Casey, Receiver of New Orleans Nat. Banking Association, v. Adams. what he does. The taxation was no doubt intended to destroy the use, but that, as has just been seen, Congress had the power to do. Judgment affirmed. CASEY, RECEIVER OF NEW ORLEANS NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIATION, V. ADAMS.* Jurisdiction- Local and transitory actions. The provision of the National Bank Act in relation to suits against National banks, section 5198, that "suits, actions and proceedings against any association under this title, may be had in any Circuit, District or Territorial Court of the United States, held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases," held to apply to transitory actions only, and not to such actions as are by law local in their character. IN N error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. The opinion states the the case. WAIT, C. J. The Federal question in this case is whether a National bank can be sued in a State court in a local action in any other county or city than that where the bank is located. By sec. 5198, Rev. Stats., it is provided that "suits, actions and proceedings against any association under this title [The National Banks] may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases." This, we think, relates to transitory actions only, and not to such actions as are by law local in their character. Sec. 5136 subjects the banks to suits at law or in equity as fully as natural persons, and we see nowhere in the banking act any evidence of an intention on the part of Congress to exempt banks from the ordinary rules of law affecting the locality of actions founded on local things. The distinction between local and tran *Not yet reported. Casey, Receiver of New Orleans Nat. Banking Association. v. Adams. sitory actions is as old as actions themselves, and no one has ever supposed that laws which prescribed generally where one should be sued, included such suits as were local in their character, either by statute or the common law, unless it was expressly so declared. Local actions are in the nature of suits in rem, and are to be prosecuted where the thing on which they are founded is situated. To give the act of Congress the construction now contended for would be in effect to declare that a National bank could not be sued at all in a local action where the thing about which the suit was brought was not in the judicial district of the United States within which the bank was located. Such a result could never have been contemplated by Congress. The proceeding in this case was clearly local in its nature. It related to property in the parish of La Fourche, which had been seized and sold under process from the District Court of that parish. The proceeds of the sale were in that court and could not be distributed until "a conflict of privileges" arising between creditors was settled. No personal claim was made against the bank. Nothing was wanted except to "class the privilege" of the bank on the property seized "according to its rank." Whether, under the laws of Louisiana, the form of proceeding instituted for that purpose was appropriate is not a question for us. The decision of the Supreme Court of the State as to that matter is conclusive. Judgment affirmed. The Federal courts have jurisdiction over all suits by and against National banks, irrespective of the subject-matter. Joining merely nominal or personal parties has no effect either to confer or exclude the jurisdiction; but trustees, executors and the like are not formal parties, within the meaning of the rule, where in fact interested in the litigation. Accordingly, where two or three persons, claiming a certain fund which was in the custody of a National bank, brought their bill in equity against the bank and a third claimant, and the bank exhibited its cross-bill, praying that the parties might interplead, held, to confer jurisdiction. (Circuit Court, District of Colorado.) N equity. Bill and cross-bill. Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. L. C. Rockwell and J. Q. Charles, for motion. Wagner, Dyer & Emmons and W. S. Decker, opposing. Foss v. First National Bank of Denver. MCCRARY, C. J. This controversy relates to a fund which, under a written agreement between Simeon H. Foss, Absalom V. Hunter, and Charles R. Bissell, was deposited to their joint credit with the First National Bank of Denver. The money can be drawn from the bank only upon the joint check of the said Foss, Hunter and Bissell, and a dispute having arisen between them as to their respective shares thereof, no joint check has been signed. On the eighth of January, 1879, defendant Bissell gave notice in writing to the bank that he claimed seven-twelfths of the fund, and that until his claim was adjusted he objected to the payment of any part of the fund to the other claimants. On the sixth of March following the plaintiffs in the original bill, Foss and Hunter served a written notice on the bank, claiming to own ninetwelfths of said fund, and declaring that said Bissell was entitled to three-twelfths only, and they demanded of the bank payment of eight-twelfths of the amount on deposit, leaving in the hands of the bank one-twelfth, as in dispute between them and Bissell. It also appears from an inspection of these notices, that Bissell claims four-twelfths of the fund in his own right, and three-twelfths as agent and attorney for one C. J. Reynolds, and that Foss and Hunter deny all claims on behalf of said Reynolds. The plaintiffs in the original bill, Foss and Hunter, instituted this proceeding in order to settle the controversy as to the proper division of the fund, and pray decree directing payment to them of their alleged share, to wit: eight-twelfths thereof. Defendant Bissell answers, claiming, in his own right and as representing C. J. Reynolds, to be entitled to seven-twelfths. The bank answers, among other things, that it has no interest in the fund, and is only claiming it as a depository, and does not know to which of the claimants it ought of right to render and pay the same. Of the cross-bill filed by the bank I will speak presently. The defendant Bissell moves to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The motion is urged upon the ground that all the parties are shown by the bill to be citizens of the State of Colorado, and that there is no jurisdiction under the National Bank Act, because the First National Bank of Denver appears, by the record, to be only a nominal party, without interest in the litigation. VOL. II-14 Foss v. First National Bank of Denver. 1. It may be regarded as settled that National banks may sue and be sued in the Federal courts by virtue of the provisions of section 629 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which provides as follows: "Section 629-Jurisdiction. The Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: * * * * * * * * * 'Tenth Of all suits by or against any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under any law providing for National banking associations."" U. S. R. S., § 629; First National Bank of Omaha v. County of Douglass, 3 Dill. 298; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 267; Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall. 383-395; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 77; Kennedy v. Gibson, & Wall. 498; Thomp. N. B. Cas. 17; Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738. Under a similar provision of the charter of the United States Bank of 1816, a question was made as to the power of Congress to confer jurisdiction upon a Federal court in a case not necessarily involving the construction or the validity of a law of the United States, or of some provision of the Constitution or of a treaty. This question was raised upon the second section of the third article of the Constitution, which limits the judicial power of the United States to "cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority," and it was claimed that a case against a bank of the United States was not necessarily a case arising under a law of the United States. But the Supreme Court, in the case of Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat, 738, in which an elaborate opinion was delivered by Chief Justice MARSHALL, held that the act of Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the Circuit courts in all suits by or against such banks, irrespective of the subject-matter, was constitutional. This ruling applies with full force to the construction of the above-quoted provision of the Revised Statutes. 2. It seems to be well settled that the joining in a suit of merely nominal or formal parties can have no effect, either in conferring or excluding jurisdiction. Browne v. Strode, 5 Cr. 303; Wormley v. Wormley, 8 Wheat. 421; Wood v. Davis, 18 How. |