different from the state law, as formulated in its acts of legislation and in the judgments of its courts, is nothing else than the establishment and enforcement of a body of judge-made law with no statutory basis and without possibility of legislative amendment." 28 § 10. Jurisdiction in equity-In general. The equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is granted in the same terms as the jurisdiction at law. The judicial power is extended "to all cases, in law and equity," arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Also, the jurisdiction depending upon the character of the parties, for example, on the ground of diverse citizenship, is entirely general, and, by implication, extends to law and equity alike. Nowhere is a more extensive jurisdiction in equity than at law granted in express terms or by natural implication. Jurisdiction in both branches is granted in identical terms. It would be expected, therefore, that jurisdiction in equity would be co-extensive, but only co-extensive, with jurisdiction at law. From the beginning, however, a different doctrine has been asserted by the Supreme Court. While denying that there was a general common-law jurisdiction of the federal courts, it has always claimed and exercised an independent jurisdiction in equity. There is, therefore, a federal equity jurisdiction practically distinct from that of the state courts. The equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is, in general, the same as that possessed by the former High 28-Patterson, United States and States under the Constitution, p. 242. The doctrine that there is a general commercial law independent of the law of the states was vigorously challenged by the Pennsylvania court in Forepaugh v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 128 Pa. St. 228, and has been frequently criticized as an anomaly. Court of Chancery in England, except, of course, that it is restricted to matters of federal cognizance. The jurisdiction, however, is not confined to the very rights and remedies recognized and employed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. The principles and practice of the High Court of Chancery constitute the foundation upon which the equitable jurisprudence of the federal courts is based, but upon this basis these courts have built up and developed a distinct system of equitable doctrines suited to conditions existing in this country at the present time.29 In general the equity jurisdiction and practice of the federal courts is uniform throughout the United States, though to a limited extent variations in practice and procedure occur as a result of the regulation by the several courts of their own practice in matters not covered by acts of Congress or by rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.30 It is provided by statute that "Suits in equity shall not be sustained in any court of the United States in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law."31 This provision, in practically identical terms, was included in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and its effect has often been stated by the Supreme Court. It is deemed to be merely declaratory of the familiar rule of equity jurisdiction, and seems to have been intended mainly to emphasize the rule and to impress it upon the attention of the courts.32 The rule has a special significance in the federal courts in view of the provision of the Constitution that "In suits at common law, where 29-Robinson V. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212; Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485. See generally, as to federal equity jurisdiction, 4 Fed. St. Ann. 530534; 9 Ibid. 81-83. 30-United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 108; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425. 31-Judicial Code, § 267. 32-Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210; New York Guaranty Co. v. Memphis Water Co., 107 U. S. 205; Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347; Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314. the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." 33 For a court of equity to assume jurisdiction of cases cognizable by the common law courts would, of course, violate this provision since the parties would thus be deprived of the right of trial by jury. § 11. Independence of federal equity jurisdiction. The equity jurisdiction of the United States is, of course, entirely beyond the control of the states, and the equity powers granted by the Constitution cannot be limited or restrained by state legislation.34 However, the federal courts may enforce new rights or grant new equitable remedies or relief created by the legislation of the state in which the court sits or where the right to be enforced arose, and thus the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts may be to some extent enlarged by the legislation of the state.35 But the federal courts are not bound by the decisions of the state courts upon questions of equity law.36 In so holding, Mr. Justice Curtis said: 37 "Wherever a case in equity may arise and be determined, under the judicial power of the United States, the same principles of equity must be applied to it, and it is for the courts of the United States and for this court [the Supreme Court] in the last resort, to decide what those principles are, and to apply such of them, to each particular case, as they may find justly applicable thereto. These principles may make 33-Const. Amend VII. 34-Kirby v. Lake Shore, etc., Railroad, 120 U. S. 130; Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202. 35-Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627; United States v. Wilson, 118 U. S. 86; Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U. S. 574. 36-Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139; Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 268. A conspicuous instance of the independence of the federal courts is afforded by the well-known case of Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, in which the Supreme Court, in a case coming up from Rhode Island, repudiated the doctrine of the Rhode Island court as to the validity of spendthrift trusts. 37-Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 268. part of the law of a state, or they may have been modified by its legislation or usages, or they may never have existed in its jurisprudence. Instances of each kind may be found in the several states. But in all the states the equity law, recognized by the Constitution and by acts of Congress, and modified by the latter, is administered by the courts of the United States, and upon appeal by this court. "Such has long been the settled doctrine of this court, repeatedly and steadily affirmed in whatever form the question has been presented. In The United States v. Howland, 4 Wheat. 115, Chief Justice Marshall said: 'As the courts of the Union have a chancery jurisdiction in every state, and the judiciary act confers the same chancery powers on all and gives the same rule of decision, the jurisdiction in Massachusetts must be the same as in other states.' So Mr. Justice Story, in Boyle v. Zacharie et al., 6 Pet. 658, says: "The chancery jurisdiction given by the Constitution and laws of the United States is the same in all the states of the Union and the rules of decision are the same in all.'"' So also, in a recent (1914) case,38 in refusing to be bound by state decisions, the Supreme Court, by Van Devanter, J., said: "By the legislation of Congress and repeated decisions of this court it has long been settled that the remedies afforded and modes of proceeding pursued in the federal courts, sitting as courts of equity, are not determined by local laws or rules of decision, but by general principles, rules, and usages of equity having uniform operation in those courts wherever sitting." § 12. Criminal jurisdiction. The question as to whether the federal courts have a common law jurisdiction of crimes is in fact a part of the general question whether there is a federal common law, and in accordance 38-Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. with the doctrine that was long in theory held that there is no federal common law, it has for a long time been held, and may be regarded as settled, that there are no common law offenses against the United States, and no one can be prosecuted criminally in the federal courts except for a violation of a statute, or for the crime of treason, which is defined by the Constitution.39 Nevertheless, when Congress adopts or creates a common-law offense, without clearly defining it, the courts may generally adopt the common-law definition.40 There are numerous statutory offenses, such as counterfeiting, offenses under the postal laws, or against the revenue laws, etc.41 It may be not without interest to note that in several very early cases the federal courts assumed jurisdiction of common law offenses against the United States, and that as late as 1816 the Supreme Court regarded the question of jurisdiction of such cases as unsettled.42 § 13. International law. The federal courts as the only national courts of the United States have, of course, jurisdiction over causes involving questions of international law, which, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, "is the law of all tribunals in the society of nations, and is 39-United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677. 40-United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610; In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104. 41-See the new Penal Code of 1909. 35 Stat. L. 1080; Supp. (1909) Fed. St. Ann. 405. 42-United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415. See the earlier case United States v. Hudson (1812), 7 Cranch 32. For a statement and discussion of the earlier cases, see 1 Whart. Crim. Law, §§ 156-173. After stating several cases in which indictments at common law were |